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ABSTRACT
THE PRESIDENT AS ADMINISTRATOR:

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL BELIEFS IN
PRESIDENTIAL

DECISION MAKING
FEBRUARY 1992

DAVID ALAN SMAILES

B.A., COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

,

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Lewis

C.

Mainzer

This research seeks to discover why and how presi-

dents choose their administrative strategies.

The hypo-

thesis advanced argues the political beliefs of a president make some administrative strategies more appealing

than others.

Chapter One offers a critique of current explanations
of presidential behavior,

including the "classic" models

of the "rational decider" and "personality" models of

decision making.

A third model, that of "political

belief," is described and discussed.

The chapter

concludes by arguing this belief model can escape the

methodological problems plaguing the other "classic"

approaches to explaining behavior.
Chapters Two, Three and Four test this model by
examining the reorganizational and budget decisions of the
Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations.
viii

Chapter Two

demonstrates that Richard Nixon's belief
in the individual's power to control one's life
best explains his
decisions to decentralize government
through reorganization and revenue sharing. Chapter
Three concludes that
Jimmy Carter's belief in a progressive
agenda to democratize government best explains his decision
to reorganize government from the ''bottom-up" and
through the use of
zero base budgeting.
Chapter Four finds that Ronald Reagan's decisions to reorganize the executive
branch from
"within" and to alter the budget process are
best ex-

plained by his belief in government as an agent for
social
change, but only in specific areas of activity.

Chapter Five concludes the research by briefly
examining the Bush presidency, and concludes that Bush,
like Jimmy Carter, is a president more concerned with
"process" than "policy."

Each "classic" methodology is

demonstrated to be flawed, and the "belief" model is shown
to best explain the behavior of each president.

For that

reason, the project closes, political science under-

appreciates the role of political belief in decision
making.

ix
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CHAPTER

I

DECISION MAKING AND POLITICAL BELIEFS

The choices shaping the federal administrative
system

constitute one element of presidential decision making.

Why and how do presidents choose their administrative
strategies?

My research will test the hypothesis that the

political beliefs of a president make some administrative
strategies more appealing than others.

By examining the

effect of these beliefs on choice, 1 this research will
1 Use

of the word "choice" in the statement of my thesis is
not meant to imply an endorsement of the "bounded rationality" approach to the study of public administration, as
outlined particularly by Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior; A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1957).
Instead, the term is meant to suggest the attempts presidents must make to organize and prioritize the functions
of government.
Indeed, as Stephen Skowronek suggests, the
period of active "state building" seems to have ended and
the modern challenge to administration is the organization
of the "hapless giant" of administration and reforms to
relieve the "...plight of presidents severely constrained
in their leadership by the normal routines of the bureaucratic state." Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 285State (New York:
While Skowronek s characterization of the
92, esp. 291.
administrative apparatus as "confused" and his conclusion
that the organization of state power requires an attack on
the bureaucracy itself (presenting opportunities to "roll
'

1

seek to clarify why specific
administrative strategies are
chosen, rather than simply describe
those choices or analyze their effects. 2

back domestic bureaucratic programs
and regulatory activities
essentially the Reagan domestic agenda)
may be
1
rOVerSia1
reading ° f the -dern exe'
cutive's task seems accurate.
cutiv's
2 Clearly,
the president is not the sole
actor in the administration of government; as Marver
Bernstein points
out no single executive can perform
all administrative
functions.
Since Richard Neustadt s seminal work,
the
political context of presidential control
of administration has been more clearly defined.
However,
president does act as an "administrator-in-chief " the
accountable for the action of the whole
executive establishment, to some extent (if hardly enough
to match traditional public administration hopes), while
lacking complete control over its constituent parts.
See Marver
Bernstein, The Job of the Fedgr^l Executive,
(Washington,
D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1958), 65-68. While
Bernstein does describe the influence Congress has
over
this process, especially when friction over policy
develops between the executive and legislative
branches,
he concludes that reorganization attempts have
begun to
strengthen the president's ability to direct and control
administration (90-110). Emmette Redford and Marian
Blissett describe similar efforts by the Johnson administration in Organiz ing the Executive Branch (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 165-85; Robert Rector
and Michael Sanera make the same argument for the Reagan
administration in "The Reagan Presidency and Policy
Change, " Steering the Elephant;
How Washington Works ed.
Rector and Sanera (New York: Universe Books, 1987), 328While these efforts do not give the president ex49.
clusive political control over the administration of
government, the constitutional authority of the office and
the techniques of government reorganization can give a
president tools with which administration can be directed.
John Millett, Government and Public Administration (New
York:
McGraw -Hill Book Company, 1959), 266-71. As a
result, elections may not provide direct popular control
over the administration of government but, as Dennis Riley
concludes, election results can confirm voter satisfaction
and provide legitimacy for administrative decisions while
giving some direction to upper-level administrators, including the president. Dennis Riley, Controlling the

Lr

'

,

2

To understand more fully one of
the primary functions
of the presidency, the faithful
execution of the laws, it
is important to understand why
particular methods are
chosen for the administration of the
laws,
without thi s
appreciation, political science can not
explain some use s
of the "executive power," and this
realm of presidential
activity, with far reaching consequences
(as recent analyses of administrative reform suggest 3
), is imperfectly

understood.

4

While many studies of the Presidency seek
to understand presidential behavior and decision making,
none adequately explain what motivates a president to
select a

particular administrative strategy.

Although this thesis

offers an explanation, it should begin by separating
the
scope of its subject matter from other, more systemic

Federal Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987), 24-57 as well as the discussion of power in
footnotes 4 and 12 below.
3 Peri Arnold, Making
the Managerial Presidency (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 312-16.
4 For the impact
on one aspect of administration, see as an
example Terry Moe, "Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration," American Journal of Political
Science 26 (May 1982):
197-224.
Obviously, this should
not suggest the president exercises sole control over the
federal government; the plural sources of power in the
federal government have been noted in the literature since
the end of the Second World War (see discussion below and
footnote 12). My position is simply that the president
provides much of the direction for public administration,
as note 2 concludes, and especially where comprehensive
coordination is required, beyond the perspective fostered
normally by the bureaucratic or the congressional committee systems.
3

examinations of the presidency.

For example, the choices

of administrative strategy
discussed in these pages do
not

"..constitute metamorphoses of the
institution," as Jeffrey Tulis describes his
work in The Bh^^^.i
dene*. 5

Insteaa>

fchis

.

thes s aadresses

^

with _

in a particular institution
during a limited scope of
time, or "fluctuations" rather
than "metamorphoses." To

claim more would move this
examination beyond the bounds
of its subject matter.
Studies that focus on the presidency
and administrative power itself offer little
guidance for under-

standing why decisions are made.

More recent developments

in the investigation of decision
making offer little im-

provement in this area.

A brief examination of the tradi-

tional study of administrative power and
the presidency

suggests some reasons for this lack of understanding.
The herald of a renewed examination of the
presi-

dent's exercise in administrative power can be
dimly heard
in Woodrow Wilson's seminal article,

stration."

"The Study of Admini-

Wilson argued a new study of administrative

power was needed, particularly the relationship between
politics and administration.

In the course of his argu-

ment, Wilson claimed some hierarchical control of admini-

stration was needed to "straighten" government, and that a
5 Jeffrey

Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987), 6-9, esp. 7. Nor would
I include this study in the list he provides in the notes
therein.

"centered and responsible" leadership
would be the key to
good administration, as it is in
business. 6

Picking up this call at the turn
of the century,
Frank Goodnow argued politics and
administration were, in
fact, divisible roles for the
government to play when he
wrote "..the action of the state as
a political entity
consists either in operations necessary
to the expression
of its will, or in operations
necessary to the execution
of that will. "7 Goodnow went on
to identify
the ex-

pression of will with the legislatures and
the execution
of will with the executive and judicial
branches. 8
The

executive was to function as an arm of the
legislature,

with regard to administration, and the dichotomy
between
politics and administration would be supported by
an

independent Civil Service.

The scope of decision making

would be limited to non-political judgements, therefore,
and presidents would carry out, rather than initiate,

changes in policy.
Goodnow'

s

description could not survive the Great

Depression, however, when such academic distinctions began
to dissolve.

With that dissolution came a renewed focus

on the executive and the political role presidents play in

6 Woodrow

Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political
Science Quarterly LVI (Winter 1957): 481-506.
7 Frank Goodnow, Politics and Administration:
A Study in
Government (New York: MacMillan Company, 1900), 9.
8 Goodnow, Politics and Administration
1900, 23-46, 72,

132

.

5

:

administration.

The first work to give public
recognition
to this role was the Report
of the President's Committee
on Administrative Management in
1937.
The Committee summarized the President's tasks in
terms which seem mundane
today, but struck early readers
as nothing less than revolut ionary

Our Presidency unites at least three
important functions. From one point
of view the President is a political
leader - leader of a party, leader of
Congress, leader of a people.
From
another point of view he is head of
the Nation in the ceremonial sense of
the term, the symbol of our American
national solidarity. From still another point of view the President is
the Chief Executive and administrator
within the federal system and service.
In many types of governments these
duties are divided or only in part
combined, but in the United States
they have always been united in one
and the same person whose duty it is
to perform all of these tasks. 9

The recognition of this political and administrative role
is evident in the committee's call for the union of

efficient and responsible administration to a democracy

through an expansion of presidential authority.

The

important element in this formulation was the idea of

democratic responsibility.

y President

The committee observed the

s Committee on Administrative Management, Report of the Committee (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1937), 2.
1

6

growth of a "..headless
-fourth branch- of the
Government,
responsible to no one, and
impossible of coordination with
general politics and work of
the Government as determined
by the people through their
duly elected representatives. "10 By recommending
presidential control over that
"fourth branch," the committee's
recommendations helped
recombine (in a more overtly
political president)
that

which Goodnow had separated:

politics and administration.

The new recognition of the
president as a primary
political as well as administrative
actor led to a renewed
interest in the institution of the
presidency.
Louis
Brownlow, a member of the President's
Committee, argued in
1949 that new expectations of the president's
abilities to
shape politics had ended the
politics-administration dichotomy, a theme echoed by Paul Appleby
that same year."
By the time Harold Stein assembled his
policy reader in
1952,

the Goodnow distinction was all but
pronounced dead

and buried. 12
This renewed interest in the presidency also
sparked

renewed interest for scholars of public administration
in
executive control over the bureaucracy.

Examinations of

10 President 's Committee,
Report of the Conmdtfcee ,
esp. 32.
1:L

31-47,

Louis Brownlow, The President and the Presidency (Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1949), esp. 52-72.
Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1949), 6-15.
xz Public Admin istration
and Policy Development ed. Harold
Stein (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), xxix.
,

the executive role, such
as Chester Barnard's
tions of fche Kv^ntWn or
Phillip Selznick's Lead^hip^n

Administration described the
personal factors needed t o
coordinate bureaucratic activity,
but made few referenc es
to the elements relevant
to the decision making
process of
the individual executive. 13
Organizations are presented
as a complex synthesis of
physical, biological, personal
and social elements in a
state of mutual dependence,
while
the executive is presented
as a rather monolithic
and un-

complicated coordinator of bureaucratic
activity.
executive was recognized as being
in charge,

The

but how the

executive decides remained largely
unexplored.

A more sophisticated understanding
of the president's
role in administration emerged with
the pluralist
inter-

pretation of American politics.

with the publication of

David Truman's The Governmental Prnnp a «

a new post-World

War Two understanding of the presidency
recognized the
complexity of exercising both formal and

informal grants

of power in a system of checks and
balances and a plural-

istic political world.

The discussion in both public ad-

ministration and presidential studies began to move
from
the formal grants of constitutional power to the
politics
13 Chester Barnard,

The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1938). Phillip Selznick, Leaders hip in Administration (New York:
Harper and
Row, 1957).
I would also include in this list most traditional examinations of executive behavior, like Alfred
Marrow, Behind the Executive Mask (New York: American
Management Association, 1964).

8

of interest group liberalism
and the requisite amounts
of
Power exercised by the executive
and

legislative branches

in a system of separated
powers. 14

Debates over the
merits and dangers of a "strong"
versus "weak" president
dominated the literature,
particularly in the aftermath of
the Vietnam War and Watergate.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.-s

no^rec^ted

^

^ ^SZ^ZT"

Zl^* ^JSS*

in
MacOregor Burns, T he Bead.
Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1963).
See also the discussion in
footnote 1 above and Louis Fisher,
The
Power:
Congress and
Eacecufclve (Washington, D C
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981)
as well as President
and Congress (New York: Free Press
1972
See also
Larry Berman, Th e New American
Pr^sidgncv (BostonLittle Brown and Company, 1987), esp.
16 for his definition of "constitutional insolvency"
and the problem of
separation of power. Certainly Congress and
the president
share administrative power as they share
legislative
power, as described in Lawrence Chamberlain,
The President, Congress and Legislation (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1946); Stephen Wayne, The
Legislative
Presidency (New York: Harper and Row, 1978);
Nelson
Polsby, Congress and the P resident (Englewood
CliffsPrentice Hall, 1976); Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr.,
Congress
Against the President (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1975) and Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott,
Congress
and the Administrative State (New York: John Wiley
and
Sons, 1979), among others.
This relationship has been
given the greatest study in the area of foreign policy, as
noted by Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations
and the Foreign Policy Consensus," American Political
Science Review 52 (1978): 725; James Robinson, Congress
and Foreign Pol icy Makin g (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1976);
Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy bv
Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
Additionally, the fragmented nature of power in Congress
itself has implications for this relationship.
See, for
example, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, Congress, the
Bureauc racy and Public Policy (Homewood: Dorsey Press,
1976) and Michael Malbin, Unelected Representatives (New
York:
Basic Books, 1980).

P^UU^!S^ed

,

)

,

9

.

The imperial

Pr^irWy

,

like all the literature of
this

discussion of power, gives an account
of the importance of
administrative power to this struggle,
particularly for
shaping the federal bureaucracy,
but does little to explain the choices presidents make as
they exercise power.
Considering the role of political beliefs
in shaping strategic choices might suggest that understanding
formal and

informal grants of power can not explain
changes in the
institution of the presidency itself or its
use of presidential power.
Other, more specific accounts of particular
reorgani-

zation efforts, such as Redford and Blissert's
Organizing
the Executive or Richard Nathan's The Plot that
Failed

,

begin with a president's decision to reorganize as a
given, without considering why a particular reorganization

plan was selected.

In this sense, both Blissert and

Nathan explain what happened without explaining why, and
thus offer no method for anticipating errors of particular

choices in the future. 15

The narrow focus of these

studies provides an adequate account of the policy process

i:3

Redford and Blissert, Organizing the Executive Branch
1981.
Richard Nathan, The Plot that Failed; Nixon and
the Administrative Presidency (New York:
John Wiley and
Sons, 1975).
I would include in this list more general
works on reorganization, such as Dodd and Schott, Congress
and the Administrative State 197 9, and Stephen Hess, Organizing the Presidency (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1976).
.

,

10

.

and its consequences but an
incomplete understanding of
the first and crucial step,
presidential choice.
More recent analyses of the
presidency have begun to
integrate the considerations of public
administration and
presidential studies by examining
presidential decision
making. But even as these approaches
have gained by departing from a too mechanical presidency
as
a chief ele-

ment of political understanding, such
approaches may have
also lost an adequate sense of the
president's administrative responsibility and the role of
beliefs in shaping
that responsibility.
This study will attempt to create a more
complete

understanding of presidential choices of administrative
strategies.

As the previous summary suggests, current

political science accounts of those choices neglect or
assume without closely focusing on the reasons why par-

ticular choices are made.

This analysis will treat these

reasons as a matter of primary concern and will offer an

explanation for those decisions.

Specifically, my thesis

will assess the impact of a president's political beliefs
on presidential selection of administrative strategies
16 The only other study to detail an ideological
link
between presidents and their decisions is presented by A.
James Reichley, "The Conservative Roots of the Nixon, Ford

and Reagan Administrations," Political Science Quarterly
96 (Winter 1981-82):
537-50.
But Reichley does not consider the selection of strategy, only a conservative
approach to certain policy issues. Indeed, Reichley does
nothing to discover the importance of this ideological
orientation to the choices made in office. Some studies
11

By examining the role
of political beliefs
in shaping
presidential administrative
choices, this study will
better explain the reasons
for particular choices.
This chapter will describe
current understandings of
decision making, examining the
factors relevant to decisions and paying particular
attention
to the role of

beliefs in the decision making
process.

To understand

political beliefs more completely,
the focus of the second
half of this chapter will be
on the concept of ideology
and will offer a research design
for better understanding
the role of beliefs in decision
making.

—

Decision Making

anri

hh e Ro i fi of Po litical

Beligfg

Many political scientists argue that
decision making,
while often included in broader studies
of
bureaucracies

and their functions, is crucial to political
action.
deed,

in-

some contend "..all the other attributes of
the ad-

ministrative process [are] dependent on, interwoven
with,
have examined the ideology of bureaucrats, however,
by
comparing the responses of bureaucrats to a set of statements and then categorizing the responses on a "liberalconservative" scale. The limits and pitfalls of this type
of study will be addressed later in the chapter See,
for
example, Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs
Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration
Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review LXX (June
1976):
456-68 and, more generally, Hugh Heclo, A
Government of S trangers (Washington, D.C.
The Brookings
Institution, 1977).
:

12

and existent for the making
of decisions.. .17
Executives
are decision makers, and
while the president is not
the
sole decider in the political
system, the central role
of
the chief executive does
suggest that an examination
of
presidential decision making win
re veal important aspects
of the political process.
Administrative choices are
therefore promising units of
study when examining decision
making,
since these choices are an
important element of
the political system, and since
recent history suggests
presidents are likely to play an
increasing
role in ad-

ministrative decisions in the future,
this research
focuses on presidential selection
of administrative strategies 18
.

While the term "strategy" may seem
to suggest a
series of choices, the term "administrative

strategy" is

used in the context of this dissertation
to note single or
multiple decisions seeking to achieve some
end result.

Specifically, this study examines presidential
admini-

strative strategies concerning reorganization
of the

7 James

McCamy, "Analysis of the Process of Decision
Making," Public Administration Revi ew VII (winter
1947):
John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision
41.
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974), 7.
William Dill, "Administrative Decision Making," Concepts
and Issues in A dministrative Behavior, eds. Sidney Mailick
and Edward Van Ness (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1962), 30.
18 James MacGregor Burns,
Presidential Government (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 124-36. Herman Finer, The Presi-

dency:
Crisis and Regeneration (Chicago:
of Chicago Press, 1974), 51-55.
13

The University

executive branch and general budget
policy.
Both areas
are recognized as critical to
the exercise of presidential
power, and both areas centralize
executive power in the
president. 19 Understanding the
decisions related to reorganization and budget policy seems likely
to reveal the
important elements of decision making
and provide information on the importance of each element
to decision
making itself.
The study of decision making is
extensive, with many
studies attempting to "map out" the process
for both

individual and groups.

While group decision making is

less relevant to this thesis, even observers
of groups

argue that group decisions can best be understood
as an

accumulation of many individual decisions. 2 0

All define

decisions as choices made by individuals or groups in
pursuit of some purpose. 21

While many studies outline the

19 Ernest Griffith, The
American Presidency: The Dilemmas
of Shared Power and Divided Government (New York:
New

York University Press, 1976), 23-32. John Burke, "The
Institutional Presidency, " The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), 363.
See also
Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic
State," The Presidency and the Political System 1988,
382-89.
20 Bruno Leoni, "The Meaning of
'Political' in Political
Decisions," Political Studies 3 (October 1957): 232;
more generally, see Samuel Kirkpatrick, Dwight Davis and
Roby Robinson, "The Process of Political Decision Making
in Groups," American Behavioral Scientist 2 0 (September/October 1976): 33-64.
21 Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision 1974,
.

,
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relevant steps of decision making,
nearly all parallel the
Phases outlined by William Dill:
Agenda building (defining goals and tasks for
organizations and assigning
priorities for their completion),
Searching (looking for
alternative courses of action and for
information which
can be used to evaluate them),
Commitment (testing proposed "solutions" to choose one for
adoption), implementation (elaborating and clarifying
decisions so they
can be acted upon), and Evaluation
(testing the results of
previous choices). others have noted that
the first two
steps are the most important for providing
direction to
decisions. 22

while each step in

fche

decision process

ha£j

been examined by scholars, action by the president
tends
to occur in the earlier stages, making them
most relevant

for study in this project. 23

Although there is general agreement on the important
stages of decision making, there are diverging inter-

pretations of the range of presidential decision making.
One interpretation argues presidents play a role in deci-

22 Dill,

"Administrative Decision Making," 1962, 34.
Irwin
Bross, Design f or Decision (New York:
MacMillan Company,
1953), 19-20.
23 Theodore Sorensen, Decision Making
in the White House
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1953), 18-19;
William Colby, "The President and National Security," The
American Presidency; Principles and Problems (Washington,
D.C.:
University Press of America, 1982), 50-51 and
Daniel Snowman, "President Truman's Decision to Drop the
First Atomic Bomb," Political Studies XIV (October 1966):
3 65-73 are several examples of the general agreement on
the relevant decision making phases.
15

sion making but the range
of their options is
severely
constrained.
other words, presidents
do not really
"decide" but rather have
decisions shaped for them.
For
example, Doris Graber argues
the nature of information

m

gathering may constrain
presidential action, making the
collection of data the most
important factor for decision
making. 24 Similarly, other
studies focus on the role of

analysts or experts for
understanding how objectives are
defined and solutions found for
problems. 25 Political
limits, such as public tolerance,
the limits of time or
other resources, or even public
opinion are also fre-

quently noted as constraints on
decision making. 26
None of these studies claims that

these limits on

presidential decision making stop presidents
from taking
action when desired, however.
other words,

m

the con-

straints noted above are offered as
potential, not absolute, limits on presidential action.
For example,

information is certainly important to making
decisions,
but executives can find information gathering
to be a

source of power and not a constraint when acting
on a
O

A

Doris Graber, "Executive Decision Making," Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science "34 (1982):
75-87.
25 R andall Calvert,
"The Value of Biased Information:
A
Rational Choice Model of Political Advice," Journal of
Politics 47 (May 1985): 530-55. Arnold Meltsnew, Policy
Analysts in th e Bureaucracy (Berekley: University of
California Press), 129-39. Allan Lerner, The Politics of
Decision Making: Strategy, Cooperation and Conflict
(Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1976).
°The best discussion of these constraints can be found in
Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House 1953, 22-56.
.
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particular problem. 27

similarly>

„

experts „

give contradictory advice
and may provide
leveis
of information rather
than speaking with one
voice.28
Even political limits change
with time and are different
under different circumstances.
Thus, while scholars must
he mindful of the potential
limits on decision making
in
given situations, none of
the limits described above
can
be seen as a permanent
constraint on presidential
decision
making.

A stronger version of this
position is found in the
recognition of an "institutional
presidency," frequently
characterized by the complexity of
the executive branch
and the divestment of political
authority
to the bureau-

cracy.29

Stephen Hess, in Organizing

i-

he Pr, R i^n. y

argues the managerial role of the
president is lost in the
political complexity of the White House.
Specifically,
Hess argues the growth of the executive
office, the rising
influence of staff members and the declining
influence of
the cabinet, the tension between the
president and the

bureaucracy, and the role of assistants as
"special

pleaders" for particular interest groups all
combine to

'Graber, "Executive Decision Making," 80-86.
28 Meltsner, Policy Analysts
in the Bureaucracy 1976, 22426.
See also Louis Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 335.
29
One of the best descriptions can be found in Burke, "The
Institutional Presidency," 358-64.
.
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limit the role presidents
play in decision making. 30
Similarly, Hugh Heclo contends
the political ambiguity of
elections, the disorganization
of a complex executive
branch, the divergent loyalties
of bureaucrats and the
operating realities of a complex
nation all combine to
limit the effect any executive
can have on the political
realm, although it may not limit
the amount of public
attention given to those executives. 3 !

While the constraints noted by the
"institutional
presidency" scholars cannot be ignored,
Hess and others
have overstated their argument.
Rather than limiting all
decision making, the institutional
constraints of the

presidency can be seen as a force in most,
but not all,
presidential actions. in other words, presidential

action

is constrained in some areas, but still
significant in

others.

Hess himself acknowledges that presidents
do make

some (albeit only a few) highly significant
political

decisions which set national priorities.

Among these,

Hess writes, are reorganization and budget policy decisions. 32

Thus, while it is foolish to argue presidents

can simply pronounce judgements and have the political

system respond swiftly and effectively, it is equally
erroneous to argue presidents never make important deci-

JU Hess, Organizing the Presidency

1976,

.

esp.

9-10 and

145-47
31 Heclo, A Government of Strangers
1977, 8-14,
32 Hess, Organizing the Presidency
1976, 10-11.
.

.

.
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84-88.

sions.

Certainly, in the areas of
concern for this
research, presidential decision
making can still be seen
as an important activity.
indeed, the "institutional
presidency" position is

ultimately undermined by its proponents'
acknowledgements
of the ability of presidents
to change
their environ-

ments. 33

Most scholars view presidents as
possessing a

great deal of power in personally
organizing their office
to control the decision making
process.
Francis Rourke,
for example, argues the "government
of strangers" lamented
by Heclo can be controlled by presidential
action, and
that increasing public frustration with
bureaucracies will
lend even greater support to presidents for
reorganization. 34

while each Qf thege schQlars acknowledges

fche

political constraints of office, all contend that
presidents retain a good deal of latitude in determining
their
choices. 35

Presidents still decide, although their deci-

sions certainly exist in a political world and are often

frustrated by the limits of that world.

33 Heclo, A Government of
Strangers 1977,
Organizing the Presidency 1976, 3.
34 Francis Rourke, "Grappling
.

177-83.

Hess,

.

With the Bureaucracy,"
Politi cs and the Oval Office: Towards Presidential
Governance, ed. Arnold Meltsner (San Francisco:
Institute
for Contemporary Studies, 1981), 123-40.
Certainly the
scholars discussed in the remainder of this section would
be included in this group.
3 5 Laurence Lynn, Jr., Managing
Public Policy (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 140-41.
See also
Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House 1953, 4-6,
10-11.
,
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Presidential decision making
is therefore a significant subject for study,
and presidents do, in
fact, make
important decisions with
significant consequences.

This
discussion, however, still begs
the question of why and
how presidents make these
decisions. The political

science literature offers two
dominant models of decision
making which address this
question most directly; a third
model will then be offered for
consideration. Both models
offer more comprehensive
methodologies which take into
account politics, administration
and decision making, and
both have become the framework
for a series of studies
which have adopted these approaches.
in that sense, they
remain the "classic" explanations
of presidential behavior
in the political science discipline.

1

*

The "Rational Decider" Model

;

Richard

The first, and certainly most widely accepted,
model
of decision making is the "rational decider"
model.

Many

scholars link the development of statistical methodology
and the increased use of rationality modeling,

with the

increasing use of computer technology, the rational model
has been applied in the fields of economics, mathematics,

and psychology as well as policy studies. 36
36 Bross,

In many ways,

Design for Decision 1953, 2-3. Steinbruner, The
Cyberne tic Theory of Decision 1974, 8-9. Bross notes at
.

.
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rational modeling advocates
argue, we are all "rational
deciders," acting ...to
ximize [our] values

^^

^

constraints [we] face. "37

Given the wide acceptance
of the "rational decidermodel, a description of its
particulars is unnecessary.
However, it is useful to keep
in mind its broad outline:
the model argues agents seek
goals and pursue those goals
by rational means, so long as
what is being sought

can be

transitively ordered (in other words,
goals or preferences
can be found)
Rational behavior becomes defined
as the
choice of the goal or preference
which will maximize utility or satisfaction of the decider
by using
.

a "cost-

benefit" analysis mode of decision
making, borrowed from
economic theory. 38 The model ±g fchen
tested

^^

^

world by examining the revealed preferences
of the decider
(by observing the choices that person
makes) or by
positing preferences for the decider (by
proposing a goal
and observing if the decider acts in ways
to achieve that
goal) .39

Executives play a particularly important role in this
process, since they are often the only deciders who
have

256 that the principle of rational modeling is the basis
of all decision making.
37 Steinbruner, The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision 1974, 8.
38 W illiam Riker and Peter Ordeshook,
An Introduction to
Positive Politic al Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1973) 16-20.
39 Riker and Ordeshook, An
Introduction to Positive
Political Theory 1973, 13-14.
.

.
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perspectives which reach across an
entire organization.
Thus, executives can determine
goals and best measure
potential costs and benefits for
each decision alternative. 40 Anthony Downg has
„
applie(J
the

rational de _

cider" model to bureaucratic
agencies as well, however,
and argues that officials at all
levels engage in this
form of decision making. 4 !
Of course, not all decisions
can be freely made.

Most "rational decider" models recognize
some of the
constraints on decision making noted in
the previous
section:
time, information, the number of
issues considered, the requisite data required for
decision, and
uncertainties about alternatives .42 Even new
situations
can upset the decider, providing a new problem
and re-

quiring reconsideration of all the steps listed
above. 43
in such cases, new sciences, chiefly utilizing
computer

technology, have emerged to help deciders recalculate
costs and benefits. 44

* u Bross,

Where these technologies are not

Design for Decision 1953, 260. Riker and
Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
.

1973, 75.
41 Anthony Downs,

.

"A Theory of Bureaucracy," American
Economic Review LV (May 1965): 439-46.
42 Downs, "A Theory of Bureaucracy,"
442.
4 3john Ries, Executives
in the American Political System
(Belmont:
Dickenson Publishing Company, 1969), 89-90.
44 Herbert Simon, The Shape of Automation for Men
and
Management (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 58-76.
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available, deciders must learn
to "satisfice," finding
alternatives that are "good
enough. "45

Although the concept of
rational decision making
certainly has some validity,

the model itself avoids
the

more difficult issue of
preference formation and the
shaping of options to be
considered.
For example, it

is

easy to understand how a
computer can be programmed by
a
"rational decider" to play checkers
or chess, and why such
games could be described as
exercises in "decision
making." However, the model
does not explain why one
might prefer a game of chess
rather than checkers on a
particular day. Critics of this model
argue that the

clarification of values or preferences
simply is not addressed by the "rational decider" model
and
thus these

goals are taken as "givens."46

simply measuring thege

values may be difficult, as no single
method of assigning
value to alternatives is agreed upon by

"rational decider-

modelers, with each study speaking a very
different

language from its predecessor. 47
The result of this problem is a conceptual
dilemma
for "rational decider" models:

since one can rarely

measure or determine the values of the decider, one must

45 Herbert Simon,

The Sciences of the Artificial
(Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1981), 36.
46 Harold Lasswell, "Current
Studies of the Decision Process:
Automation Versus Creativity," Western Political
Quarterly VIII (September 1955): 389-91.
47 Bross, Design for Decision
1953, 85-98.
.
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look to the outcome of
the decision to find the
goals and
preferences underlying the
decision process. However,
by
taking this step, the modeler
creates a self-fulfilling
prophecy concerning what has
been assumed to be the
goals
and preferences in existence
from the start of the decision process. 48 Far from
rational>
preferences

^

q£

^

decision maker may lead her or
him to decide to use ..irrational" means to some desired
end, and the choice of
those
means may be determined by the
end itself, a possibility
which is incompatible with the
rational decider model,
other words, the definition of
the boundaries of .'rational., decisions, determined
by this assumption from outcomes, places other goals outside
the consideration of the
observer. 49

m

This objection can be most clearly
illustrated by
examining the first "classic" explanation
of presidential
behavior offered by presidential studies,
Richard NeuStadt s Residential Pn WPr
According to Neustadt, the
'

.

fragmentation and sharing of authority in
government
forces the president who wishes to be
successful to

develop the ability to persuade.

Unless this ability is

developed, affirmative grants of power would be meaningless words on paper.

Like the "rational decider" model,

48'Charles Anderson,

"The Place of Principles in Policy
Analysxa,-talysis," American fo±i
Political Science Review 73 (Septei
1979):
712-13.
49 Leoni, "The Meaning
of 'Political' in Political Decisions," 227-28.
(
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s

.

Neustadt takes presidential
success through legislative
and administrative action
to be the given objective
of
presidents and argues the
ability to persuade rests
on a
Presidentskill at cultivating a
s
professional reputation
for being effective and
tough, and on a measure
of public
Prestige. Both reputation and
prestige can be threatened
by the perception of failure
or frustration.
To avoid
this perception, Neustadt
believes presidents must make
careful, rational choices in
applying political
per-

suasion. 50

it is this rational calculation
of political

costs and benefits to achieve
the goal of success that
characterizes Neustadt
description of decision making as
an example of the "rational
decider" model, as well as his
more normative recommendations for
presidential behavior.
While subsequent chapters will test
Neustadt
thesis, it is important to note that
Neustadt does not
escape the problem of the rational decider
model: his
theory cannot account for the goals and
preferences of
'

individual presidents, and can only assume that
the results obtained by presidents were motivated
by the goals

he posits for them.

Later chapters will argue this is not

the case at all times, and other goals which seem
"ir-

rational" to Neustadt'

s

thesis will seem quite "rational"

when considered in light of a president's political
beliefs
50 Richard Neustadt, Presidential
Power
Wiley and Sons, 1980), 26-79.
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(New York:

John

2.

The

A second explanation for
presidential behavior can be
found in the "cognitive"
or "personality" model
of decision making. Cognitive
theorists generally argue the
"rational decider" model ignores
the most important element in the decision process:
the decision maker.
By
focusing attention on the
individual, cognitive theorists
attempt to discover what happens
in the mind;
the science
of psychology therefore becomes
the basis for understanding behavior (as economics
provided the basis for the
"rational decider" model). 51 To do
so, cognitive theory
argues behavior is linked to a mental
process which is not
open to direct, conscious experience
but must be observed. 52

Adding to the information and environmental
constraints recognized by the previous model,
personality is
a key factor for understanding decision
making, according
to this model. 53

Each dec ision reveals the personality of

the decider, and thus each administrative decision
"..re51 Steinbruner, The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision 1974,
90.
D.J. White, Decision Theory (Chicago:
Aldine
.

Publishing, 1969), 10-12.
52 Steinbruner, The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision 1974,
90-92.
53 McCamy, "Analysis of
the Process of Decision-Making,"
44-47.
.
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veals the President as a
person. "54

Thig personality

shapes the administrative
actions of the president, accounting for various presidential
"styles. "55 under-

standing the personality of the
president, therefore, is
the key to understanding how
presidents make decisions.
The "classic" study of presidential
personality,

James David Barber's President-^!
Charagter

best illu-

strates this understanding of
presidential behavior.
Although Barber does separate
"personality" and "character," his methodology proceeds from
the same arguments
presented above. Barber argues the
president's character
shapes performance by interacting with
the "rational"
side;

Barber explains this by applying two
baselines for
understanding character. The first, "active-passive,"
refers to the president's use of power;

the second,

"positive-negative," refers to the president's attitude
or

perception toward the task of being president.

Presidents

who enjoy the position they hold and utilize the powers
of

office to achieve their ends are classified as "activepositives;"

those who do not enjoy the office but util-

ize its powers are "active-negatives;"

those who enjoy

the office but rarely exercise its powers are "passive-

54 Koenig,

The Chief Executive 1964, 353.
Lynn, Managing
Public Policy 1987, 143.
55 Hess, Organizing the Presidency
1976, 3.
Koenig, The
Chief Executive
1964, 337-42.
.

,

,
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Positives;"

and those who do not enjoy
their position and
rarely use the powers of office
are "passive-negatives 56

Although Barber -b analysis
recognizes the importanc e
of ideology or "world view,
it neglects to consider
it
influence in shaping the direction
of presidential action,
instead, Barber uses the single
variable of character to
explain presidential behavior. 57
while Barber's
analysis

does move beyond the "rational
decider" model by considering why some presidents might
choose administrative
strategies which seem "irrational" (in
terms of maximizing
political power), his analysis of character
is limited in
its explanatory value.
Like the "rational decider" model,

Barber must extract his account of character
from the
behavior of the subject, reading into that
behavior the
type of character Barber wishes to perceive.
sense,

In this

the approach Barber utilizes suffers the same

affliction as that of Neustadt:

the subject matter of

both studies (policy goals, evidence of character) cannot
be examined before the behavior takes place but can only
be found as being reflected in the behavior observed,

opening both to the "bias trap" noted below. 58
In both models, the explanation for presidential

behavior fails to account successfully for the admini56 James David Barber,

Presidential Character
3rd. ed.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 8-10.
57 Barber, Presidential Character
1985, 7.
58 Heinz Eulau, Politics, Self and Society (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986) 53-56.
,
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strative choices of the executives.

Behavioral style

alone is not a satisfactory
explanatory source for behavior in an area such as politics,
as will be even more
evident in the following chapters
when beliefs are
examined. No political leader merely
drifts through
office totally unaware of the meaning
of the experience,
the opportunities it presents, or
the purposes each leader
brings to the task of governing. For
that reason, political beliefs are just as significant
for explaining the
behavior of political leaders, even those
who seem clearly
pragmatic or, to put it bluntly, opportunistic.

3.

Va lues and Preferences

To understand decision making more fully, one must

return to the start of the decision process, the selection
of preferences and goals.

This is the first step in all

decision models and is acknowledged (although then is

posited or ignored) by the "rational decider" and "personality" models. 59

All three models acknowledge that

individual presidents are the relevant unit of analysis
for those wishing to understand presidential behavior. 60

59 Lasswell,

"Current Studies of the Decision Process,"
387-89.
60 Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New
York:
Random House, 1963), 14-16.
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An examination of political
k-h
political beliefs,
however, can begin to
reconsider the preferences of
the
decider.

By defining decision making
as a question of value
allocation, some early scholars
attempted to escape the
institutional interpretations
described earlier and to
establish the central role of
political beliefs in decision making. 61 The leading
fi gure in this reconsideration
of values and beliefs is
Harold Lasswell, whose
Personality argues the predispositions
of the individual
decider are critical for understanding
decision making. 62
Lasswell argues elsewhere that
decision making is, in
fact,

"participants (with various value
perspectives)
employing base values by various
strategies interacting in
an arena to influence outcomes and
effects." The importance Lasswell places on understanding
these values is
clear in a set of questions he offers
to elicit information concerning the study of decision
making, including
the scope of the values of the participants,
the ob-

jectives sought as a result of those values,
and the

position of the participant in the social structure. 63
Although the study of decision making is thus less
formalized than the "rational decider" and "personality"

61 Eulau,

The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics.

1963,

27-

29.

Harold Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: The
Viking Press, 1948), 105-7.
63 Lasswell, "Current
Studies of the Decision Process,"
382-88.
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models, Lasswell suggests
more information concerning
decision making will be discovered
by considering these
Questions. 64 Similarly, Heinz
Eulau argues that while the
examination of beliefs may be
difficult, they play an
important role in decision making. 65

Although a more complete presentation
of this concept
will be presented later in this
chapter, a
better appre-

ciation of the role of political
beliefs in decision
making would begin to address the
limitations of the
previous models.

By understanding and clarifying
the

reasons why particular administrative
strategies are
chosen and the importance of beliefs
to that

choice, a

"belief system" model of analysis would
explain the

seemingly irrational decisions unaccounted
for by the
"rational decider" model.

The concept of a political

belief system could also help to better explain
the inter-

action between personality and environment unappreciated

by the "personality" model. 66

But -beliefs" and "ide-

ology" are often used interchangeably, and the relation-

ship between the two concepts is vague.

D4 Lasswell,

Some clarifi-

"Current Studies of the Decision Process,"
384-85.
65 Eulau, Politics, Self and Society
1986, 72-74.
6 6 Lasswell, "Current
Studies of the Decision Process,"
3 89-91.
Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1963), 112.
.
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cation of that relationship
is needed before a plan
of
study based on a "belief
system" model can be proposed. 67

B.

Ideology and

BeHpf.

*

ReaftaT .„ h n

^^

The study of ideology has
undergone a renaissance in
recent decades, gaining a place
in the language of social
science which has given it wide
circulation. The term
"ideology" finds its roots in the
French Revolution, beginning with De Tracey's attempt to
define the ideas
raised by different revolutionary
groups. 68 Most observers credit the Second World War, with
its geopolitical
conflict between "competing ideologies,"
with providing an
67 It is

possible to propose a fourth decision making
model:
incrementalism.
Indeed, incrementalism is often
offered as an alternative to the "rational decider"
model
as explained and defended by Charles Lindblom,
"The Science of 'Muddling Through'," Public Admini strati on
Review
XIX (Spring 1959): 79-88. Lindblom argues the
rational
model simply cannot handle value clarification since
disagreements on values exist, preferences fail to form
and conflicting values cannot be transitively ranked (81While Lindblom' s point is well taken, his conception
82).
of incrementalism also limits the study of values by
arguing those choices are also guided incrementally (83).
Thus, Lindblom' s model fails to account for decision
making by arguing only minor decisions will be needed.
Critics point out that while Lindblom' s analysis may be
adequate for daily administration, its focus cannot
explain the type of strategic choices under consideration
in this study.
See Yehezkel Dror, "Muddling Through Science' or Inertia?" Public Administration Review XXIV
(September 1964):
153-57.
68 Hans Barth, Truth and Ideology (Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1976), 1.
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infusion of vigor to discussions
of political beliefs.
Recent political "awakenings" of
many so-called "Third
World" nations, as well as events
in the Russian Republics
and Eastern Europe, have also
increased scholarly interest
in the concept of ideology.
Although use of the term ideology has moved away from these
discussions,
as this sec-

tion will outline, the term itself
has gained new substance and is a central part of many
political discus69
sions
All concepts of ideology make some
reference to

institutions of political action, arguing
ideology needs
the political system to give ideas reality.
Indeed, it

was this aspect of ideology (in part) which
led Mannheim
to differentiate ideology from mere Utopian
thinking. 70

Not all definitions agree that ideology is important
to

activity in that political system, however.

Understanding

the different concepts of ideology helps to explain
the

relationship between ideology and belief, and the effect
of ideas on the political system.

David Minar provides a useful typology for understanding various conceptions of ideology and the literature surrounding the use of this term.

Minar himself

argues understandings of ideology are needed to explain

69 Walter Carlsnaes,

The Concept of Ideology and Political
Analysis (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 3-11.
70 Karl Loewenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies
and
Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation," Western
Political Quarterly VI (December 1953):
689-706.
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the consensus surrounding
the political institutions
of a
given society. Minar-s own
definition, therefore, shapes
the conclusions reached at
the end of his essay.
However,
the typology he presents
for understanding the
different

definitions of ideology offered
by social science is not
bound by his own definition. 71

Minar's typology delineates two
categories of
ideological definition, with an
"intermediate" position
between the two. The first category
includes "macrodefinitions, which Minar indirectly
describes as beliefs
held by an entire political system.
particular, Minar
argues ideology as "thought distinguished
by its locus"

m

typifies these definitions:

concepts of ideology in this

category consist of social ideologies,
or those beliefs
held and shared by an entire society
72
(the "isms").

The second, or "intermediate," category
describes

ideology as "thought distinguished by its
function."
Three subsets of this category are offered,
each bridging
the "macro" theory described above (system wide
beliefs)

and the "micro" theory described below (individually
held

beliefs).

First, Minar distinguishes "personal-social

function" ideologies as those ideas used by an individual

71 David Minar, "Ideology
and Political Behavior," Midwest
Journal of Political Science V (November 1961): 318. I
describe Minar's categories in different order than his
original article, to clarify what he describes as "macro"
and "micro" conceptions of ideology.
72 Minar, "Ideology and Political
Behavior," 325-26.
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to

rational^

one

•

s

Xlf . or social role

_

^

subset i. th6 "organizational
function" ideologies Qr
ideas which connect an
organizational pattern of
activities.
The third ana final
subset is ideologies which
Perform a ..transmission
function" through persuasion
and
reorientation of thought.73
Karl Loewenstein
,

^

example, that an ideology
must be formulated in
such a
manner as to be communicable
to the mass of ..poweraddressees,
accepted by those masses and
not confined to
a social elite, and
oriented toward human values
or preferences to create an attachment
to these ideas. V 4 The
"end of ideology thesis also
draws upon this third subset
of "transmission,., arguing
substantive debates between
ideologies have ended. 75

Both categories are encompassed
in the traditional
literature on the concept of ideology.
By tying the
definition of the "intermediate"
category to that of the
"macro" category, Minar opens both
definitions to a common
critique. This critique was advanced
by Karl Marx in his
7 3 Minar,

"Ideology and Political Behavior," 322-25.
"Political Systems, Ideologies and
Institutions," 691.
"^Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the ExhaimM™
of
Political Ideas in the Fifties Ne w York: The
Free Press,
1965).
Others argue this definition of ideology restricts
the scope of debate too narrowly, thus defining
away much
of the current ideological debate.
For responses, see the
various contributors to The End of Ideology Debate
ed.
Chaim Waxman (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968) and
Kenneth Minoque, Alien Po wers: The Pure Theory of Ideology
(New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1985).
74 Loewenstein,

(

,
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s

discussion of ideology and
historical materialism, when
Marx argued ideology was
nothing more than the "false
consciousness" of a society or
class.
By definition, ideology was associated with
error and
falsehood, and there-

fore was not to be taken
seriously.

These "macro" defi-

nitions of ideology (and the
"intermediate" concepts
associated with them) were mere
devices for hiding power
behind social beliefs designed
to protect the owners of
the means of production. 7 6
The Marxist critique of the
concept of ideology led
followers of Marx to dismiss ideology
as an unimportant
phenomenon, until the evident social
power of such ideas
began to challenge this conception. An
attempt to "rescue" ideology was made by Louis
Althusser in For Marx

.

Althusser reclaimed the use of ideology as
an important
subject, while redefining ideology to be
ideas which are

evident to humans, even as those ideas remain
imaginary

with respect to true knowledge. 77

in other words,

Althusser argued a distinction could be clearly drawn

between ideology and science, with the former representing
disillusion and the latter truth. 78

7 ft For

Antonio Gramsci

'

an excellent summary of Marx's critique of ideology
and the problems associated with his argument, see Martin
Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1977).
77Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York: Vintage Books,
1970), esp. 229-36.
78 Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain,
"The Question of Ideology:
Althusser, Pecheux and Foucault," Power, Action
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discussion of ideology followed
similar lines. Like
Althusser, Gramsci argued
ideology was a part of
political
discourse, but ultimately
agreed with Marx and Althusser
that ideology was still a
class based phenomenon,
masking
the exercise of power.79
In the end>
Alfchusser

^

^

Gramsci all agreed ideologies
were not an important phenomenon for study, although
the use of ideology certainly
merited attention.
The first strong challenge
to this conception of
ideology came from Karl Mannheim
at the beginning of this
century.
Mannheim argued the Marxist
interpretation of
ideology was oversimplified in its
understanding of the
relationship between ideology and
class.
Instead, Mannheim sought to replace this
understanding with a conception of a "sociology of knowledge,
encompassing the
•'

perspective of a subject and identifiable
with the social
group from which the subject emerged (a
process he labeled
"particularization»).80

ThuS/ Mannheim loseg nQne Qf

fche

social determinism of Marx and yet suggests
ideology is
not merely a negative denial of truth.

Instead, Mann-

and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? ed.
John Law
(Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), esp. 161-63.
79 A good discussion
of the agreement on this point can be
found in Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology 1977,
as well as Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power:
Discourse
and Ideology in Modern Society (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1988), esp. 196.
pA
ou
The best summary of Mannheim on this point can be found
in William Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New
York: Atherton Press, 1967), 56-63.
,

,
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hei m .s definition
argues ideology can
be ,
force for making sociai
interchange possible. As
one
observer explained, Mannheim
offers a ne w understanding
»
-which depicts ideas as
causes of human action,
which

presents beliefs as major,
if not the only,
factors in
social integration. "81
This "sociology of knowledge"
informs most modern
uses of the term ideology.
But that use, as well
as its
Marxist roots outlined above,
has come under increasing
attack by post-modern theorists
for its inadequate understanding of power relationships.
Leading this attack is
Michel Foucault, whose writings
challenge traditional
definitions of power as located
in a particular segment
of
a society.
Foucault most directly challenges
Althusser's
(and, by implication, Marx
and Gramsci) distinction between science and ideology, arguing
power which lacks
self-conscious activity and located in
"discursive practice" has no use for ideology. 82
Foucault
position that
power is not "hidden" but, more accurately,
dispersed
throughout a web of power relationships
leads observers to
the conclusion that there is no need
to "mask" power in
the fiction of ideology, and thus the
Marxist under-

Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters
On Modernity, Post- Modernity and Intellectuals (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1987), 107.
John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philos °P h Y (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1985), 86-88.
;
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.

staging

of power is in e rror.83

Ideology , it seems>

^

^

discussion of power which
completely misses its intended
target

A methodological problem is
also raised by the
"macro" concept of ideology
which li mits its useful

appU .

cation for understanding decision
making.
Isolating and
defining an ideology is difficult
since there may be no
clear conception of an "ideal
type" for the ideology.

Karl Loewenstein observed,

As

"Even the most elementary

classification reveals that... most
modern ideologies contain elements of collateral,
complementary and even antithetical thought and belief patterns. "84
0ne recent gtudy
has attempted to apply this concept
of ideology
to bud-

geting and therefore merits closer
examination.

Steven

Koven

PnHH. a

'

s

Ideological Budget dng.

Philosophy on Public Pol cy
i

,

T he Influence of

i

argues, as this thesis does,

that ideology plays a significant role in
shaping decision

making on budget policy.

Koven's definition of ideology,

however, is rooted in this "macro" category, which
he

83 Michel Foucault,

Discipline and Punish: The Birth of
the Prison (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1977), 26;
The
History of Sexua lity. Volume 1: An Introduction (New
York:
Vintage Books, 1980), 140. See also the discussion
throughout Foucault: A Critical Reader ed. David Couzens
Hoy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), as well as Cousins
and Hussain, "The Question of Ideology," 177-79. For a
rejoinder, see Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan, Michel
Foucaul t:
Social Theory and Transgression (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982), esp. 112-14.
84 Loewenstein, "Political
Systems, Ideologies and Institutions," 695.
,
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describes as theories on how
power in a society should
be
organized. 85 G i ven this
definition, Koven goes on
to
describe ideologies of
Nationalism, Communism,
Socialism,
Capitalism, Fascism and Democracy,
each with characteristic social patterns of
thought (placing him closer
to
Mannheims definition of ideology, although

he fails to
reflect on the origins of his
use of the term). 86 Koven
defines the American ideology
as Liberalism, and goes on

to provide definitions of
"liberalism" and "conservatism"
within these broader categories.
in this sense, Koven

moves beyond most studies in this
category by taking the
"macro" definition of ideology
and associating
it to the

"micro" definition, as described
in Minar

category. 87

s

"intermediate-

However, Koven 's conclusion returns
to the

"macro" level by arguing all budgeting
is bound to a

conception of Liberalism, which finds
differing expressions on a liberal-conservative continuum.
Koven 's
definition of these categories, however,
remains "timebound," and his application of the
liberal-conservative

categories cannot escape some of the methodological

problems described later in this section. 88

85stephen Koven, Ideological Budgeting; The Influence of
Political Philo sophy on Public Policy (New York: Praeger
1988),

22-25.

86 Koven,

Ideological Budgeting 1988, 29-51.
Ideological Budgeting 1988, 55-83.
88 Koven, Ideological Budgeting
1988, 167-68.
See also
discussion below on the "bias trap" of such categories.
.

87 Koven,

.

.
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The final category in
Minar. s typology describes
the
"micro" theories of ideology,
or those defining individually held beliefs.
"Micro" theories may not
stand
separately from discussions
of "macro" theory, however,
and therefore ulnar's
categories do not provide safe
definitions of ideology. Minar
describes these as
"thought distinguished by
content or structure" and
includes two subsets in his
discussion of this category.
The first subset, theories
of "content," includes a
personal attachment to some values,
particularly as that
idea relates to the immediate
concern (or "life space"
of the individual.
Minar points out, however, that
these
beliefs are shaped by outside forces.
Thus,
)

the "microlevel concept of "content" is
often (if not always) connected to the "macro" concept of
"thought distinguished by
its locus." This "content" definition
is thus open to the
same critique as the "macro" concept,
with the associated

methodological problems as well.
For example, this "content" definition
is the most

commonly utilized conception of ideology in
American
political science, according to Minar, since it
includes
the liberal-conservative dichotomy used in voter

studies. 89

Everett C. Ladd's study of the American polity

is a good example of the link between this definition
of

89 For an example of
this concept of ideology in use,

see

Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald
Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960).
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ideology and the ".acre"
theories noted above.
Although
Ladd defines ideology as
an individually held
belief, he
argues ideology becomes
significant only when it is
a part
of a larger, coherent view
of the world. 90
This
con-

nection exposes Ladd-s definition
to the same theoretical
and methodological objections
noted earlier.
The second subset of this
category is "internal
structures of thought," or beliefs
individually created
and maintained by stable,
interconnected systems of
thought.
This subset should be considered
separately from
the other categories for two
reasons.
First, the subset
does not rely on the "macro"
definition of ideology for
its substance, thus avoiding the
theoretical grounds for
criticism already advanced above. since
this definition
does not seek to define ideology as
a system of thought
(necessarily) shared by a society, it
considers beliefs
from a different perspective which need
not provide "true"

readings of power.

in other words, these beliefs may be

wrong, but that error does not invalidate
their importance
or usefulness in understanding behavior (while
the Marxist

and Foucaultian critiques of "macro" definitions
argue
these concepts either mask or miss true power rela-

tionships

)

.

* u Everett

C. Ladd, The American Polity (New York:
w.w.
Norton, 1987), 58.
See also Philip Converse, "The Nature
of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 206-61.
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Second, the methodology
employed by this subset can
escape the most difficult
methodological problem facing
the previously described
categories: how can ideological

individuals hope to study the
phenomenon of ideology without imposing their own
ideological beliefs? Karl
Mannheim
observed this problem from a
different perspective in Ideoloav and Utop ia.
What we are concerned with
here is the
elemental perplexity of our time,
which can be epitomized in the
symptomatic question "How is it
possible
for man to continue to think
and live
in a time when the problems
of ideology and Utopia are being radically
raised and thought through in all
their implications?" 91

Mannheim argued individuals living in
an "ideological agewill find it difficult (if not impossible)
to think
clearly about ideology.

Yet, the concept of ideology is

most relevant to social scientists during
such ideological
ages, as the previous discussion suggested.

This paradox

troubles Mannheim, and was only resolved by
redefining

ideology as a "sociology of knowledge."

At the same time,

Mannheim cannot avoid the charge that such an understanding obscures the power relationships of a society. 92

Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; An Introduction to
the Sociology o f Knowledge (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1936), 28.
for a discussion on this point, see Connolly, Political
Science and Ideology 1967, 76-79.
.
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Mannheim's paradox is stin
a problem for any attempt
to understand ideology and
beliefs, however, and finds
it s
way into the sooial soientifio
application of ideology
described by Miner. The paradox
ensnares those who attempt to test the existence of
ideology through
the appli-

cation of these definitions in the
political world. Some
refer to this problem as a •bias
trap,- Minar describes
the problem by arguing
...ideology becomes response to an
item or set of items selected by
the
researcher, who must assume that his
instrument probes to a basic layer of
disposition significantly related to
political choice. .even with sophistication, the indicators of ideology
are evoked responses to artificial
stimuli 93
.

.

In other words, the researcher necessarily
shapes the

results of the research by defining and applying
arti-

ficially created categories of belief, no matter how

carefully those categories are defined or how precisely
they are measured.

How does one escape this "bias trap?"

One method is

suggested by William Connolly in The Terms of Political
Discourse, when he argues observers must take into account
the existence of "essentially contested concepts."

Con-

nolly argues that scientific application of definitions, a

93 Minar,

"Ideology and Political Behavior," 329.
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methodology borrowed from
the natural sciences,
fails to
explain beliefs which carry
i mp i icitly held
values
the concept
_

••is appraisive in that
the state of
affairs it describes is a
valued
achievement, when the practice
described is internally
in fcha
its characterization
involves reference to several dimensions,

^

and when
agreed and contested rules
of application are relatively open,
enabling
parties to interpret even those
shared
rules differently as new and
unforeseen situations arise, then
the concept in question is an
"essentially
contested concept." 94

Connolly observes that politics
itself is the "ambiguous
and relatively open-ended interaction
of persons and
groups who share a range of concepts,
but share them imperfectly and incompletely." Attempts
to apply

categories

to beliefs, therefore,

fail to understand politics and

produce "serious misreadings" of these
concepts. 95
If Connolly is indeed correct, one
must turn to some-

thing other than the broad categories of
"macro" understandings of ideology to understand beliefs,
since those

categories necessarily generalize about these "essentially

contested concepts."

Indeed, this side of ideology is

lost in works utilizing these categories on the "macro,"
94 William Connolly,

The Terms of Political Discourse
(Lexington:
D.C. Heath, 1974), 10.
95 Connolly, The Terms of Political
Discourse 1974, 6.
.
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"intermediate" and "content"
levels because the researcher
must impose an artificially
created category to produce
the generalized responses
from the observed political
subjects,
only the final subset offers
a chance to observe
these contested concepts as the
individual understands
them.
This, for example, is the
error made by Koven in
his study of budgets and ideology:
Koven can only measure
the beliefs which fit within
his defined category of
Liberalism and, more importantly, the
liberal-conservative
continuum. Thus, Koven must assume,
all liberals believe
the same things, as do all
conservatives, if one can even
begin to explain what those categories
mean.
As a result,

Koven is either forced to place all
presidents and other
political agents under a single category
("Liberals"),

thus failing to distinguish between such
diverse presi-

dents as Ronald Reagan and Franklin Roosevelt,
or to group

presidents into categories which ignore contested
concepts
within the bounds artificially created by Koven,
thus

failing to distinguish the "liberal" beliefs of
Jimmy

Carter from those of Lyndon Johnson (again, assuming these
categories can even be defined)

.

As Minar describes

above, the result is an artificial response to some arti-

ficial stimulus which may bear no relation to the actual

beliefs of the individual.
The problem for students of ideology, then, is to

find a technique for studying ideology which accounts for
these "essentially contested concepts" but escapes the
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"bias trap."

One

i mportant

first step might be a more

careful reflection on terminology.

The WO rd "ideology.. is

normally associated with a
set of beliefs held by
a society or segment of a society;
all the definitions noted
above are in agreement on this
point.
"Beliefs,

on the

other hand, are usually
associated with individuals and
are seen as preceding the
formation
of ideology. 96

As

John Plamenatz explains
What makes beliefs ideological
.. is
their constituting a system of
beliefs
which is functional in these ways
[holding together groups and justifying their attitudes and characteristics]
and is therefore accepted
regardless of whether or not its constituent beliefs satisfy the criteria
of truth
The set of beliefs need
not, and usually is not, a theory. 97
,

Thus, the important unit for analysis when
attempting to

avoid the "bias trap" (as well as the objections
raised
against the "macro" definitions of ideology)
is political
beliefs, as defined separately from "ideology."

Although

the terms are often used as if they were interchangeable,
the theoretical and methodological questions raised
by

each suggest one must take great caution in their use.
Eulau, Politics, Self and Society 1986, 50-51.
See
also James Borhek and Richard Curtis, A Sociology of
Belief (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975), 3-8. To observe
this definition in use, see Louis J. Halle, The Ideological Imagination (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).
97 John Plamenatz, Ideology
(New York:
Praeger, 1970), 31.
.
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The theoretical debate
around the true nature of
power
relationships, and the
methodological problem of the
"bias
trap" are raised by "ideology"
but avoided by "beliefs."
This is more evident when
one considers the use of
this final category, "internal
structures of thought," or
political beliefs. Robert Lane
put this concept into
practice in much of his research
by arguing the political
behavior of an individual comes from
within and is associated with belief:
"if one knows what ideas will
be useful to a man in his time and
situation, with his goals and
needs, one knows how he will
select from among the available alternatives, and in what
direction he will strain
them. "98 By discovering thege ideag/

^

argueg/ a

researcher can better understand the
structure of the
beliefs held by the subject under observation.
This step alone will not escape the "bias
trap," however,

since the researcher can still impose a
given set of

categories on these beliefs.

As Lane points out, two

techniques can be used to uncover beliefs:

An outsider cannot see another person's values the way he can see his
behavior, but he can find out about
them in two ways. One is to observe
that person's choice of goals, to see
what they have in common ... Or one can
ask that person to reflect on his own
behavior and thought, so that he can
say for himself what is worthwhile,
98 Robert Lane,

Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chi
cago: Markham Publishing, 1969), 2.
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what is a value. There
is scarcely
any other way to find
out. 99

interestingly, the first option
suggested by Lane moves to
the "micro" level described
in the last category, but
may
still be vulnerable to the
"bias trap" since that observation can be shaped by only the
goals for which the
researcher is watching (or, to
paraphrase Felix Frankfurter, where one goes in determines
where one comes
out). 100 ThiS/ as x argue n
fche prev ous sect on
will demonstrate in this research,
is the trap which
ensnares the "classic" descriptions
of presidential
behavior offered by Neustadt and Barber.
.

.

.

^

The second option proposed by Lane
offers greater
promise to the researcher seeking to avoid
the "bias

trap,

"

since the information given to the observer
comes

from the subject.

Although this technique certainly

creates more vaguely defined categories of
beliefs (or no

category at all, theoretically) it does promise
to avoid
9 9 Lane

Political Thinki ng and ConsciousnssR 1969, 19.
'
10 °A useful illustration
of this danger can be found in
.

the discussion in William Bluhm, Ideology and
Attitudes
(Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1974), esp. 8-10.
Bluhm argues categories may not exist for the elements of
an ideology which is very important to the subject of the
study.
These categories, like the "liberal-conservative"
dichotomy noted earlier, come with their own sets of
defining political ideas, and thus may either misrepresent
or omit other relevant political beliefs. Other examples
of this conception in practice can be found in Jerrold
Schneider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1979) and Gerald Hikel, Beyond the Polls
(Lexington:
D.C. Heath, 1973).
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the artificially created
observations of the other concepts of ideology. Milton
Rokeach offers one technique
for discovering such beliefs
by carefully uncovering the
"belief system" of the subject,
defining such systems as
"...all the beliefs, sets, expectancies,
or hypotheses,
conscious and unconscious, that a
person at a given time
accepts as true of the world he
lives in. "101 Rok each
contends individual beliefs can only
be linked to behavio
through this discovery, although this
aspect of belief is

generally ignored or presumed. 102
How can one be sure a "belief system"
has been uncovered and understood? The methodology
described here
does have the difficulty of creating single

categories of

political beliefs.

Rokeach resolves this problem within

the context of his discussion by observing
that "belief

systems" are based upon a set of "primitive
beliefs" that

can be uncovered by observation.

These "primitive be-

liefs" are characterized by their repetition and
the

importance assigned to them by the individual 103
.

M inar

anticipates the nature of this methodology and its limits
his explanation merits lengthy quotation (keeping in mind
the use of "ideology" he employs here has been redefined
as "beliefs"

)

:

1U -'-Mil ton Rokeach, The Open and
Closed Mind (New York:
Basic Books, 1960) 33.
l° 2 Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind
1960, 18-19.
l° 3 Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind
1960, 40-42.
,

.
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.

Another approach to the
study of ideology that may possibly
yield some of
the relevance of the macro
approach
and some of the rigor of
the micro,
proceeds from the study of
policy
backward through behavior to
the ideational antecedents. This
appears to
be the least cultivated
approach to
the subject.... as people
engage in
policy making process, therefore, the
they
are engaging the ideology,
if any,
which actually preconditions
political
action.
responses to the policy
process, it should be possible
to detect ideology that can be defined
in
specific operational terms and
that
actually represents beliefs that
really will be acted upon in the
presence of political stimuli.
it may be
doubted that ideology is real, or,
if
real, is very important, unless
it can
be shown to make a difference where
action is involved. .The problem of
establishing linkage is a difficult
one, but in any case the student
of
the effect of ideology on political
behavior must probably be content with
demonstrating relationships rather
than causes 104

m

.

This project proposes to utilize this concept
of "belief
systems" to better understand the role of political

beliefs in decision making.

By examining the admini-

strative system control decisions of presidents, this

study will test the three models of presidential behavior
"rational decider," "personality" and "belief systems."

The following three chapters will present accounts of

presidential decisions, will examine and evaluate the
104 Minar,

"Ideology and Political Behavior," 329-30.
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three models using
counterfactual arguments, and
win
conclude that the ..belief
systems" model provides the
best
explanation for the decisions
under consideration. To
maintain a reasonably consistent
data base, the decision
of each president concerning
administrative reorganization
and budget policy will be
examined. As noted earlier
in
this chapter, a consensus exists
among presidential
scholars that these areas are
productive subjects for
understanding decision making since
the president has
relatively greater control over the
decisions, thus providing the clearest examples of
presidential decision
making.

Chapter Two will therefore present an
account of
Richard Nixon's major administrative
choices in

these

areas;

Chapter Three will examine Jimmy Carter's
choices;
Chapter Four considers the choices made
by Ronald
Reagan.

These particular presidents will be examined
for several
reasons:

first,

they offer divergent views on the role of

government and its relationship to its citizens
(and thus

disagreement on at least one dimension of political
belief);

second, they view the goals of administration

differently, each offering a comprehensive plan of reform
in the course of his term;

finally, they provide the most

sensible cases for comparison since all shared the political environment of an expanded "administrative state"

which has prevailed since the Great Society programs of
the Johnson administration (although their differences on
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the first and second points
reflect their different understandings of that environment).

Each chapter will examine the
administrative choices
of these presidents by
chronologically presenting the
major turning points in reorganization
and budget policy
under each and will utilize a
historical approach to
describe those choices. Explanations
or justifications
for administrative actions will
be found by examining the
primary source material available
for each president 105
By using a chronological approach,
these three chapters
will provide a neutral structure for
a discussion of
political beliefs. Each chapter will
present the choices
.

of the presidents as a series of
conundrums for the

discipline's current explanations for behavior.

in other

words, each example will illustrate why the
discipline

fails to account adequately for the choices
made by each
5 Studies

of earlier presidents have had the advantage
of full, well-organized archival material.
The study of
these three presidents has the advantage of contemporary
participants and their operating in the modern administrative state, although some of the material related
to
these activities remains classified or unorganized. The
Nixon papers are currently available for research use in
Washington, D.C. and include separate material on the
reorganization plans, materials related to domestic policy
and some of Nixon's personal papers. The Carter library
is now open in Georgia and provides some information on
Carter's reorganization and budget policies (although the
files for the President's Reorganization Project have not
"

yet been organized)
The Reagan and Bush presidential
materials are, to this date, rather unavailable (although
the Reagan library has recently opened), and a greater use
of secondary sources in those chapters concerning these
presidents is necessary.
.
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president.

Each chapter will then
offer the "belief
systems" model as an
explanation for these conundrums:
the historical record will
be searched to find reflections
on the role of the bureaucracy
and the duties of
the

administrative state, as well as
expressions of core or
"primitive" beliefs which can be
used to assemble each

presidents "belief system."

By reconsidering these

choices, Chapters Two through
Four will demonstrate the
role beliefs play in determining
the choice of a particular strategy in a manner currently
unappreciated by the
political science literature.

Chapter Five will conclude by describing
how these
beliefs can be used to examine other
presidents,
and a

brief examination of George Bush will
be offered.

Finally, the importance of this new
understanding of the role
of political beliefs will be described
in reference to the

analysis presented in this chapter.

Through this exploration, the role of political
beliefs in the selection of administrative strategy
will
be tested and the importance of belief systems
to under-

standing presidential behavior will be explored.
so,

By doing

the analysis will also suggest some of the broader

ramifications of beliefs as a force for shaping political
action.
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CHAPTER II
GOALS AND BELIEFS

:

THE NIXON PRESIDENCY

Richard Nixon has often been
described (and sometimes
praised) as the "foreign policy"
president;

analyses of
his administration have often
ignored his domestic policy
efforts. 1 one recent biographer
has claimed that many
Americans can recall nothing about the
domestic agenda of
the Nixon administration, except
perhaps the events

surrounding the Watergate affair. 2

while foreign policy

was certainly the preoccupation of Nixon's
first years in
office, due largely to the Vietnam War and
the initiatives
to open relations with China, Nixon
recognized that

domestic policy was important to a successful
presidency,
if for no other reason than its implications
for con-

ducting foreign policy. 3

While an accurate description of

the Nixon administration must therefore begin by noting
1 Paul

Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore:
Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1983), 47.
2 Tom Wicker,
One of Us (New York: Random House, 1991),
xiii-xiv.
3 Herbert
Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 531.
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the importance of foreign
policy, one should not
leap to
the conclusion that domestic
policy was unimportant to
Nixon.
Domestic concerns occupied
a good deal more time
than many observers realize.
4
Nixon was keenly interested
in domestic policy, and
his activity in the areas
of

executive reorganization and
revenue sharing reflect that
interest. 5 Both goals were mutually
supportive, and

separating the discussion of one
subject from the other is
rather difficult: without
reorganization, revenue sharing

would fail to achieve the goal of
decentralized government;
without revenue sharing, reorganization
would lack
a guiding rationale.
Nixon considered reorganization

and

revenue sharing a "package," and he
pursued both with
vigor, albeit with alternating degrees
of effort, during
his administration. 6 Both reorganization
and revenue
sharing are best understood as elements in
a belief system, held by Nixon,

that emphasized individual initiative

under a limited government, a government close
to the

people and, at the same time, ready to exercise
federal
power.

Understanding the relationship between the two

policy goals and the role of political beliefs for shaping
both is essential for explaining Nixon's behavior.
4 To

This

this point and echoing Parmet, see Wicker, One of Us

1991,

414,

.

539.

5 John

Ehrlichman, Witness to Power (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1982), 207-8.
6 Ronald Moe,
"Traditional Organizational Principles and
the Managerial Presidency:
From Phoenix to Ashes," Public
Administration Review 50 (January/February 1991): 130-31.
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section wil! examine both
goals separately, and then
consider them as one when
evaluating the models of
presidential behavior offered in
Chapter
One.

"Centralized"

D^^, aUzaHnn

,

Pq _, anizatinn

The reorganization of the
executive branch was the
first major domestic policy
initiative of the Nixon administration. Nixon seemed to have
high hopes for his
Cabinet when he first took office,
claiming he had
appointed "independent thinkers" to
advise him. 7 Nixon
Planned to keep the number of formal
Cabinet meetings to a
minimum, but planned to have members
act independently

within the range of control he established.

in a sense,

Nixon's plan for his Cabinet seemed almost
contradictory,
even as he described it in his later
memoirs:
I felt that the better each
Cabinet
member performed his job, the less
time I should have to spend discussing
it with him except for major questions
of politics or policy
I had also
seen the hazards of appointing Cabinet
members who were too strong willed to
act as part of a team.
I wanted
people who would fight for what they

7 Richard

Nathan, The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the
Administrative P residency (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc.,
1975), 37-8.
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8

9

thought was right but
would support my
decision once it was made.

Nearly all observers of the
administration agree Nixon
became dissatisfied with his
Cabinet rather sickly, as
he
increasingly felt his new appointees
had failed
to control

their respective bureaucracies
and were presiding over departments which were undermining
administration policy.
However, this feeling did not
mean Nixon had misrepresented his plans for the Cabinet.
He was apparently
quite serious in his intent to
utilize his Cabinet,
devoting a great deal of time during
his transition period
to the selection of department
secretaries 10 Had he
appointed his Cabinet, planning all the
while to ignore
their advice, it would seem unlikely
that Nixon would have
spent so much time and have taken so
much care in their
selection. a better explanation might be
found in some of
the changing circumstances of the administration
which led
.

Nixon to reconsider his initial Cabinet plan
for
reorganization.
At the same time Nixon made plans for his new

Cabinet, the president announced a clear intention
to

8 Richard

Nixon, RN:
The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New
York:
Simon and Schuster, 1990), 338.
9 For examples,
see Herbert Klein, Making It Perfectly
clear (Garden City: Doubleday and Company. 1980), 300;
Ehrlichman, Witness to Power 1982, 110-11; Nathan, The
Plot That Failed 1975, 39-49.
1 o
Carl Brauer, Presidential Transitions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 143-47.
.

.
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decentralize his administration,
on both the federal-state
level and within each
department.
On March 27, 1969,
Nixon directed his newly
appointed Cabinet secretaries
to
begin a program of decentralization
within their departments, placing decision
making as close as possible
to
those who deliver the services
of government
to the

people.

Nixon did not intend to surrender
complete
control over administration to
these deliverers, since
decentralization required some
centralized body to issue
guidelines and perform review
functions, as well
as

guarantee that qualified field
officers exist. But Nixon
was proposing a more far reaching
decentralization of
decision making functions than any
modern president had
ventured to date. 11 ay
Bv dpnPTihran,^^
decentralizing
the government,

Nixon was attempting to increase the
political power of
the state and local governments to
control domestic
policy. 12

The Cabinet secretaries, an able and
inde-

pendent lot according to Nixon, would be
given de-

centralized power within the federal executive,
and would
in turn initiate the decentralization of
their own

departments. *3

Those cabinet officers would thus perform

1:L

Dwight Ink and Alan Dean, "A Concept of Decentrali" Public Administration Review
30 (January/February 1970): 60-61.
12 David Porter and
Eugene Olsen, "Some Critical Issues in
Government Centralization and Decentralization," Public
Administration Review 36 (January/February, 1976): 76.
13 William Safire,
Before the Fall (New York: Ballantine
zation,

Books,

1977),

136.
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a dual function:

as department administrators,
they would

perform regulatory and review
functions (making independence and competence key); as
political appointees,
they would oversee the decentralization
of their own

departments.

As George Shultz, then serving as
Director

of OMB, explained in testimony on
June 2,

1971

s

A primary objective of the President's
Departmental Reorganization Program is
to decentralize the authority and
related resources to carry out Federal
programs. Matched with this, his
Revenue Sharing proposals have the
objective of returning resources and
the control of them directly to state

and local governments. Thus, both
forms of decentralization are designed
to bring government closer to the
people. The reorganization does it by
shifting control within the federal
structure down to the level where the
problems exist and where Federal officials can work more meaningfully
with State, local and private concerns.
Revenue sharing does it by
shifting a greater measure of discretion and control from the Federal
level to State and local authorities. 14

As one of the first acts of his administration, Nixon

ordered a study of administrative reorganization by a
President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(PACEO) on April 5,

196 9.

PACEO

'

s

mandate was "To review

14 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, Reorganization of the Executive
Departments, Part One (Washington, D.C.
United States
Government Printing Office, 1971), 160.
:
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organization of Executive
Branch and its links with
state
and local governments "15
Nixon named a£}
Qf
Council Roy Ash, the President
of Litton Industries.
Nixon had a good deal of
confidence in Ash's skills
as an
industrial management reformer,
knowing (and apparently
caring) very little about
Ash's politics." The number
of
Ash council members was
deliberately kept low

^

.

^

to facili-

tate speedy action;

in addition to Ash, George
Baker

(dean of the Harvard School
of Business), John Connolly
(at that time a partner in
a prominent Houston Law
firm),
Frederick Kappel (chair of the ATT
Executive Committee)

and Richard Paget

(a

partner in the management consulting

firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget)
all served on the
Council.
to further speed the Council's
work, a series of
memoranda (rather than a single final
report) were issued
to the president as the work was
completed.

m

15 "To:

fact,

the

PACEO Briefing Book Recipients," March
White House Special Files, John D. Ehrlichman, 6, 1970
box 32
Nixon Library, 64-11.
16 Rowland Evans
and Robert Novak, Nixon in the White
House:
The Frustration of Power (New York: Random
House,
1371), 237.
in fact, Roy Ash explained in an oral
interview that the call came from out of the blue,
and
that he had only briefly met Nixon, laughing
as he
explained "..I volunteered for something I wasn't
sure
what I was volunteering for!" Ash claimed he
had only a
five minute interview with Nixon before being offered
the
position.
See "Oral Interview with Roy Ash, January 13,
1988," Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, Nixon Library.
If Nixon was concerned about the outcome of the
Council's
study, or wished to direct that outcome toward an
administrative "coup," one must conclude his method of
selecting Ash was foolhardy at best.
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Council planned to work so
quickly that they intended to
be "out of business by December,
1970. "17

Perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of the Ash Council
was the amount of time Nixon
devoted to reorganization
discussions: Nixon gave the Council
a good deal of access
and attention, although he was
personally bored by the
details of reorganization planning. 18
The Council worked
for eight months, interviewing
past and present officials
in the Executive Office of the
President and the executive
branch, outside experts on administrative
organizations
and industrial managers, and by
reviewing past reorganization studies. 19 At its peak, the
Council employed some
47 staff members20 and after facing
some immediate start _
,

up problems, had prepared a number of
reports for the

president by mid-1970. 21
The Council's reports to the president
reflected the

perception of many executive branch observers that
there

17 "To:

PACEO Briefing Book Recipients," 64-12. in fact,
the Council continued to work until mid- 1971, although
it
did product the first reorganization plan in mid-1970
as
promised.
See memorandum from Water Thayer to Ron
Zeigler, "Summation of PACEO Council Agenda," September
10, 1969, White House Central Files, Staff Member and
Office Files, PACEO, Box 6, Nixon Library.
io
p eri Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 277, 280Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House 1971, 238.
82;
i9 "Reorganization Plan of 1970,"
Public Administration
Review 30 (November/December 1970):
617.
20 Roy Ash (testimony June
2, 1971), "Reorganization of
Executive Departments," 167.
2 lArnold, Making the
Managerial Presidency 1986, 278-79.
.

.
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existed a greater need for
coherence and organization in
domestic policy planning.22
In a CQver
accompanying its first set of
reorganization proposals,
the Council noted that
reorganization of the Executive
Office was a necessary first step
before any other reforms
could be contemplated, explaining
"it is a question of
putting the horse before the cart.
The organization of
the Executive Office is crucial
to the effectiveness of
the other changes we will propose. "23
The Ash Council
proposed in its first set of reorganization
plans the
formation of a Domestic Council, resembling
the National
Security Council, to aid the President
in the formulation
of domestic policy.
The Council would include the president, Vice President, Attorney General,
and the

^

^

Secre-

taries of Treasury, Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce,
Labor, HEW, HUD and Transportation.

The Ash Council also

recommended the restructuring and renaming of the
Bureau
of the Budget into a new Office of Management
and

Budget. 24

22 William Carey,

"Presidential Staffing in the Sixties and
Seventies," Public Administration Review XXIX
(September/October 1969): 457-58 broadly reflects this
perception even before the Ash Council began its most
serious work.
23 "Memoranda for the President,"
July 19, 1969, White
House Central File, Staff Member and Office Files,
President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(PACEO), Box 1, Nixon Library.
24 Cabinets and Counselors:
The President and the
Executive Branch (Washington, D.C.
Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1989), 40.
:
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Notes taken during one of the
Ash Council's early
meetings with Nixon and his
immediate White House staff
indicate Nixon gave the new
reorganization plan high
priority, recognizing the need
to move quickly if the
Council's recommendations were to
be adopted. 25 These
notes, taken at the August 20,
1969 meeting at San
Clemente, captured the President's
reactions to the first
set of Ash Council recommendations.

in addition to the

Council members, the President, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman,
Kissinger and Flanigan were all in
attendance. Nixon
seemed most concerned about the need to
make change
possible, even when the White House has a
vested interest
in keeping what had been created in
previous administrations.

He seemed particularly concerned that
members

of the Cabinet would become captive and
would be unable to

evaluate their department's programs. 26

At the same time,

25 "Memorandum for the
President," Reports and Papers,
Council Meeting August 20, 1969. File [6-1], White House
Central Files, PACEO, Nixon Library. The notes referred
to in the following paragraph were written onto the
document by an unnamed person.
Since the notes appear on
the PACEO copy and that copy was retained for PACEO s
official file of the meeting, I am assuming the notes are
'

accurate. A cover letter accompanying those notes and
authored by Andrew Rouse, the Deputy Executive Director at
PACEO, summarizes these handwritten notes and uses them to
create a set of recommendations for revisions. It is
therefore clear Rouse considers them accurate and
authoritative representations of the President's wishes.
Although it is somewhat difficult to tell, the handwriting
does appear to be that of Rouse, who is also listed as
being present at the meeting.
26 "Memorandum for the President," handwritten
notes on
front and reverse of page five.
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the Report clearly delineated
the dangers of allowing
the
staff to control too much,
arguing "A President whose
office lacks these [well-organized
systems of information]
will necessarily be less
inclined toward delegation and,
will try by default, to retain
in his control operating
responsibilities he cannot possibly
handle." On that same
page, handwritten notes indicate
Nixon recognized the need
for such an information system. 27

While reorganization was later
perceived as a method
for replacing Nixon's discredited
(in
his view) Cabinet,

one would be mistaken to assume
reorganization was merely
a method for avoiding recalcitrant
Cabinet secretaries.
Had Nixon's original intentions for
his Cabinet come to
fruition, it is clear the Ash Council's
recommendations
for coordinating the White House would
still be considered

necessary.

m

the course of the August 20 meeting, Nixon

also made it clear that the proposal would have
to be
"sold" to the Cabinet, suggesting the president
recognized

the importance of keeping the Cabinet together
through the

transition.

At the same time, according to handwritten

notes of the meeting, Nixon insisted on keeping the report
"where it is

-

if this report gets beyond this room, we're

in trouble." 28

The central concern for the reorganization

was the patchwork system of exercising executive power in

domestic affairs:

Nixon sought to coordinate all domestic

27 "Memorandum for the President,"
28 "Memorandum for the President,"
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6
8

and reverse of

7.

Policy activity, not control
the Cabinet officers. 29
hindsight, it may appear
the changes were used
as a means
to a nefarious concentration
of power.
The

m

first round of
reorganization is often perceived
as a carefully constructed and well planned
prelude to the second set of

reorganization proposals.

At the time, however,
changes

in the staff system were
judged necessary simply because
Nixon believed that an efficient
staff was needed if the
Cabinet itself was to have any
hope of running well. 3 0

Additionally, the general need to
concentrate power in the
hands of the Cabinet was perceived
as equally crucial to
the overall goal of decentralization.
if the Cabinet
lacked the authority or ability to
act with resolve,

decentralization would be impossible. 31
In fact, the idea of a Domestic
Council was hardly
original;
the Ash Council had essentially
modified a

proposal Richard Goodwin had made to Lyndon
Johnson in
1964.32 Ash himself admitted their work
was guided by
earlier studies (including the Hoover
Commission,
the

Rockefeller Committee, the Price Task Force, the
Heineman

29william Carey, "Presidential Staffing in the Sixties
and
Seventies," 457-58.
30joan Hoff-Wilson, "Richard M. Nixon: The Corporate
Presidency," Leadershi p in the Modern Presidency ed.
Fred
Greenstein (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988)
,

172
See Dwight Ink's comments in "President Nixon's
Proposals for Executive Reorganization: A Mini.

a

-i

,

Symposium, " Public Administration Review 34
(September /October 1974): 488.
32 cabinets and Counselors
1989, 40.
.
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^

^

Tas K Korce and the Lindsay
Task
new
s
from Nixon or any other
member of the administration
to
consolidate power:

^33,,

In working through those
[reorganization recommendations of
previous
presidential commissions] I saw
a lot
of good ideas and decided
our job was
not to come up with a lot
of new
ideas.
All the good ideas were already out there. We defined
our
mission as getting something done,
not
Dust making another report,
throwing
it in, and seeing if somebody
wants to
do something about it some day.
So we
modified some of the previous ideas
slightly, but we worked basically
from
the work that had gone on since
Roosevelt' s time. 34

Despite later analyses, it seems clear
Nixon's Domestic
Council was to supplement and correct
Cabinet

action, not

the first step toward replacing the
Cabinet with a new

executive authority.

Nixon transmitted the proposal

to Congress on March

claiming that the Domestic Council would begin
to control the large federal bureaucracy and
help him
decide what to do, while the Office of Management
and
12,

1970,

Budget would help determine how and how well those
tasks
were being performed. 35

In Nixon's own words:

33 Roy Ash

(testimony June 2, 1971) "Reorganization of
Executive Departments," 186.
34 "Oral Interview with
Roy Ash," 4-5.
35 "Reorganization Plan of 1970,"
612.
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A President whose programs
are carefully coordinated, whose
information
system keeps him adequately
informed,
and whose organizational
assignments
are plainly set out, can
delegate
authority with security and
confidence. A president whose
office is
deficient in these respects will
be
inclined, instead, to retain
close
control of operating responsibilities
which he cannot and should not
handle. 36

Although Congress was leery of the
reorganization proposal, John Connolly (a member of
the Ash Council)

was

able to help ease its passage.

The congressional debate

was surprisingly brief and without
serious disagreement
from either party; 37 approval came
from fche House
Senate on May 13 and 16, respectively.

^

Nixon was lucky to gain approval of the
first round
of reorganization proposals:

1970 was a bad year for

Nixon's legislative initiatives.

Although Nixon had a

"rocky" relationship with Congress throughout
his

presidency, he was frequently successful at putting
to-

gether coalitions of votes during his first two years. 38
However, this should not obscure the fact that Nixon took
a tremendous political risk in pressing the reorganization

plans for the Domestic Council.

As William Carey ex-

plains,

"Reorganization Plan of 1970," 612.
Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House 1971, 240-41.
Brauer, Presidential Transitions
1986, 158-59.
.

.
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[The Domestic Council
reorganization]
has the merit of ending
a prolonged
and costly inertia in the
development
of the presidential office.
Movement
was needed - needed badly.
Most
Presidents would have hesitated
to act
at a time like this - the
country
divided, the presidency in deep
trouble, the opposing party in
control
of Congress.
Not many Presidents
would have risked it, and I suspect
that in the test hours before the
House voted, some of Mr. Nixon's
counsellors may have regretted their
rashness. But he did it, and made it
stick. 39

But the administration found the bad
showing in the fall

mid-term elections had begun to erode the
fragile coalition of moderate Democrats and reformist

Republicans that

had been crucial to early legislative successes .40

The

general shakeups from reorganization had already
begun to

alter bureaucratic control over the federal government
from the top, while revenue sharing (as will be
noted in
the next section) threatened to alter bureaucratic and

congressional control at the bottom.

In other words, at

the same moment that members of Congress began to realize
the extent to which their control over spending would be

limited by the changes Nixon proposed, the administration

39 William Carey,

"Reorganization Plan No. 2," Public
Administration Review 30 (November /December 1970):
631.
40 Dan Rather and Gary Paul Gates, The
Palace Guard (New
York:
Harper and Row, 1974), 269-70; A. James Reichley,
Conservatives in an Age of Chance (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1981), 97; Nathan, The Plot That
Failed 1975, 7.
,
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began the next serious attempt
to alter bureaucratic
arrangements. 41 N ixon clearly
hafl Congress
formulating the first reorganization
effort, whose passage
he barely managed to secure,
and Congress was not

^

^^
in-

tending to allow more control to
be taken by the administration.
The 1971 State of the Union address
also contained a
second round of reorganization
proposals created by the
Ash Council. Six Cabinet positions
were to be reorganized
into four new ' superagencies" (the
Departments
of Com-

munity Development, Human Resources,
Natural Resources and
Economic Affairs), intended to combine
disparate agencies
around commonly held objectives.

The Department of Com-

munity Development (DCD) was to absorb most
elements of
HUD,

the Highway and Mass Transportation sections
of the

Department of Transportation, the Community Action
Program
of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Farmer's
Home

Administration and the Rural Electrification Program.
These programs were to be decentralized into subregional
offices, providing the greatest amount of control for

policy in each region.

The Department of Human Resources

41 Matthew Crenson and Francis
Rourke,

"By Way of
Conclusion: American Bureaucracy Since World War II," The
New Ame rican State ed. Louis Galambos (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University, 1987), 160; William Gormley, Taming
the Bureaucrats (Princeton:
Princeton University Press,
1989), 176-77;
Ray Price, With Nixon (New York: Viking
Press, 1977), 197;
Nathan, The Plot That Failed 1975,
31, 74-75.
,

,
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(DHR)

combined the remaining
parts of hud, the Unemployment Services and
Compensation functions of the
Department of Labor, and several
offices of GEO. while
these programs would still
be centralized in Washington,
their budgets would be the taroetc?
targets of the ~
greatest amount
of revenue sharing changes,
giving a great deal of
autonomy to regional managers
outside Washington for
budgetary control and policy
administration. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
united the Department
of the interior, NOAA from the
Department
of Commerce,

the

Forest Service and the planning
departments of the Army
Corps of Engineers, while these
agencies were already
largely decentralized into field offices,
the reorganization plan called for the additional
creation of new
offices to further decentralize administration.

Finally,

the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA)
would take the

leftover functions of the Departments of
Transportation,

Commerce and Labor as well as the Small Business
Association and the Office of Technical Utilization in
the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The plan

called for the current number of field offices to be

maintained to administer programs which were already
decentralized. 42

^Douglas

Fox,

"The President's Proposals for Executive
Reorganization: A Critique," Public Administration
Quarterly 33 September /October 1973):
401-2.
(
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The reluctance of Congress
and the bureaucracy to
support the Nixon reorganisation
initiatives (and the
revenue sharing proposal
discussed in the next section),
argues Richard Nathan, led to
the development of the nowfamous ••administrative presidency,"
where bureaucrat! c
functions were assumed by the White
House count erbureaucracy until the details of
governing simply overwhelmed the comparatively small
white House staff. 43
Nathan is not entirely certain when
this takeover occurred; his preface names either
1971 or 1972, which
could indicate either the early or
later reorganization
initiative. 44

Nathan accurately describes the changing
nature of
administrative power in the Nixon administration
and
generally seems sympathetic to Nixon's reforms.

One must

doubt, however, Nathan's conclusion that
Nixon's admini-

strative -coup'' represented a devious act, as
Nathan seems
to imply.

other scholars of reorganization plans noted

even before the Ash Council began its deliberations
that
securing agency cooperation (and with it, congressional
approval) in reorganization would be difficult. 45

Nathan

himself acknowledged rather casually that the "superagency" concept was simply the fulfillment of the original

^Nathan, The Plot That Failed

.

44 Nathan,

.

The Plot That Failed

51-53.
1975, vii.
1975,

45 "What, Another Hoover Commission?"
Public Administration
Review XXVIII (March/April 1968): 170-71.
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Ash council reco.nendations.46

Nixon

,

s

_

ieanc

toward placing the blame
for reorganization
resistance
the cabinet and not on
bureaucrats as a whole.

^

As he

noted in his autobiography
later, bureaucrats need
direction which "captured"
Cabinet officers cannot
provide. 47 Nixon did not
mask his agreement with
that belief, announcing even as
early as March 14, 1969
that he
Planned to move reluctant
holdovers from office as soon
as
possible, long before Nathan
ascribes that motive to Nixon
only after the 1970-71
legislative failures. 48
The irony of Nixon's
reorganization effort lies in
the fact that many considered
the plan too quick to give
up power, rather than finding
its essence in the consolidation of power in the White House. 49

m

fact,

the

greater irony, as Peri Arnold points
out, is that "Nixon
failed in further centralizing
executive branch organization because government was not
centralized enough to
give him adequate political leverage
to accomplish that
end. "50

critics of the plan argued that the
reorgani-

zation effort created too many changes
too quickly.

Editorialists throughout the country concentrated
on the
46Nathan, The Plot That Failed
1975, 68-69.
In the Arena:
A Memoir of Victory^
Defeat and Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1990)
279-80.
48 N ixon:
The First Year of H is Presidency (Washington,
D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1970), 16-A.
49see, for example, Roy Ash's testimony in "Reorganization
of Executive Departments," 190-91.
50 Arnold, Making the
Managerial Presidency 1986, 301.
.

47 Richard Nixon,

.
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political difficulties of passing
such a wide sweeping
alteration of bureaucratic
responsibility, but they placed
the blame for these difficulties
on Congress, not the
president.
indeed, most editorialists
argued that the
"superagency" proposal was an idea
long overdue. 51

Reviewing the plan in 1973, Douglas
Fox argued that the
decentralizing effect of the plan would
lessen the power
of the new department secretaries
rather than increasing

their power to coordinate policy, making
the overall
effect of decentralization a loss of
administrative

efficiency and not an improvement.

By turning power over

to state administrators in some cases,
or field offices in
others, Fox noted secretaries would simply
lose the

ability to exercise administrative control.

Admini-

stration defenders also noted that the effort
would lead
to less, not more, control over the functions
of govern-

ment;

of course, they argued, that was what was
intended

from the beginning. 52

Long after leaving the White House,

John Ehrlichman claimed the reorganization efforts were an
effort to strengthen the Cabinet so that decentralization

could take place.

Unless power was wrested from those who

had traditionally held government in place, no decentrali-

^See, for example, editorials from the Charlotte Observer
(January 26, 1971), Salt Lake Tribune (January 24, 1971),
St. Louis Dispatch (January 24, 1971) and the Dallas
Morning News (January 26, 1971) in Editorials on File 2
(January 16-31, 1971):
76-81.
52 Price, With Nixon
1977, 196-97.
,
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zation plan could succeed.
succeed

irk-u u
Ehrlichman
even suggests in

his account of the Nixon
years that the expansion
of the
White House staff duties was
a desperate last resort,
not
Part of a general, preconceived
plot to take power. 53
Without question, the simultaneous
centralization and
decentralization of government accounts
for much of the
confusion surrounding Nixon's
reorganization proposals.
as Nathan himself explained
in 1975, Nixon's fundamental
aim was decentralization:

™

Despite the fact that both
decentralizing and centralizing proposals
were
part of the Nixon program, the important direction of change was decentralization. Coming at the end of
a 3 0-year period in which the
predominate trend of domestic policy had
been to increase the responsibility
of
the national government, Nixon's
program marked an important shift. 55

By the time these proposals were made,
however, Nixon was
struggling to pass even modest revenue sharing
reforms.

The widespread reaction to a second round of
reorgani-

zation was negative and the proposals were given
little
chance of passage.

5^

instead, Nixon concentrated his

bJ Ehrlichman,

Witness to Power 1982, 210-12.
54 Evans and Novak, Nixon
in the White House
1971,
55 Nathan, The Plot That Failed
1975, 22-23.
56 Richard Nathan, Allen
.

.

241-43.

.

Manvel and Susannah Calkins,
Monitoring Rev enue Sharing (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1975), 59-69.

75

Political efforts on passing
.venue snaring. ^organization would have to take
place through different
means.
Nixon considered altering
his reorganization
strategy
from legislative initiatives
to one of reform from
withinafter the 1972 election, a
general shakeup of the
Cabinet
took place. Nixon had found
that he could not rely
on his
earlier appointees to follow
his orders to replace
Democratic holdovers who were
hostile to the administration
and its initiatives.
Understood in the context of
"Protecting turf rather than
political hostility, Nixon's
comments in his later autobiographical
account
of the

Cabinet shakeup become clear:

"I could

only console

myself with the determination
that ... I would not make the
same mistake of leaving the
initiative [to control individual departments and force change]
to individual Cabinet
members. "57 The administration made
some ambiguous attempts at subjecting new appointees
to political loyalty
tests.
The ambiguity can be explained, at
least in part,

by Nixon's early antipathy to loyalty
tests and his surprisingly lackadaisical attitude toward the
political
loyalty of the early appointees 58 Appointees
with little
.

political experience were chosen, and Nixon
increasingly
chose individuals with no independent public
standing of
their own, reducing the chance the appointee would
feel
loyal to some interest or group whose political support
57 Nixon, RN,
1990, 355-56.
58 Cabinets and Counselors
.

1989,

76

28.

had helped secure the
Dositinn
POSltlon

-

t~
Loyalty was stressed, but

the execution of orders
was valued above personal
or
Political fidelity. Nixon s
clear go£Q
,

^^^^

executive branch responsive
to the presidents will,
not a
mere mirror image of himself. 59
ThuS/ Nixon turned fcQ
politically costly alternative
of the "administrative
presidency- as the "superagency"
reforms guietly died in
committee. 60 Both the - superagency"
and politicization
strategies came to a halt, however,
as the White House
became preoccupied with the
Watergate
61

^

scandal.

^

"Centralized"

Dejcejxfcr ay^a£ioni

Budget

The second major domestic policy
initiative in the
administration's first years was revenue sharing.
Al-

though Nixon spent little time on domestic
policy, revenue
sharing was the single new budgetary initiative
(aside

from reorganization of 0MB)

Nixon pursued. 62

59 Nelson Polsby,

The concept

"Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons
for the Political System," Political Science Quarterly
93
(Spring, 1978):
16-17.
60 Arnold, Making t he
Managerial Presidency 1986, 299.
61 Arnold, Making t
he Managerial Presidency 1986, 65-67;
Reichley, Conserv atives in an Ace of Change 1981, 244-45.
62 Tom Wicker uses revenue
sharing as a prime example of
the misinterpretation of the priority given to domestic
policy by Nixon; while revenue sharing was certainly
never as important to Nixon as winning the war in Vietnam,
Wicker argues it would be a mistake to conclude Nixon was
not concerned with domestic issues. War, according to
.

.

.
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of revenue sharing was
importanh
important i-o
to mNixon, and had been
very much on his mind
during the 1968 campaign.63
Revenue
sharing was the centerpiece
of Nixon- s concept of
"New

Federalism," a more general
plan to complete the
overall
Plan of decentralization. 64
New Federalism was to sort
out responsibility for
domestic action.
Like reorganization, it consisted of a
variety of plans to centralize
and decentralize elements of
the budget, both between
the
federal and state governments
and within individual departments.
Services delivered to communities
were targeted to be decentralized, while
certain elements of the
domestic agenda would remain in
federal control. 65

Nixon planned to use revenue sharing
to accomplish
the first element of New Federalism. 66
Like

the concept

of a Domestic Council,

revenue sharing had first been

proposed during the Johnson Administration.

The National

Governor's Conference called for revenue
sharing in 1966,
followed by the recommendation of revenue
sharing by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations in 1967
and the National Commission on Urban Problems
in 1968.67

Wicker, hides the relative importance of domestic
policy
to a president.
See Wicker, One of Us
1991, 412.
63 Richard Whalen,
Catch the Falling Flag (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 38-39.
64 Safire, Before the
Fall 1977. 275-76.
65 Nathan, The Plot
That Failed 1975, 18-19.
66Nixon:
The Fi rst Year of His Presidency 1970, 66.
Nathan, Manvel, and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue Sharing
.

.

.

.

1975,

14.

78
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Nixon announced his
intentions for the general
revernue sharing program on
August 8, 1969, stressing
its
importance for his overall
plan to decentralize
government.
The original proposal
was guite modest, asking
for
only $5 00 million to be
returned in 1971, but N i xon
planned to raise the stakes to
$5 billion by 1975.68
The

modesty of Nixon -s original
proposal belied its explosive
political effect. Nixon knew
that even a slight re-

structuring of the normal budgetary
relationship between
the federal government and
the states would be met with
resistance by those who traditionally
controlled
such

power.

indeed, the response from
Congress was swift.
House Ways and Means Chair Wilbur
Mills was particularly
adamant in his opposition to the
proposal, recognizing its

potential and arguing the bill meant
money would be
funnelled to larger states who had the
least need for new
funds. 69

He re f U sed to schedule hearings on
the bill

during the 91st Congress. 70

Nixon stood his political

ground, however, and was unwilling to
surrender his

efforts to have revenue sharing enacted. 71

Indeed, Nixon

devoted a great deal of time to revenue sharing,
demon-

68 Nathan,

1975,

Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue sha nna

15-16.

69 Jerry Voorhis,

The Stran ge Case of Richard Milhous Nixon
(New York:
Paul S. Eriksson, Inc., 1972), 132-34.
7 0Nathan, Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring
Revenue sh aring.
*
1975, 16.
71 The Nixon Pres idential
Press Conferences (London:
Heyden Press, 1978), 251-252.

79

strating an uncharacteristic
interest in t-v^
j-nterest:
,
the complexities
of domestic legislative
initiatives.
He enthusiasticall
y
lobbied congress for passage
and, later, reconsideration
John Ehrlichman noted that
Nixon "involved himself
frequently" in the legislative
battle, something Nix0 n
often
declined to do and found
personally distasteful Nix0
n
disliked, in his own words,
the "buddy- buddy" wheeling
and
dealing of the legislative
72
process ). But Ehrlichman
reports that Nixon made himself
available "virtually on
request" where revenue sharing
was concerned, making it
"a
personal issue. "73 while those
initial efforts were frustrated by Mills, Nixon^s initiative
gained widespread
support among local government
officials (understandably)
and a groundswell of support for
the concept of revenue
sharing began to build. 74

m

,

(

in some ways, Mills's obstinacy
actually worked to
the advantage of the Nixon administration.
By delaying
action on the proposal until the next
congress, Mills gave
Nixon enough time to persuade the public
to the necessity
for decentralization through revenuesharing.

Nixon spent

a great deal of time developing the
details of the revenue

sharing proposal, making it his top domestic
policy issue
in 197 0 and 1971 and ordering the Treasury
Department to

72 Wicker,

One of Us
73 Wicker, One of Us
74 Paul Dommel, The

(Bloomington:

.

.

1991,
1991,

205-6.
527.

Politics of Revenue Sharing
Indiana University Press, 1974), 91-93.

80

release a large amount of
information documenting some
of
the details of the new
bill to the public. 75
Revenue
sharing became the centerpiece
of Nixon's state
of the

anion address in January
1971.

The speech was unusual
in

that it did not mention
foreign policy (even as the
Vietnam war raged) and focused
on Nixon, s plan to change
the
national-state-local government
balance of power. Earlier
in the winter, and throughout
the spring of 1971, Nixon
devoted an uncharacteristically
large amount of time to
lobbying Congress, laying the
groundwork for a new legislative initiative on revenue
sharing. 76 By June< the

Administration had proposed an even
larger revenue sharing
bill, and Mills had little choice
but to reverse
his

earlier opposition.

Mills began hearings on the Administration
bill on
June

2,

1971, but only on the condition that his
own

version of revenue sharing was considered
as an alternative. A bill introduced by Russel Long,

chair of the

Senate Finance Committee was reported out of
committee on
April 17 1972, with much stronger limits on
revenue
,

sharing priorities.
the House on June 22.

A revenue sharing bill was passed in
In the Senate, Long put aside the

Family Assistance Plan then under consideration and took
75 Stephen Ambrose, Nixon;

The Triumph of a Politician.
1962-1972 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1989), 398-99;
Dommel, The Politics of Revenue Sharing 1974, 96-98.
776
^Domm<
Dommel, The Politics of Revenue Sharing 1974, 103-4,
112-14
.

.
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up the revenue sharing
proposal.

The Finance Committee

reported favorably on the bill
on August 16. and a Conference Committee worked out
the differences in the
formulas for revenue sharing which
existed between the two
houses.
The final version was signed
into law by Nixon on
October 20. 1972, and given the title
"State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act. "" Nixon
aiscussed his decigion tQ
sign the bill during his October
28, 1972 radio address,
linking revenue sharing to "..decision
making power, and
the means to carry out those decisions,
are flowing back
to the grassroots. 1,78
As Nixon managed to press Congress on
his revenue
sharing plans, he was moderately successful
at removing

administrative control over local programs from
federal
agencies and placing it on the states.

If anything, Nixon

was even more determined to expand decentralization
in the

second administration. 7 9

Nixon encouraged the further

expansion of revenue sharing in 1974, pressing passage in
a Congress which was quite hostile to his administration.

Indeed, Nixon pursued revenue sharing reforms long after

such legislation was politically viable, and even as he

''Nathan, Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue Sharing.
1975, 16-19.
78 The Clearest Choice (Committee to Re-Elect the

President,
79 Nathan,

1972), 45.
The Plot That Failed

82

.

1975,

70-73.

undermined his own efforts by
simultaneously pressing a
new round of reorganization. 80
Later critics argued that
Nixon's revenue sharing
Plan was simply a budgetary device
to limit spending or a
"backdoor" method for eliminating
unwanted programs. 81 As
Richard Nathan points out, however,
such hasty dismissals
fail to capture the complexity
of Nixon's intentions for
decentralization though revenue sharing:

According to the latter view, Nixon
simply decentralized the programs
he
did not like.
I submit that these
interpretations, emphasizing conservatism and negativism in the domestic policies of the Nixon years, are
too simple and, in many areas, are
unduly influenced by later events Watergate, the White House "plumbers"
and Nixon's resignation. 82

The true aim of revenue sharing, like
reorganization, was

decentralization.

in essence, revenue sharing acted much

like reorganization:

it removed power from Washington and

returned it to the "grassroots ." 83

This made reve nue

sharing and reorganization targets for Congressional and

bureaucratic resistance, increasing Nixon's insistence
that further revenue sharing and reorganization efforts

80 Nathan,

1975,

Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue Sharing

.

19.

8lReichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change 1981, 172.
82 Nathan, The Plot That Failed
1975, 26.
83 william Gormley, Taming the Bureaucracy
1989), 176-77.
.

.

.
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were needed.

The irony of

„„»..

reform efforts

l ay i»
the feet that the more
successful Nixon was at
aohieving
reform, the less successful
future reform efforts would
be, as each victory would
be more likely to increase
the
resistance of those who traditionally
wielded administrative power.

By turning this power over
certain elements of the
budget to decentralized federal
offices and the states,
Nixon created new flexibility
in the way money would be
used and accounted for and avoided
the necessity to
exercise central control himself. 84
under the best

political arrangement, local governments
would control
this money directly.
For example, Nixon linked revenue
sharing to the new freedom and
responsibility of urban
managers to run their cities, noting in
a November
1,

1972

radio speech that "The goal of all these
proposals is to
make government responsive again to the
voice of the average citizen. "85

Like reorganization, revenue sharing
also

came under criticism for decentralizing
government past a
safe point of control.
Critics claimed that the executive

branch might lose even more power to set national
goals

under such a program. 86

Additionally, some people feared

that the unpredictable nature of state governments would

04 The Nixon Pre sidential
News Conferences
85 <rhe Clearest Choice
1972, 60-61.
86 Michael Reagan, The New

.

1978,

150-51.

.

Federalism (New York:
University Press, 1972), 96-101.

84

Oxford

permit fiscally irresponsible
state legislatureg
decide
how to spend revenue
which had been returned
to the
states. 87 la the end

^

,

fchese

sharing might create poorer
delivery of government services at all administrative
levels.

With revenue sharing in
place, Nixon- s attention
had
returned to reorganization.
The two policies were thus
intertwined, although separated
in their legislative form,
and the only real obstacle to
decentralization Nixon faced
was new arrangement of the
executive branch. Given the
success of revenue sharing, the
reorganization program
gained even greater importance in
Nixon
plans: without
reorganization, newly decentralized
programs would come
into conflict with bureaucratic
controls. 88 At the same
time, however, Nixon's increased
success in one arena of

reform seemed to lead to less success
in the other arena,
as members of Congress nervously
reacted

to their loss of

power.

Rather than compromise in one arena or
the other,

Nixon pressed for success in both, and
ultimately failed
in both.

Nevertheless, revenue sharing remains a point
of

pride for the former president.

In a 1984 interview, he

remarked "There was a feeling, despite the way

[my]

ad-

ministration ended, that at least it was an administration
that knew what it was doing.

87 Nixon:

88 Nathan,

.

.Domestic affairs, despite

The Firs t Year of His Presidgnny
The Plot That Failed 1975, 8.
.

85

.

1970,

67-68.

the fact we did not have
the Congress, we got
(sic)
revenue sharing and
environmental programs .•• 8 9

C.

Exnla-im'
nlng the Nixon Decisions:

Tr^u^n.i

M~1rl

-

Nixon's administrative choices
present a difficult
problem for the "rational decider"
explanation of presidential behavior. On the one
hand, Neustadt and others
argue that presidents must
increase their power to persuade by demonstrating tenacity
and skill, increasing
public prestige and their reputation
of being
"tough."

On
the other hand, Neustadt portrays
Nixon as a president who

demonstrated these qualities and failed.

Neustadt attri-

butes staff deficiencies to the Nixon
White House "counter-bureaucracy" which, to some degree,
echoed the "staff
system" of the Eisenhower presidency.

That system is

damaged by loyal staff members who view power
as hierarchical in nature, leading to a misguided
sense of

loyalty to the president and reducing the amount
of dissent and discussion within the White House (in
fact, Neu-

stadt intimates Nixon learned this unfortunate organi-

zational lesson from Ike). 90

The reS ult, claims Neustadt,

was an "'administrative presidency

89 Parmet,

that could guarantee

Richard Nixon and His America 1990, 25.
Presidential Power (New York: John
.

90 Richard Neustadt,

Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1980), 117-19.
86

Nixon or his agents mastery
at any time of anybody's
choices, anywhere on the
domestic side of government "91
But the irony of this
critique comes from the advice
Neustadt and others give to
modern presidents: learn to
persuade and, ultimately, control
the government.
The
power to achieve one
s goals is the aim of persuasion,
and
Neustadt 's measure of a "successful"
presidency
.

•

is one

where achievement of goals is
the end of political decision making. As Chapter One
points
out,

this locks

Neustadt into the "bias trap" of
reading a president's
goals as the rational cause of
presidential action. if a
president acts in a manner which seems
to undermine or
contradict those posited goals, the
president must be
making grave mistakes or acting "irrationally".

Thus,

Neustadt explains presidential "failures"
as either errors
in political judgement or "irrational"
behavior.

When this standard is applied to the Nixon
decisions,
however, the limits of the "rational decider"
model become
clear,

when the second set of reorganization plans were

announced, Neustadt hardly considered Nixon's efforts
a

mistake in political judgement, claiming "It's not very
new.. It's not as different as it looks.

All this is a

determined effort to get control of the details and operations of the executive establishment.

Mr. Nixon was not

the first president who wanted to do this.

91 Neustadt,

Presidential Power

87

.

1980,

However, his

198-200

is the most intensive
effort that I oan recall..

M

^

the last sentence would
seem to indicate that
Neustadt was
troubled by Nixon s approach<

^

.

of

^

seems to suggest he was
merely surprised by the
vigor with
which Nixon pursued change,
as were several other
political scientists interviewed
for the same Nation^ .t^.-.
article.
indeed, Nixon followed a
pattern of presidential behavior which did not seem odd
or in error for the modern
presidency. As Peri Arnold points
out, the expectation of
the "managerial presidency"
requires this type of control.
Arnold concludes that presidents
pursue reorganization

precisely because they need to build
reputation and prestige.
He specifically argues that
Nixon's ambitions
for

reorganization were not idiosyncratic but
"..were characteristic of the modern presidency. " 93
Elsewhere, Arnold
describes Nixon's handling of the Ash
Council's recom-

mendations and the later transfer of power
from the
"experts" at OMB to the political side of the

admini-

stration as an effort to "tame" the departments
and increase presidential power. 94

Arnold concludes that the

92 Dom Bonafede,

"President Nixon's Executive
Reorganization Plans Prompt Praise and Criticism,"
Nationa l Journal 5 (March 10, 1973): 339.
J Arnold, Making
t he Managerial Presidency
1986, 361-63,
.

302
94
Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency 1986, 273,
294, 356;
see also Crenson and Rourke, "By Way of
Conclusion," 161-62.
.

.

88

"Watergate" syndrome obscured
this desire from the observer's attention:

^^

6
ifferent in faCt and P^nciple
from the mass of questionable,
covert
activities of the Nixon administration, those final, unilateral
reorganization efforts of the administration appeared to melt into the
mass of
suspicious activities conducted
by a
chief executive who seemed
not to
recognize the limitations imposed
by
the regime in which he worked. 95

Therein lies the task of the modern
"managerial presidency":
if presidents wish to act,
they must
control.

Why would a president take on such
a task, if control is
so difficult? Arnold does not
answer that question
directly, suggesting that the need to
make political

choices "come alive" might drive presidents
to reorganization.
But Arnold stops short of examining
these
choices, and instead relies on the "rational
decider"

model for explaining why presidents would choose
to engage
in reorganization efforts. 96

The Neustadt model fails to adequately explain

Nixon's decisions, however.

Presidents must control the

administrative process if they wish to succeed.

If presi-

dents must control government to avoid the appearance of

frustration and build reputation and prestige, Neustadt

95 Arnold,
96 Arnold,

Making the Managerial Presidency
Making the Managerial Presidency

89

.

,

1986,
1986,

273.

361-63.

^^

seems to imply that they
must
cracy.

^
^

^

In fact/ Neustadt

to learn this lesson.

On the other hand, it
is precisely
this control which Neustadt
argues led directly to
Wat:ergate. 97 The political
go&1 Qf

^

^^.^ ^

the strategic choices which
lead to control. Neustadt
's
model is thus caught in a
dilemma where the goal is
under-

mined by the means to achieving
that goal.
a sense,
Neustadt wishes to have it both
ways:
Presidents should
control without being controlling.

m

To save his model, Neustadt
finds it necessary to
separate Nixon from other presidents
by distinguishing

Nixon as a person.
ment,

His focus turns to Nixon's
"tempera-

arguing that one must be careful
to "beware the
insecure" when selecting presidents 98
»

.

Elsewhere, Neu-

stadt claims that Nixon's own failings
led to his "administrative presidency." Had Nixon been
a better judge of
character, more discriminating in whom he
placed trust,

more careful to whom he divested power,
Neustadt implies,
Nixon would have been a successful president. 99
In the

end, Neustadt relies more on a "personality"
model of

behavior than the model he is advancing in the
remainder
of his book.

Eisenhower's and Truman's failures are de-

Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency,
1986, 157;
K1 ein, Making It Perfectly Clear
1980, 357.
98 Neustadt, Presidential
Power 1980, 182-83.
"Neustadt, Presidential Power 1980, 169-70, 189.
.

.

.

.

90

scribed as bad choices
cnoxces, not personality
faults.
seems, Nixon is the victim
of his own

character.

But,

it

Thus,

Neustadt can keep his model
of control and simply
warn
that the "right person"
must be at
the helm.

Perhaps Neustadt might reply
by arguing that Nixon
merely "overlearned" the lesson
of control and that a
moderate middle ground between
loyalty and obstruction
might be found. However, the
consequences of Nixon's
efforts would have further
undermined Neustadt s notion of
persuasion. As argued below, Nixon's
proposed reorganization and program of revenue sharing
were reflections of
his desire to surrender power,
not increase it.
Other
observers, like Richard Nathan, argue
that Nixon specifically rejected the idea of "persuasion"
when he moved away
from Cabinet control of domestic policy. 100
ultimately,
Nixon's attempt to alter the bureaucratic
setting of his

administration and to promote and expand
decentralization
through revenue sharing was seen as a hopeless
attempt at
change.
Further, the methods for change Nixon selected
decreased, not enhanced, his prestige by increasing
the

determination of the bureaucracy and Congress to resist
his efforts at persuasion and, later, control. 101

100 Nathan,

Thus,

The Plot That Failed 1975, 41-43.
See the admonitions in Rufus Miles, "Considerations for
a President Bent on Reorganization," Public Administration
Review 37 (March/April 1977): 161-62; James March and
John Olson, "Organizing Political Life: What
Administrative Reorganization Tells Us About Government,"
LU

.

L
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91

the values Nixon sought
to put into action
through reorganization and revenue sharing
are not reflected in the
apparent goal Neustadt assu.es
N ixon must possess:
the
increase of power. The
"rational decider" model
does not
consider the possibility that
action to increase the power
to persuade may, in fact,
ultimately undermine that
power.
The Nixon initiatives on
reorganization and revenue
sharing cast similar shadows
on the "personality" model
of
presidential behavior. James David
Barber argues that
Nixon is the classic "active-negative"
type, thirsting for
independence and power. Nixon felt
a need for "getting,
holding and protecting power."
Thus, Barber describes
Nixon as "..power seeking ... [his]
life is a hard struggle
to achieve and hold power... "102
Barber's interpretation
of Nixon as an "active-negative"
seemed to be confirmed by
the events surrounding Watergate.
Indeed, a small industry of "Nixon analysis" boomed in the
early 1970 's. Old

opponents like Frank Mankiewicz argued that
Nixon had only
a "..limitless appetite for victory..
No one can point to a

Nixon ideology, beyond winning the next election..."
Others went further to argue that Nixon was seeking
in his
staff the earlier loyalty provided by his mother,
that he

was "anal compulsive" in his desire for power, and that

even his appearance reflected the evil nature of his

American Politi cal Science Review 77 (June 1983): 285-86;
Price, With Nixon 1977, 194-96.
Jam es David Barber, Presidential Character (Englewood
.

Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall, 1985),

92

299,

362,

322,

9.

character.103

^

Herbert parmefc

even .ore forcefully in
his recent biography
on Nixon:
Once the depth of the
abuse of power
had been revealed, there
was an insatiable appetite for
psychological
explanations which, of course,
was not
unique to Nixon. But
noteworthy in
his case was the shelfful
of volumes
specifically devoted to psychobiographical dissections. They
scrutinized every known aspect of
his life
most particularly as gleaned
from
early accounts and contemporary
interviews.
They concluded that he was
a
psychopathic liar, needed maternal
love, disdained his father,
and was so
full of aggression that he
loved
mashing potatoes, which was
read as
proof that he needed outlets for
his
inner hostilities. 104
'

Contemporaneous evaluations of Nixon's
reorganization and
revenue sharing efforts belie these
backward glances,

how-

ever,

as described earlier, Nixon did not
turn to staff

control of the domestic agenda immediately
upon taking
office, and did so only after he began
to experience

legislative defeats and dissension within his
Cabinet.
Nor, as also noted earlier, was the reaction
to Nixon's

reorganization plans universally negative.

The pre-

dominant mood, even after the more ambitious
"superagency"

103 Frank Mankiewicz,
Perfectly Clear: Nixon from Whittier
to Watergate (New York:
Quadrangle, 1973), 2;
David
Abrahamsen, Nixon Ve rsus Nixon; An Emotional Tragedy (New
York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), 184, 180-81.
104 Parmet, Richard Nixon and
His America
1990, 16.
.
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Proposal was unveiled, was
approval and some condescension:
many thought that Nixon
was simply naive to
believe
Power could ever be wrested
from Congress or the
bureaucracy.
The "personality, model
argues that those inclinations should have been
present at the start of the
Nixon
administration, while the record
suggests that Nixon did
not turn to the devices
Barber attributes to
his -type"

until much later in the
administration.
Moreover, recent works have
begun to cast doubts on
the evidence collected by these
various armchair psychobiographers.
Stephen Ambrose's recent two
volume biography of Nixon, for example,
argues that Nixon had a
comparatively normal and, in some
respects, somewhat

privileged childhood for a Depression-era
family:
his
parents were much more loving than
previously believed,
and Nixon showed greater amounts of
self-esteem than
Barber suggests. 105 Peri Arnold agrees,
arguing that

Nixon's behavior is reflective of forces
beyond personality:

The appearance is that President
Nixon's ambitions for reorganization
were part and parcel of the same
personal flaws that led to his misuse
of power.
However this appearance is
false, and it may even put things
backwards. Nixon's ambitions for reorganization were not idiosyncratic;
they were characteristic of the modern
105 Robert Strong,

"Richard Nixon Revisited," Virginia
Quarterly Review 64 (Summer 1988):
526-27.
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presidency... The imperative
of the
managerial presidency
was that the
Presidents must control.
«txon could not arrange If reorgani
govern^tTo
make It controllable,
then perhaps
other means to that goal
are justiliable. 10 °

As noted earlier, Arnold's
explanation for Nixon's
choice s
fails to account for these
choices completely. Yet
it is
worth noting that personality
does not seem to be the
critical factor for shaping
those decisions.
,

Barbers analysis

is undermined further
when one

considers the ultimate intention
of reorganization and
revenue sharing. Nixon's
decision to reorganize was an
integral element to his plan
to turn administrative
power
over to the states and individuals
through revenue
sharing,

without reorganization, revenue
sharing decentralization would not have occurred. 107
If Nixon desired
power, he selected a mode of
reorganization and budgeting
specifically at odds with that desire.
Again, the posited
values that are attributed to Nixon
are not evidenced in
Nixon's behavior, and Barber's assumptions
about Nixon's
values provide a poor explanation of the
president s de'

cisions

Ub Arnold,

Making t he Managerial Presidency 1986, 302.
"Traditional Organizational Principles and the
Managerial Presidency," 130-31; Nathan, The Plot That
Failed 1975, 8.
.

107 Moe,
.
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lain ^^o^ecision,.

.

,

1rr1

.

|r

A better accounting of
Nixon « behavior might be
found in the "belief system"
model

.

By lQoking

^

&

consistently held "system," one
can better explain the
selection of Nixon- administrative
s
strategy.
Nixon
strident ant i- communism and
keen interest in foreign
policy tended to obscure his
political belief system. On
the other hand, that system
was consistent with his concern, nearing obsession, to
oppose communism. From 1950
on, the subject of communism
was Nixon's strongest theme
when giving speeches, swallowing
references to issues
which otherwise might have been
given his attention. Just
as his focus on foreign policy
can be mistaken for a lack
of concern in domestic issues,
however, one would be mis-

taken to assume that Nixon revealed no
political beliefs
for the domestic agenda. 108
Like many presidents, Nixon has been
classified as a
"conservative," "pragmatic," and even "liberal"
president.

Those classifications suffer the "bias trap"
noted in

Chapter One, however, and lead to the erroneous
conclusion
that Nixon had no political beliefs when he fails
to fit

neatly into one of the categories. 10 9

This "bias trap"

also led to the charge that Nixon was merely a political
108 Parmet, Richard Nixon and
His America
1990, 298.
109 See, at various points,
Parmet, Richard Nixon and Hi
America 1990, esp. 58-60.
.

.
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opportunist, supporting
liberal positions Qnoe
because they were politically
acceptable and turning his
back on "true conservative
principle., when such
action
would be too politically
costly. HO The key
vglues hela
by Nixon revolve around
his interpretation of
individual
freedom.
Specifically, N i xoa oriented
his political views
toward increasing individual
control over one's own
life. HI According to Nixon's
belief system, government
intervention can undermine this
control, and Nixon maintained throughout his political
career the principle that
local government is always the
preferred source of interference, if such interference
is necessary,
only under a
specific set of circumstances is
national action desired
(unlike carter and, more importantly,
Reagan, as the next
two chapters will demonstrate) H2

^

.

Most observers attribute Nixon's
dissatisfaction with
the bureaucracy to his partisan
conflict with remaining
Democratic appointees, and Nixon himself
occasionally

slipped into this language.

But a deeper disdain for

government interference underscores this
attitude, and

Nixon's desire to undermine bureaucratic control
of
domestic policy predates his own administration.

His

early experience working for the OPA during the
Roosevelt
110 Parmet, Richard
Nixon and His America 1990, 79, 116.
111 Reichley, Conserva tives
in an Acre of change 1981, 56;
Price, With Nixon 1977, 47-48.
112 For early Nixon
views on the subject, see James Keogh,
This is Nixon (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1956), 82.
.

.
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^^

years seemed to £irst
sour

despite the fact that he
had gone to Washington
with
confidence that more could
he done by the government
to
help individuals hit hard
by the Depression.
Nixon noted
that after that experience
"1 took a very
dim view of
controls. » explaining
unrestrained power in the
hands of
bureaucrats was to be feared
above other uses of
113

power.
That fear of unrestrained
power, ironic in light of
the
Watergate revelations, was
also directed at "big business." Nixon was no more
trustful of so much power in
private hands than public. H*

Nixon was extolling the virtues
of individual control
and decrying the power of
"irresponsible
government agen-

cies" as early as 1945, the
beginning of his political
career, arguing (as he later would
when justifying revenue
sharing) that individual control
is critical to initiative
and democracy. 115 At a Lincoln Day
dinner in 1946, Nixon
took the opportunity to depart from
discussions of foreign
policy and attacked the Truman administration
for re-

placing "individual enterprise" with a
"planned economy"
which removed individual control over
1 !*
life.

His first

election circular called for "..a sound progressive
program in which government will work with and
through pri-

H Parmet, Richard Nixon and His
H 4 Parmet, Richard Nixon
H 5 Reichley, Conserva tivesandin His
an
3

America
America
Acre

.

1990,

.

1990,

of Change

Keogh, This is Nixon 1956, 79-86.
p armet, Richard Nixon and His America

.

67.

62.

1981,

.
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1990,

29.

46;

s

vate enterprise, toward
our goal of assuring
hous ing,
clothing, food, education,
and opportunity for every
American. "117
These core political
beliefs also shaped Nixonbehavior once he took office.
His 1947 support of the
Taft-Hartley bill was justified
as an attempt to release
the fetters of control
from the working class,
which Nixon
believed would become an inherently
inferior class
if

overregulated and overprotected. 118
credits Nixon-

0 ne biographer

concern for individual economic
progress
as the cause for Nixon's
decidedly progressive views on
civil rights, reflected throughout
his service in Congress
and during the Eisenhower
administration. As vice President, Nixon advocated spending
to improve the nation's
infrastructure, also with the goal of
increasing indis

vidual enterprise.

H9

Nixon's 1950 Senate campaign set these
ideas out with
greater clarity and force. in his campaign
speech notes
for that contest, Nixon stressed his
opposition to communism, telling a friend "That's all the
people want to

Parmet, Richard Nixon and His Amerioa
1990, 96.
118 Parmet, Richard
Nixon and His America 1990, 130-31.
119 Wicker, One of Us.
1991, 180.
Parmet gives Nixon
credit for being much more vocal and aggressive on
individual economic rights for blacks than most fellow
Republicans. He later argues this same view led Nixon to
his concern for "black capitalism." See Parmet, Richard
Nixon a nd His America 1990, 267-69, 546.
.

.

.

99

hear about „

But , as hig notes
suggegt

Nixon

^

domestic agenda in mind
as well:

^

a

St

Wlth ne ^tive
L^ET
^f position xndefensxble

opposition opposition to
security, wages, housing,
medical
care.
We must believe & sell
ideas
WS
° ffer a System which
^eets
thf n
tt6r " bY receivi
Minimum
aovt aid & maximum ind
govt
[ependent]
terprise & voluntary cooperative eneffort [Nixon's abbreviations] 120

,T
^

^

.

Nixon's campaign continued
to oppose "compulsory
regimentation" on major domestic

issues (health care was a

prime example). 121
Nor was this criticism confined
to Democratic admini.
strations, as many Nixon observers
claim.
Nixon argued
that such power in Republican
hands was equally intrusive
and dangerous, and erroneously
believed Eisenhower
recog-

nized the same problem.

This view even led Nixon to call

for a retrenchment of Republican
government during the
1956 campaign, arguing the protection of
individual free-

dom demanded greater attention. 122

During his campaign

for the presidency in 1960, Nixon
argued that "terrible

hazards" would emerge if government were
allowed to con-

tinue to interfere with the lives of citizens. 123

The

120 Parmet,

Richard Nixon and His America 1990, 190.
121parmet, Richard Nixon and His America 1990, 189.
122 Ambrose/ Nixon,
1989, 328-29;
Keogh, This is Nixon
.

.

1956, 80-81, 158-59.
l 23 Earl
Mazo, Richard

Portrait (New York:

Nixon: A Political and Personal
Harper and Row, 1959) 282-83.
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contrast that Hi XO n drew
het W een oommjnism
during that campaign also
r ef l eoted these
liefs.124

^
fce _

Nixon repeated this theme
during the 1968 and 1972
Presidential contests. 125 During
the 1968

^

argued that "Government is
formed to protect the individual's life, property and
rights, and to help the
helpless - not to dominate a
person's life or rob him of
his
self-respect. "126 William Safire
notes that Nixon insisted on adding the following
to a speech to be delivered
on October 11
-one candidate advocates
concentrating
more and more power in the federal
government;
I say it
is time for new policies
which will move power away from
Washington back to the states, local
governments and the
people. "127 while Nixon clearly
preferred state and local
government to federal intervention, he
rarely dis,

tinguished between the two.

when he did so, he con-

sistently made reference to local government
as being
closest to the people. Even during his

1963-67 exile from

politics, Nixon continued to speak on the
theme of de-

l 24 Parmet,

Richard Nixon and His America 1990, 353-54.
125 Ea rl Mazo and
Stephen Hess, Nixon: A Political
Portrait (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 314-15; The
Clearest Choice 1972, 20-23, 45, 60-61.
126 Sa fire, Before the Fall
1977, 61.
127safire, Before the Fall
1977, 95.
.
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centralists

and the

in

, ortanoe

^

Qf

local communities. 12

^

At the beginning of
Nixon's administration,
these
Political be i iefs Bere meanfc
tQ aot ag a guiae
luring the early first
months, while he still
retained
confidence in the Cabinet as
an agency for change,
Nixon
circulated a copy of John
Gardner's Godwin lectures,
which
had recently been delivered
at Harvard.
Nixon attached a
note to his cabinet members
and White House staff,
saying
in part »I found John
Gardner's Godlcin lectures
expressed
better than anything I have
read what I hope would be
the
Philosophy of this administration."
ln the circulated
copy of the lectures, Nixon
made a point of underlining
the parts of Gardner's argument
calling for putting faith
in private, not public,
institutions and the need to restore the "vitality of local
leadership" over centralized
planning. 12 9
As alluded to earlier, Nixon made
these beliefs the

centerpiece of his attack on the Great
Society, giving his
words a partisan edge but keeping the
focus of his criti-

cism of Democratic policies on their
undermining effect on
individual and community life. 13 0 As Tom wicker
noteg/

Nixon's opposition to bureaucratic power had
little to do
12 8Richard M.

Nivnn. ed. Howard Bremer (Dobbs Ferry,
New
York:
Oceana Publications, 1975), 95
12 ^Parmet,
9
Richard Nixon and His America 1990, 533-34.
130 Reichley, Conserva
tives in an Aae of Chance 1981, 169;
Nixon, In the Arena
1990, 352.
.

.
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with the Democrats still
i„ the bureauoracy
The pres ._
dent's views were brought
with hi m to Washington,
and were
not shaped by the Washington
bureaucracy at the ti me he
took office:
_

Nixon actually had a certain
domestic vision, a commodity definable
not every
president has brought to the
White
House:
he wanted, and to some
extent
achieved, a government doing
what
needed to be done for the
welfare of
the nation, but doing it
with a diminished concentration of power
in
Washington. 13 1

Nixon remained, in the words of
one observer, "surprisingly constant" in his application
of

those beliefs to

domestic policy, through efforts at
reorganization and his
unwillingness to compromise on revenue
sharing when presented to Congress. 132 This determination
and consistency
led Richard Nathan to conclude that
Nixon's decentralization plan was hardly one of political
expedience (as one
might expect Neustadt to argue), since
it called for the

decentralization of a broad range of categories
and made
numerous enemies. 133
131wicker, One of Us
1991, 540-41.
The Plot That Failed. 1975, 16; Rather and
Gates The Palace Guard, 1974, 231-32; John Osborne,
The
Second Year of th e Nixon Watch (New York: Liveright
Press, 1971), 148-49;
and, more generally, Nixon
Presidential Press Conferences. 1978, 251-52 and Dommel,
The Politics of Revenue Sharing 1974, 111-12 for his
determined attitude on revenue sharing.
133Nathan, The Plot That Failed 1975, 22-23, 26.
.

132 Na than,
'
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One might even argue
N xon
.

,

s

^^^^

.

fr enaships

^_

fleet this set of core
political be ii efs at the
risfc Qf
engaging in revisionist
•psychobiography. - Nixon aia
have
few close friends, and
the people who did get
close to him
were all "self-made"
entrepreneurs: Don Kendall,
Robert
Abplanalp, and Bebe Reboso.
to name the more important
friends 13 *
,

Far from being an opportunist
or mere pragmatist,
Nixon held a core set of beliefs
throughout his career and
during some very different
periods of history. Herbert
Parmet neatly summarized those
beliefs in his recent biography of Nixon, listing them as
..the encouragement of individual
enterprise, protection of those with
modest means from economic hazards
as
the nation bumped along through
the
uncertainties of reconversion, and a
consistent sense of nationalism and
realpolitik in dealing with the rest
of the world. 13 5

With these ideological goals in mind, the
reasons for
Nixon's administrative strategy can be better
understood.

A second important element of Nixon's belief
system is his
well documented belief in the primacy of executive
power.

Nixon viewed the president as the "tribune of the general
interests," acting for people in government and, in this

1

O

A

Parmet,
135 Parmet,

Richard Nixon and His America
Richard Nixon and His America
104

.

.

1990,
1990,

396,

116.

400.

case, even against
govern.nent.136

It is lmportant

^

^

cognise, however, thl.
view did not include
public PBrtl .
cipation in the process or
governing. The people
speak , t
the ballot box, in Nixon's
a view
view, and
ana i-h.„
then expect the
president to act (in coita.h
contrast to Jimmy Carter,
as the next
chapter will demonstrate,.^
This presidential
is motivated by the
ideological ends or,

words, the "great goals"
of a leader. 13 8

in Nixon's own

Until that

dominance was secured through
the use of the Domestic
Council and, later, the
"counter-bureaucracy," the administration seemed to drift through
domestic policy action.
Once that control was established,
however,

a clear pattern of action emerged aimed
at the goal of decentralizing
government .13 9

Additionally, revenue sharing was a
necessity for
decentralization, without the revenue
sharing plan, de-

centralization would be meaningless, as
control over money
would give permanent control to Congress.
By selectively
decentralizing the government through a program
of revenue
sharing, Nixon hoped to return elements
of government

power to the individual or local government.

The inten-

Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Politics. Position
and Power (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986), 110;
Reichley, Conserva tives in an Aae of Change 1981,
247.
137 Jules Witcover,
Marathon (New York: viking Press
1977), 398-99.
138 Nixon, In the Arena
1990, 286-87.
139 Theodore White, The
Making of the President, 1972 (New
York:
Atheneum Publishers, 1973), 180.
.

.
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tion of revenue sharing
was clear to all, and
Congress
responded shortly after Nixon
took office by taking hack
the power he had wrested
from them. 140 As Tom
wicker
Points out, Nixon- s revenue
sharing approach was
...perhaps the most successful
example
of h 1S hope to reorder
government
responsibilities so that necessary
services could be performed
at the
most appropriate level... if
revenue
sharxng did not come close
to the
promised 'revolution,' it was
still a
good try at redeeming government
... 141

Thus, the central dilemma of
the Nixon domestic

agenda can be explained by examining
Nixon's own disposition to decentralization and executive

action, two

beliefs which created both centralization
and decentralization, presidential control and
political de-control,

greater regulation and self -regulation, all
at the same
time. 142

As Theodore White described the Nixon
paradox in

1975:

[Nixon] held, as a leadership credo,
that the president must control the
government personally; but he held,
as a political credo, that the Federal
government must get rid of most of

140 Ne lson Polsby,

"Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons
for the Political System, " Political Science Quarterly 93
(Spring 1978):
17;
Safire, Before the Fall
1977, 7.
141wicker, One of Us
1991, 529.
142price With Nixon. 1977, 76-77; Evans and Novak, Nixon
in the White House. 1971, 241-43;
Reichley, Conservative
in an Age of Chance
1981, 70.
.
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these controls- social,
administrative, economic - which
the Democrats
had so long concentrated
in Washing14
ton.

3

The contradictory nature of
the Nixon agenda, therefore,
can only be made intelligible
through a better understanding of Nixon's "belief
system."

3 White,

The Making of the President. 1972

107

.

1973,

181.

CHAPTER III

BELIEFS AND FAILURE

:

THE CARTER PRESIDENCY

An examination of the Carter
presidency clearly reveals the troublesome role
beliefs can play in decision
making: political beliefs
can lead presidents to make
serious policy mistakes which
can frustrate their own
success.
This chapter will examine the
administrative
strategies on reorganization and
budgeting selected by
Carter and will demonstrate that
Carter's beliefs led him
to pursue failed policies in both
areas.
The first and
second sections of this chapter outline
the policy
decisions on reorganization and budgeting
and the con-

sequences they produced.

Section three analyzes these

decisions using the "rational decider" and
"personalitymodels, and argues that neither model can
adequately

account for the decisions made by the president.

The last

section reexamines the decisions in light of Carter's

political beliefs, and

demonstrates that the "belief

system" model can better explain Carter's behavior.

108

2
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ArtmlnW ation,
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Jimmy Carter^ campaign
for the presidency in
1976
was unusual in the stress
it placed on administrative
reform. No previous
candidate for that office
made reorganization a central theme in
the campaign, but Carter
repeatedly stressed the need
for change in the executive
branch, warning voters not
to support him if they
did not
support reform.
His campaign autobiography
1
argued these
changes could be achieved
because they had been successful
at the state level, including
Carter's home state of Georgia;
the so-called "Georgia example"
with reorganization
became a centerpiece of Carter's
campaign
speeches.

Carter's interest in the issue of
reorganization was
further highlighted by the establishment
of a working
group on reorganization planning during
his campaign,

chaired by Harrison Wellford and staffed
by a dozen

professional administrators.

The group was charged with

developing recommendations for changes in
federal organization and began their review of the executive
branch
almost immediately.

Their early recommendation for the

1 John

Dempsey, "Carter's Reorganization: A Midterm Appraisal," Public Administr ation Review 39 (January/ February 1979)
74.
2 Jimmy
Carter, Why Not t he Best? (Nashville:
Boardman,
:

1975),

105-16.
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e St a blishment of a
Deparfcment of

Enew

^_

nounced by candidate
Carter.
Carter recognized
reorganization would not be
an easy
matter, noting in the
1974 announcement of his
candidacy
that "This is no job for
the faint-hearted.
It will be
met with violent opposition
from those who en joy a
special
Privilege, those who prefer
to work in the dark,
or those
whose private fiefdoms are
threatened. -4 The announcement
is particularly noteworthy
in that Carter
did not cite

more traditional goals for
reorganization, such as efficiency or cost-effectiveness.
instead, Carter intimated
his motivation lay in moving
the control of administration
from private power to other
hands.
His plans to do so
were ambitious even in the
face of this anticipated opposition.
Early in his campaign, Carter
announced that he
Planned to reduce the number of
federal agencies from
1,

900 to 200 through reorganization.

5

Believing that swift action would
be needed to
overcome the "violent opposition" he
expected, the newly
inaugurated Carter quickly moved to begin
his reorgani-

sed Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidgnry (PrincetonPrinceton University Press, 1986), 308.
4 The
quotation is from Carter's 1974 announcement of
his
intention to run for office. Quoted by Carter
in "Remarks
to Reporters Announcing the Executive Branch
Reorganization Studies," Public Pan ers of
fchg President-*, of fh.
United States, Jimmy Carter Vol. II (Washington,
D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 1192.
5 Joel
Havemann, "Reorganization - How Clean Can Carter's
Broom Sweep?" National Journal 9 (January 1, 1977): 6.
.

1

10

zation efforts.

At his

f irst

Cabinet meeting/

^

asked each department
head to submit a
preliminary reorganization plan no later
than February 15. 6
0nly twQ
weeks after taking office,
Carter spent a great deal
of
time during his first
fireside chat discussing
the reorganization effort he was
proposing. citing the need
to
make government more
"competent" and "compassionate,"
Carter explained he would
immediately seek congressional
renewal of his authority as
president to set reorganization policy.7 As his
announcement speech
suggegtedj
Carter noted his goal was to
improve

^

communication, not

efficiency alone, stating "Ordinary
people should be able
to understand how our own
Government works, and to get
satisfactory answers to questions. "8
Following the speech, Carter created
a President's
Reorganization Project committee (prp)
within the Office
of Management and Budget to make
recommendations for

agency reorganization.

Chaired by Richard Pettigrew, the

PRP reported directly to Carter
but maintained a close

Untitled Memo, Bert Lance to Cabinet Members,
February 4
Box 270 [CF O/A 28] [1], Domestic Policy Staff
File
Jimmy Carter Library.
1977,

Presidency 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978), 69A.
8 "Address
From the White House Library," Public Papers of
the Presidents of the Uni ted States, Jimmv Carter. 1977
Vol. I (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government
Printing Office, 1977), 73.
.
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association with OMB action
on budgeting
eluded a group of political

The PRP in .

appointees. 0MB careerists
and

a group of administrators
"detailed" to the prp by
the

individual agencies themselves.10

within its f irst year
the PHP staff had swollen
to 300, with a $2,172,000
operating budget, a considerable
commitment of staff and
money.
Two days after the first
fireside chat, Carter formally submitted a request to
Congress for renewal of the
president's authority to submit
executive branch reorganization plans directly to the
legislature." The power to
do so had lapsed following
Nixon's attempt to secure
passage of his second round of
reorganizations

to establish the"superagencies," and
Carter believed the authority
was critical to the success of
his reorganization ef-

fort. 13

initially, Carter planned to merely
ask for a

renewal of Nixon's authority, but his
reorganization staff
made several recommendations to Carter
for the expansion
of that power. 14 The authority Carter
eventually re-

quested went well beyond Nixon's powers by
granting Carter
9 Mem

Hamilton Jordan to Bert Lance and Richard Petti
"Structure for Reorganization Effort," Box 52,
Hamilton Jordan's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
l°Dempsey, "Carter's Reorganization," 74.
HArnold, Making t he Managerial Presidency 1986, 311.
l 2 Public
Papers o f the Presidents. Jimmy Carter 1977,
0/

grew,

.

.

1977,

81-84.

Richard Pettigrew, "Improving Government Competence,"
Publius 8 (Spring 1978): 100.
l 4 Havemann,
"Reorganization," 4.
1

12

certain new freedoms for
proposing and amenaing
mlt plans to Congres3

wMch

^

wouia
enaotea
days if congress did not
vote to veto the plan.
But Carter asked for additional
power to submit amendments
to
those plans within 30 days
of their submission,
giving him
the power to bargain and
compromise with members and
avoid
the possibility of
Congressional amendments.
Carter also
revested that Congress eliminate
earlier rules which stipulated that only one plan be
submitted in any 30 day
Period, that each plan cover
only one executive area,
and
that each plan submitted carry
detailed information on
cost savings.
Finally, carter requested the
reorganization power be granted for the
entire four year period of
his administration. 15 As Peri
Arnold reflected on these
changes, he noted:
,

^

In this light, the reorganization
authority, as it had been altered for
Carter, seemed an ideal means for
seeking small to medium scale organizational change. The alterations gave
the president more flexibility about
what could be included within one
plan, more flexibility over the frequency with which plans could be sent
to Congress, and more latitude on the
justifications contained within those
plans. 16

Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency
Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency

1

13

.

.

1986,
1986,

309.
310.

in other words, the
Carter reor g ani 2a tion

revest was

designed to piace the
greatest am ount of control
over the
legislative process in
Carter's
hands.

Approval of this new power
was forthcoming, but
some
meters of Congress expressed
reservations. Carter had
met with congressional
leaders on November 17,
197 6 to
discuss the renewal of Nixon's
earlier power, particularly
the inability of Congress
to amend the president's
proposals. 17 The new reguests
ra sed
.

^^

wati<M<

^

the method of approval
(adoption through Congressional
inaction) remained the main
point of contention. Abraham
Ribicoff CD-Conn. >, as Chair of
the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, was willing
to simply endorse Carter's
requests, but Jack Brooks <D-Texas),
Ribicoff s counterpart as the Chair of the House
Government Operations Committee, objected on constitutional
grounds and demanded a
'

positive vote by Congress for each
reorganization plan be
required. 18 The new proposed changes
in
presidential

authority made passage even more uncertain
in the face of
Brooks's almost certain opposition.
Carter submitted his new requests on February
1977.

4,

Four days later, Ribicoff convened hearings
on the

request in the Senate, with a series of favorable
wit-

nesses testifying to the necessity of the new
presidential
l 7 Havemann,

"Reorganization," 5.
"Carter's Plans for Reorganization Get Mixed
Reception," National Journal 9 (February 12, 1977): 2 55.
18 Havemann,

1

14

authority.

Xn the House, HR 3407
was introduced as the
President's version of the
reorganization revest, whiie
Brooks proposed a substitute
bill, HR 3131.
On March 3,
the Senate voted 92-0
to agree to the
president's reQtuest.19
In the House , a comprom
ge bui/ RR so4o
on March 29 by a 395-22
vote.
while Representative Brooks
still opposed the presidential
"fiat" of reorganization
approval, he did manage to
limit Carter's authority
to a
three year period and demand
that cost savings figures
be
required in all proposals. with
those concessions, Brooks
grudgingly voted in favor of the
compromise, calling it
"the best unconstitutional bill
that can be drawn up."
on
March 31, a House-Senate compromise
bill, identical to
that passed by the House, was
sent to Carter. 20
.

^

Thus,

in the end, Congress granted
Carter new reor-

ganization authority, but not all the
particulars he had
requested. Carter still took pride in
the passage of the
Reorganization Act, signing the bill into
law on April 6.
At the bill signing ceremony, Carter
reemphasized
the

importance of reorganization to his administration,
and
stressed the public would play a key role in
the formu-

lation of reorganization agendas:

y

"Executive Reorganization Powers: Action to Date in the
95th Congress," Congressional Digest, 56 (April 1977)106-7.
20,,
Recent Major Action in the Congress," Congressional
Digest 56 (May 1977):
129-30.
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1

The reorganization
process which is
set into motion today
will be an open
one.
we intend to involve
the Con
SS/ Sta " e
l0Cal governments,
and
,
"ups and citizens
«*>
will
wiii be r^ri
affected by change. We
shall
depend on public awareness
and participation to help us pinpoint
problems,
to originate ideas and
solutions, and
to provide reactions
to various options developed by
reorganization
study teams which are already
at
work 2

^

f

By the end of August, the
PRP had already begun 3
0
studies of reorganization
proposals in seven major areas:
economic development, general
government, human resources,
natural resources, national
security and international
affairs, management improvement,
and regulatory
22

reform.
in July, carter sent to Congress
a first Reorganization
Plan, proposing to consolidate
many of the White House
staff positions as well as a
reorganization plan for the

Executive Office of the President. 23

The plan reduced the

White House staff from 485 positions
to 351 and the EOP
staff by 15%.
The plan eliminated the Domestic
Council

created by Nixon, the Council on International
Economic
Policy, the Office of Telecommunications
Policy, the

Federal Property Council, the Office of Drug
Abuse Policy,
21 "Statement on Signing
S.,626 into Law," Public Papers of
the Presidents. Jimmy Carter. 1977 vol. I,
1977, 573.
22 David Beam,
"Public Administration is Alive and Well and Living in the White House," Public Administration
Review 38 (January/ February 1978), 72-73.
2 3 Betty
Glad, Jimmy Carter (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1980),
412
.

.
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the Energy Resources
Council
11 and the
hh e Economic
*
Opportunity
Council. 24 The
r*A*n,-,*-4
ine reductions
were
«j-e not an
all f-v,«
they seemed, however, as many upper
level managers were simply
transferred
rather than eased from
office. As one member
of the reor .
ganization team suwnarized
the changes, ..it was a
reduction of Indians, rather
than chiefs." Nevertheless,
the
changes did mark an important
conceptual change in the
expected expansion of the
EOP.25 In Auffu3t>

ther proposed a 40% reduction
in the number of federal
advisory committees and
commissions. 26 Carter seemed
ouite serious about fulfilling
his promise to streamline
government 27
The aims of this reorganization
effort remained
vague, however, beyond this
seemingly traditional goal.
The administration advocated
a "bottom-up" approach to

"Carter Proposes White House
Reorganization," National
51
Journal 9 (July 23, 1977):
1165.
25 D om Bonafede,
"White House Reorganization Separating
*
S bStanCe '" N * tional
(August
9
20
?977?:
1307 ?
26pettigrew, "Improving Government
Competence," 101
Not everyone in the White House was
pleased with these
changes, however.
Hamilton Jordan was informed about cuts
in his office and complained "If the
cuts were going to
affect everyone equally I could justify
having to lose two
persons.. Under your proposal, I will make
the greatest
sacrifice of any senior staff member and will
have the
smallest staff. GIVE ME BACK MY ONE PERSON."
Undated
Memo, Hamilton Jordan to Harrison Wellford
and A D
Frazier [CF, O/A 646] [3], Box 53, Reorganization
File,
Jimmy Carter Library. Apparently worried the
reorganization team would think he was joking, Jordan included
a
handwritten note at the bottom of the memo, saying "I'm
serious about this."

^naj

1
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administrative reform,
allowina
owlng *
m «„<
a niaximum
amount of input
from the people direotly
af£eoted by
citizens were to lodge
complaints and surest
reforms for
the agency in question
directly to the prp.28
To
strengthen and expand citizen
participation, each department was ordered in March
1978 to create a public
pattl .
cipation funding program. 29
PRP staf£

^

^

described and defended the
bottom-up" approach in a
speech before the National
Capital Area Chapter of the
American Society for Public
Administration on December
1977, explaining:

1,

We've labeled this the
"bottom-up"
approach to contrast it with prior
efforts that tried to reorganize
from
the "top-down" - tackling
everything
at once and looking only at
the top
level structure of departments
and
agencies. We think "bottom-up"
is infinitely preferable because it
bases
recommendations on real evidence of
problems; allows the most appropriate
solution - whether structural, procedural or administrative; and avoids
all or nothing confrontations ..
.The
third major distinguishing characteristic of our approach is its openness.
Past reorganizers have developed proposals in relative secrecy
and sprung them on the Congress and
2 g Pettigrew,

"Improving Government Competence," 1978, 102See
also President's Reorganization Authority Mater3.
ials, Domestic Policy Staff, "Questions and
Answers on the
President's Reorganization Project," April 6, 1977 [CF
O/A
28] [1], Domestic Policy Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
29 Memo, Jimmy
Carter to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, May 16, 1979, Box FG-3, WHCF-Federal GovernmentOrganizations, Jimmy Carter Library.
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the people. We see
no benefits in
that approach. We want
to take advantage of all the expertise
available
in this country, learn
the lessons of
the past, and test our
proposals before we ask the President
to make decisions J0
Thus,

the "bottom-up" strategy
required citizen participation to provide the focus
for its efforts at reorganization, without that
participation, the PRP would

have a difficult time isolating
problems and the administration would lose the benefit
of the public- . experience
dealing with the federal bureaucracy. 31
As a result,

citizens were given several avenues
for input into prp
deliberations:
interest group surveys on
organizational
issues were distributed to
approximately 1000 groups after
a more general public appeal was
filed in the July
7,

Federal Register

,

1977

as well as an additional 25,000
forms to

smaller organizations;

sessions with representatives of

larger organizations such as the AFL-CIO,
Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, League of
Women Voters, New

Directions

,

National Association of Counties, National

Conference of State Legislatures, and the National
League
of Cities and the Conference of Mayors;

reorganization

staff members debriefed the 37 Federal Information
Center
30,,

Remarks of Jim Mclntyre before American Society for
Public Administration, National Capital Area Chapter,
December 1, 1977," 12/1/77-2/6/80, Box 79, WHCF- Government
Reform Neustadt, Jimmy Carter Library.
31 Jean Conley
and Joel Havemann, "Reorganization - Two
Plans, One Department Down, Much More to Come," National
Journal 9 (December 3, 1977):
1872.
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Regional Managers on the
historic pattern of citizen
complaints and questions
concerning government performance;
material collected through
the White House mail
from individual citizens;
clipping surveys;

and, finally, a series of public
speeches and open meetings by

Director Pettigrew himself .32

The plan to allow direct

citizen input into the reorganization
project had its more
humorous side as well: the PRP was
plagued by calls from
one citizen in Iowa who insisted
upon payment for ideas he
had submitted for reorganization
which were subsequently
adopted.
Eventually, the man threatened to
sue PRP director Pettigrew in a District of
Columbia court for failing
to provide reimbursement 33
.

Public consultation was also expanded
by the prp to
include a survey of Congressional constituent
problems.

Pettigrew organized a survey of congressional
offices
during the summer of 1977, noting in his report
to the
President on September 29 that the survey
"...provides an
excellent source of bottom-up information on government

performance;"

Pettigrew noted later in that report that

the survey had been "well received" and had provided
"rich

detail on the day-to-day functioning of federal programs
32 Memo,

Richard Pettigrew to Jody Powell, July 13, 1777,
"Public Involvement Activities Report," Box FG-57, WHCFFederal Government-Organizations, Jimmy Carter Library.
•^Letter, Hazel Fulton to Richard Pettigrew, June 14,
1977, "Call from Bill Dennis, Iowa City, Iowa," Box FG-57,
WHCF-Federal Government-Organizations, Jimmy Carter
Library.
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from the perspective of
the average citizen. The survey
was returned by some
200 members of Congress,
chiefly
Democrats who apparently were
doing their
best to coop-

erate with the new administration.34

0n October

2

^

President Carter sent a memorandum
to the heads of executive departments and agencies,
noting that "Senators and

Congressmen devote a good portion
of their time and staff
resources... to helping individual
constituents deal with
government agencies." Carter went
on to ask the agency
heads to provide the Office of
Management and Budget with
information on how the agencies were
handling
these com-

plaints 35
But the rationale behind this
choice of strategy re-

mained vaguely stated at best, and the
specifics of the
changes Carter would seek were not
provided;

instead, a

series of "goals" were offered to justify
the value of
reform itself. 36 contradictory lists of
goals began to

emerge in the press, however, and the rationale
behind the
early reorganization decisions remained hazy,
while one
might dismiss the confusion as a public relations
probl<.em

OA

Memo, Richard Pettigrew to the President, September
29,
1977, "Survey of Congressional Constituent Problems," Box
FG-147, WHCF-Federal Government-Organizations, Jimmy
Carter Library.
Unless otherwise noted, the emphasis in this
memo and those which follow are those of the original

author.
35 Memo, Jimmy Carter to
Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, October 28, 1977, "Survey of Congressional
Constituent Problems," Box FG-57, WHCF-Federal GovernmentOrganizations, Jimmy Carter Library.
36 Arnold, Making the Managerial
Presidency 1986, 312-13.
.
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PKP was having explaining
lts aotions<

^^
w
^
^ ^ ^.^^
^

surprising number of memos,
rai s i„ g
. tloa . abQut
seals of reorganization,
had begun circulating
in the

prp
in the fall of 1 977
,
several months
tion.s efforts in this area,
and certainly late in
the
decision making process when
one considers the time
and
energy being devoted to
reorganization that summer.
Members of the prp staff held
a meeting in the first
wee, of
November to reassess the P RP
S efforts and goals.
The
report to Harrison Wellford
summarizing the results of the
meeting suggests an organization
"adrift., from the mooring
clear goals provide. For
example, the memorandum argues
Carter's original reorganization
effort, the "Georgia
example,
attempted to restructure government
through
.

••

agency reductions.

Although such a plan could work
on the
state level, the memo argues such
reductions are
not

likely to be the focus of the PRP's
future work (indeed,
the participants shared considerable
doubts that the ..bottom-up" strategy was at all appropriate
to such changes).
Nor could the committee justify reorganization
as a costcutting device. Instead, the committee
embraced the ideas
of productivity (in the sense of
coordination of programs

and fair enforcement of rules) and, more
importantly, responsiveness (including "increase public participation
and
openness").

The conclusion of the memo best illustrates

the confusion surrounding the PRP's goals:

122

i
3 r6al Problem ^re.
We arfnn Stating
? f
Ur 9° als
a
it.l than confident °
less
fashion) in terms
of productivity and
responsiveness
8 n ° t Ut lGaSt
t0 me)
that'th"
that
1
the results
(projects) will in
most cases be seen to
reflect or further those goals to any
significant
degree
parti
r, a
aa
.reorganisation pi nnn which
shift functions and programs from one
to another will not ^Tamati department
rally -improve productivity and r fi BDQn piL fl
any more than they will
reduce agency
numbers or save budget dollars
i
would offer the hypothesis
that,
generally speaking, program
shifting
through reorganization plans
can
mamly be justified by reference
to
goals intelligible mainly from
a
bureaucratic perspective; such
goals
are not insubstantial, but
by themselves they will not do much
to sell
the program or to turn it into
a
selling point for the President. 37

^

*

m

r^

»

A few weeks later, auucner
another ppp
r,*.^,
^kp internal
memo agreed,
stating:
,•

'

To date we have n ot done an adequate
job of establishi ng firmly in our own
minds, and communicating to the nnt-side world, the go als of the reorgani zation, the rationale for our ap proach, and the signif iciance of thin
effort in contrast to others
The
result is some embarrassment and frustration about the vagueness and
generality of our goals (and our inability thus far to operationally
37 Memo,

Si Lazarus to Stuart Eizenstat, November 11,
1977,
"Reorganization Planning," Box 79, Government Reform-Neu-'

stadt, Jimmy Carter Library.
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Ur projects in terms
of these
oof lo? some doubts
goals),
about the wisdom
of our approach, and
a hesitancy to
engage our critics and
aggressively
sell our efforts to the
public.
i
think this continuing
uncertainty
about our goals and approach
is unjustified and increasingly
counterproductive. 38

The memo went on to note
the »bottom-up» approach was
largely responsible for the
drift in the organization,
since such a strategy requires
that no coordinating principles exist (or the underlying
rationale, openness, is
lost)

Given the discontinuity between
the actions being
taken by the administration in
the series of reorganization plans submitted to Congress
and the strategy for
formulating reorganization through a
"bottom-up" approach,
it is not surprising the members
of the PRP were puzzled

by the strategy they were following.

Members found the

methods they were employing to gather
information were

inappropriate to the type of reorganization they
knew
would be politically beneficial, while the
Carter administration made it clear how it would seek to reorganize,
it
was decidedly unclear as to why it was following
the path
it had chosen.

Memo ' Keith Miles to Peter Szanton, November 22, 1977,
"The Carter Reorganization:
Its Goals, Rationale and
Distinguishing Characteristics," Box 79, Government
Ref orm-Neustadt, Jimmy Carter Library.
124

Despite the confusion
at prp cart-^-carter's first efforts
were followed by a series
of reorganlzation
plans
with ffrea t regularity
to Congress between
1977 and 1980
By the time of his first
Annual Message to Congress
on
January 19, 1978, Carter
could claim the initial
efforts
at reorganization a
success, as the administration
had
managed to streamline the
Executive Office

^

of the President as well as the White
House staff, combined eleven
agencies into a new Department
of Energy and abolished
500
advisory committees and small
agencies. 39 a second Reorganization Plan of 1977 had been
announced on October 11,
proposing to comiine the United
States Information Agency
and the State Department s
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 40 The 1978 plans
noluded efforts fco
enforce non-discrimination rules
by consolidating a number
of "equal employment" activities
in the E<Iual Employment
•

.

Opportunity Commission, to create a Federal
Emergency
Management Agency for the improvement
of emergency preparedness, to abolish the Civil Service
Commission by
splitting its functions into two new
agencies (the Office
of Personnel Management and the Merit
System Protection
Board) and to clarify the responsibilities
of the Depart-

ments of Treasury and Labor for administering the
Employee
3Q

"Annual Message to Congress, January 19, 1978," Public
Papers of the P residents; Jimmv Carter. 197ft vol. I
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1979), 108.
40 Conley and Havemann,
"Reorganization," 1872-73.
.
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Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.41 The 1979
plang
included the establishment
of an Office of Federal
inspector for the Alaska Natural
Gas Transportation System,
an
international Development
Cooperation Agency to coordinate
government activities relating
to the developing world,
the consolidation of various
trade functions into an
Office of U.S. Trade
Representative and the clarification
of the responsibilities of
the Department of Commerce.
Finally, the last plan,
submitted in 1980, increased
the
authority of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the
powers of its chair. 42

While Carter's efforts at
reorganization were
obviously far reaching, they quickly
developed into a
struggle with Congress over "turf"
between agencies.

Harrison Wellford discovered there was
very little
"unidentified territory" between agencies,
and that each
reorganization proposal meant a protracted
set of nego-

tiations between the affected agencies
and members of
Congress. 43 Carter had much greater success
with his

second element of reform, the proposal to
change the Civil
Service Commission and the creation of a Merit
System

Protection Board, designed to guarantee the neutrality
of
civil service appointments, and the Office of Personnel
4lDempsey, "Carter's Reorganization," 75; Arnold, Making
the Man agerial Presidency 1986, 328.
42 Arnold, Making the
Managerial Presidency 1986, 328-29.
43 Joel Havemann,
"Carter's Reorganization Plans - Scrambling for Turf," National Journal 10 (May 20, 1978): 788.
.

.
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Mana gement to serve as
a staff ag enc on
y
personnel (although the function of
both wou ld be radically
altered by
the Reagan administration,
as the next chapter
win
strate)
The reforms also created
a Senior Executive
Service, a pool of movable
administrative executives at
the
senior level, as well as
a new set of guidelines
for performance appraisal. Although
these reforms did manage
to
pass through Congress,
pressure to compromise on many
issues threatened to reduce
their ef f ectiveness 44
only a
major lobbying effort by
Carter managed to fend off
many
of the challenges to the
administration's reform efforts,
and Carter found his efforts
were benefited (and perhaps
scived) by a. public which
supported reform. 45

ca-

.

.

Thus, the Carter administration
began with a commitment to reform the bureaucracy,
and Carter immediately
sought to meet that commitment by
requesting expanded

presidential authority to reorganize
the federal bureaucracy.
But these structural changes were
unable
to im-

prove Carter's ability to govern well
by achieving the
goals of efficiency and "compassion"
he professed in 1976.
Indeed, the proposals themselves were
traditional in their

conception and appeared quite contradictory as
they centralized agency and executive control of reform
while

simultaneously pursuing a "bottom-up" strategy for
agenda
44 Jack Knott and
Gary Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy; The
Politics of Institutional Chang* (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-

tice-Hall, 1987), 242-47.
45 Arnold, Making the
Managerial Presidency
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1986,

333-35.

settings

ln other „ oraS;

^

^

reforms
secure presidential
control over the reform
effort and
left many despairing
Carter, focus on the
political
details of reform while
ignoring the ends to which
the
political system may be used. 47

B
.

The zero Based

Al^rrmWa,

Carfcer

,

Bu fla a

t

r

]

^

i
,

Like reorganization,
Carter's plan to reform the
budget process was a major
issue in the 1976 campaign.
The zero based budgeting
plan Carter proposed as a
reform
measure, however, was a well
rehearsed concept. 48 Carter
began championing the plan to
use zero based budgeting
ZBB) to set executive
priorities in speeches to the
National Press Club on February
9, 1973, during the Law
Day Celebration at the University
of Georgia in May 1974,
and at the National Governor's
Conference the following
month.
his standard speech delivered to
these groups,
(

m

Carter described the reorganization
program he used to
streamline Georgia's executive branch (the
antecedent to
the reorganization effort described in
the previous sec-

46 Beam,

"Public Administration is Alive and Well,"
75.
Arnold, Making the Mana gerial Presidency
1986, 336.
48There seems to be some dispute concerning the
hyphenation of "zero based budgeting"; while some writers
provxde hyphens, I choose to follow the spelling used
by the
Carter White House, which omits them.
.
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tion,.

Key to that e££ort<
he arjuea
a
zero based budgeting.
in wMch
every program; existina
and proposed. must now
vie for funding ln the
new bu(Jget
on an e
l level
Every single dQllar
Justified if it ls to be
recorded by the governor for
funding in the following
year's budget. "49

^

_

..

_

W

^

.

zbb was to

provide a mechanism for strict
scrutiny of government
activities,
such scrutiny would not
come from above,
however, as had been the
case in previous budget
reform
measures.
instead, the ZBB strategy
called for scrutiny
from below.
The goal of the ZBB plan in
Georgia, Carter stated,
was the restoration of citizen
control over state
spending: with a zero based
budget plan in place, any
citizen would be able to monitor any
aspect of state
activity.

Additionally, state agents at the
lower levels
of the administrative chain of
command would be able to
provide input into the formulation and
prioritizing of

agency action (in effect, a "bottom-up"
strategy for budgeting)
Carter cited similar claims for his
budgeting
reform on a national level, telling Labor
.

Department

employees in the first weeks of his administration
that
zero based budgeting "..strips down your
department's

activities every year to zero.
scratch.

.

You start from

.The second thing it does is it lets employees

^Presidential Campaign. 1976. Vol.

I,

(Washington, D.C.:

United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 19.
129

1

deep within the d ep
artme nt have an input
into the budg£t _
ary syste. each year.-SO

^

In the end<

ZBB meant more open
government

.

5

The concept of zero
based budgets was simple
to
^asp. carter was first
attracted to the idea after
reading an article by Peter
P yhrr
the originator

^^

of the

,

Plan, in 1971.52

As Daniel

^

budget process has two main
steps:

in theory, zero based
budgeting calls
for total cost analysis
of all programs every year.
Each item of expenditure is to be scrutinized
to see if
it can be reduced or
eliminated.
Thus, zero base budgeting
has two distinctive characteristics.
First
budget requests are formulated
in
"decision packages" in each
management
50 "Questions

S ™ \T!

and Answer Session with
Department of Labor
Pa
nf
_^_£_L/ voi. 1 1 1977,
106.
.
Carter repeated the same
message later that day (February
9, 1977) to employees of
the Commerce Department, and on
subsequent days to em°?partme » ts of Treasury (February 10) and
HEW (February

y

S^V*

16).

T

!r

See 130-132,

159-166.

^"Questions and Answer Session with Department
of Labor
Employees,"

19-21; see also Jimmy Carter, "Zero-Base
Budgeting," Zero Base Budgeting rnmo«
ed> Logan
Cheek (New York: AMACOM, 1977), 296-303.
52 Peter Phyrr,
"Zero-Base Budgeting," Harvard Buflinesjj
Review 49 (November /Dec ember 1970): 111-21.
For a
lengthy description of the plan for ZBB,
see Phyrr, Zero
Base Budgeting (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1973T~a^d
"The Zero-Base Approach to Government
Budgeting," Public
Administration RftviPw 37 (January/ February 1977): 1-8;
see also Graeme Taylor, "Introduction to
Zero-Base
Budgeting," Contemporary Approa ches to Puhlic Budgeting
ed. Fred Kramer (Cambridge:
Winthrop Publishers, 1979)
149-61 and Joseph Woley, Zero-Base Budgeting and Program
Evaluation (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1978).

^

^

,
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minimum
"
in which all
M * functionspackage,
exxstxng
must be justified
at the lowest practical
level of
operation, forms the first
block.
Addxtxonal decision packages
offer
more program results for
greater
costs, bringing the total
budget proposals to successively
higher levels,
some below the current
level,
whxch might be at the existing one
level,
and others which represent
increased
support.
Second, each unit manager
ranks all "decision packages"
by
priority and each successively
higher
manager similarly ranks
packages
across program lines clear
to the top
of the organization. 53

By implementing this plan,
Carter stressed throughout his
campaign and in his first debate
with Gerald Ford, ZBB
would eliminate "obsolete" or
"obsolescent" programs which
could not justify their existence. 54
Through a

"bottomup" approach to budgeting, where
the individuals closest
to the agency's operations would
have the greatest influence in funding decisions, Carter
promised to return control of the federal government to
the people. 55

Carter kept his campaign pledge almost
immediately
after taking office by announcing an executive
order to

Daniel Odgen, Jr., "Beyond Zero Based Budgeting,"
Public
Administration Review 38 (November /December 1978):
528.
^Presidential Campaign. 1976. Volume 3 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1979), 69.
55 Frank Draper and
Bernard Pitsvada, "ZBB - Looking Back
After Ten Years," Public Administration Review 41 (January/February 1981): 78.
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begin zero based budgeting
in all federal agencies. 56
indeed, Carter became
involved in nearly all
aspects of
ZBB integration into
the budget process,
believing it to
be crucial to his broader
plan for reorganization
discussed in the previous
section.57 0n February
u§
Carter delivered a Valentine
Day message to the heads'
of
all federal departments
and agencies, ordering
them to
"..develop a zero base system in
accordance with instructions to be issued by the
Office of Management and
Budget." wasting no time,
Budget Director

^

^

Bert Lance met
that same day with the new
Cabinet members and briefed
them on the ZBB objectives 58
on March 21, guidelines for
ZBB planning were sent to the
departments 59 OMB quickly
followed by issuing a directive to
implement the ZBB plan
on April 19, 1977 (Number 77-9);
the directive was
.

.

quickly obeyed, to the surprise of many
observers. 60 To
facilitate the transition, OMB even
provided ZBB liaison
officers who were given a brief "pep
talk-' by
the Presi-

56 E xecutive Order,

"Implementation of the Concept of Zero
Base Budgeting," Box FI-7, WHCF-Finance
2/11/77-2/15/77,
Jimmy Carter Library.
57 Donald Haider,
"Zero Base;
Federal Style," Public
Administration Revipw
(July/August, 1977):
400, 405-

406
58 Haider, "Zero Base,"
401.
5 Joel Havemann,
"Taking Up the Tools to Tame the Bureaucracy, " National Journal 9 (April 2, 1977):
515.
60 Allen Schick, "The
Road From ZBB," Public Administration
Review 38 (March/April 1978):
177.
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dent before they were
ere senh
sent o,^
out -to advise agencies
on the
new procedures. 6 1

As with reorganization,
Carter insisted citizens
play
a role in making budget
decisions under zero based
budgeting.
Shortly after is£ming

^

Carter instructed the
department and agency heads
to
encourage participation by
state and local government
officials in their budget
process, particularly when
the
issue substantially affected
local concerns, as well
as
those of individual citizens. 62
The major focus of ZBB,
however, remained at the agency
level,
while citizens
rarely called in budget
recommendations (as they called in
reorganization suggestions), Carter
argued citizen participation would come in the form of
observation: by
eliminating secrecy from the budget
process, citizens
could help rank priorities 63 Thus,
Carter pursued budget
reform with traditional goals of
economy and efficiency in
mind, but did so to achieve a more
critical goal in the
.

process.

As Carter told Department of Interior
employees

during his first month in office,
I want to make sure that our
Government is more economical and efficient,
better organized, better administered,
more competent. At the same time, I

61 Haider,

"Zero Base," 401.
62Memo, Jimmy Carter to Bert Lance, March 8, 1977,
"Zero
Base Budgeting Guidelines," Box FI-7, WHCF-Finance, Jimmy
Carter Library.
63presidential Ca mpaign. 1976 Volume I, 1978, 19-20.
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is

cloLr,

altllltl It

S rS th
.K

"

our sovemment
Pe ° Ple and m° re sen-

"" "

e
a sense °* fear or
alienation or disappointmentdespair or
or prejudice or hatred, and
substitute for
those oharaoteristios
the national
inclinations of the people
of this
country. 64

As the Carter administration
entered its second full
year in office, however, roany
began to wonder if the
easy
transition to ZBB procedures
suggested the "new reform"
was nothing new at all. A
i though Budget
Director

^

had previously indicated ZBB
would create money to apply
to other programs and help
to eliminate

some programs, but

not balance the budget, Carter
held out hope that a
balanced budget could be achieved
through ZBB procedures. 65 carter began the year
with his Fiscal Year 1979
Budget Message, delivered on January
23, 1978, claiming
that thanks to ZBB procedures
the government had "..gained
a better understanding of federal
programs and have made

better, more evenhanded judgments;"

Carter made no claims

of ZBB success beyond this pedagogic
function, however. 66

Indeed, he seemed to hedge on the success
of ZBB in an

64 "Questions and
Answers with Department of Interior
Employees," Public Papers of fche Presidents. Jimmv p a r h P r
1977 Vol. I, 1977, 198.
,

65Memo, Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, April 29,
1977, "The
Long-Range Budget Outlook," Box FI-7, WHCF-Finance! Jimmy
Carter Library.
66 President Carter. 197ft
(Washington, D.C.:
Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1979), 76.
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interview with a group of
editQrs
days earlier, when he
told then, -xt [ZBB]
worked out well
for us.
I thin, it will
get even better in
subseguent
years because of experience
with it. "67 x more
careful
examination of that budget
revealed few changes from
the
previous year,
fact, federal spending
remained at the
same level in 1977 that
it would have reached
without the
new budgeting procedure. 68
Even Carter seemed worried
about the lack of movement
in the budget, telling

^

m

the

heads of departments and
agencies in a gently worded
memorandum:

..some agencies did better than
others. Most agencies need
to focus
more attention on objectives
and on
ways to accomplish those
objectives
more efficiently.
addition, I
think more emphasis should be
placed
on the examination of minimum
levels,
so I ask that you make additional
efforts to do this." 69

m

An OMB review of the new ZBB plan,
"Assessment of the
First Year of Zero-Based Budgeting, "
released
in May, con-

firmed this impression when it failed to
mention a single

"Interview with a Group of Editors and News Directors,
January 13, 1978," Public Pane rs of the Presidents:
Jimmy
Carter, 1978 Vol. I (Washington, D.C.:
United States
Government Printing Office, 1979), 69.
68 Schick, "The Road
From ZBB," 177.
69
Untitled Memo, Jimmy Carter to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, April 14, 1978, Box FG-2, WHCF,
Jimmy Carter Library.
,
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specific instance of savings
as a result of the new
reform;
even the minimum levels
of proposed spending
under ZBB plans cut agency
budgets by only io-m.70
ta
earlier Nationa! .Tnurnal
interview with the budget
officials of all cabinet
departments uncovered nearly
unanimous disapproval of the ZBB
approach. The budget director
for the Treasury Department.
Arthur Kalian, went on the
record stating "No matter what
OMB says about going back
to zero, we've been nibbling
at the margins. "71

mring

that previous year, agencies
faithfully following zbb
procedures still freguently lobbied
the Appropriations
Committees of Congress to restore
their reduced budgets to
the previous year's levels. 72

The departure of Lance as OMB
Director created even
more problems for ZBB: program
"liberals" who wished to
increase government services clashed
with fiscal "conservatives" within the administration,
firing off memos to
one another debating budget policy.
As a result, whatever
minimal control OMB was able to exercise
over ZBB was

quickly lost. 73

Rumors began tQ spread among federal

70 Draper and
Pitsvada,
71 Joel Havemann,

"ZBB," 77.

"The Budget - A Tax Cut, Little Else,"
National Journal 10 (January 28, 1978): 129.
72 Memo, Joe Onek
to Stuart Eizenstat, May 9, 1977,
"Soaring Appropriations," Box FI-7, WHCG-FI 4 5/1/775/31/77, Jimmy Carter Library.
Colin Campbell, Managing the Presidency (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 177-80. See also
Charles Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana University Press, 1988), 91-93.
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agencies that cnanges
chancre*? in
in t-v.»
the economy would
undermine
Carter's budget P
r ar hter
policv
0 r v,
* to
y
Car
had
issue a memo to the
department and agency heads
denying the rumors and
ordering them to continue
to use ZBB.74 By
198Q#
minimum levels of many agencies
were set above the previous year's appropriations 75
The 1981 budget fared no
better, continuing the
pattern set in 1980.76 To
*

^^

.

a large

degree, the federal budget
looked exactly as it had
before
ZBB procedures were adopted.
No one could argue with the
fact that ZBB had failed to
cut expenditures significantly
or streamline the federal
government .77

The reasons for the ultimate
failure of zero based
budgeting to achieve the reforms
Carter sought were
apparent to most. indeed, a 1962 study
of budgeting by
the principles used by ZBB in the
Department of Agriculture by Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur
Hammond predicted

many of the troubles the Carter
administration experienced
during the late 1970's.78 For all its
apparent simpli _

74 M emo,

Jimmy Carter to Heads of Executive Departments
and
Agencies, August 2, 1979, "The Administration's
Budgetary
Policy," Box FG-4, WHCF-Federal Government
-Organizations
Jimmy Carter Library.
7 5 H oward Shuman, Politics and the
Budget (Englewood
Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1988), 39.
76 G lenn Pascall, The
Trillion Dollar Budget (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1985), 17-20.
77 "It's a Long Way
to October," Economist 274 (February 2
1980):
29-30.
78 Aaron Wildavsky and
Arthur Hammond, "Comprehensive
Versus Incremental Budgeting in the Department of
Agriculture," Administrative Science Quarterly 10 (May
1965):
321-46.
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city, ZBB was a confusing,
incoherent system Qf
Despite calls for ZBB
reform by the General
Accounting
Office in 1979, the Carter
administration remained
constant in its support of
ZBB in its original form.79
The directives from OMB
were vaguely worded, and
terms
like "decision units,"
central to successful ZBB
procedures, were ill defined, if
at all.

Those who attempted
to adhere closely to the
guidelines found they often had
to consider hundreds, and
even thousands, of decisions
units. 80
addition, the ranking of
programs was accom-

m

plished through a variety of
procedures, not all using the
same standards or system. 81
Even the term "zero basedmade little practical sense to the
agencies charged with
implementing the new plan, since each
agency invariably
used the previous year's budget to
construct the new
fiscal year's requests, with no
other plan or guideline
from the administration linking the
departments of the
executive branch together in an overall
budget plan, managers relied on old habits. 82

79 Ha!der,

"Zero Base," 402-5. Donald Axel rod, Budgeting
for Modern Governrngnr (New York:
St. Martin's Press
1988), 300.
8°Havemann, "The Budget," 130.
81 Schick, "The
Road From ZBB," 178.
82 Thomas Lauth,
"Zero-Base Budgeting in Georgia State
Government: Myth and Reality," Public Administration
Review 38 September/October 1978
420.
Ogden, "Beyond
Zero Based Budgeting," 528. This was most clearly a
problem for social service agencies, as documented by
Campbell, Managing the Presidency 1986, 173-74.
(

)

.
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the end, managers
found themselves called
upon to
justify each p rogr am
request, all on an
inflexible schedule which gave them
little time to organize
and reflect
upon a new set of objectives
for their agenc y .83
Lengthy
bulletins from OMB began to
arrive in agencies shortly
after ZBB fi rst went into
effect, describing
additional

classification retirements for
agency submission by
specifying additional subfunctions
of each agency decision
package.
Thus, the originally
complex instructions
for

ZBB were frequently made
more complex as agencies
struggled to comply. 84 Administrative
"horror stories" began
to emerge almost immediately
under the new ZBB requirements:
One agency reported a 300%
increase in the amount
of documentation needed for
budget preparations, in-

creasing its output of paper from
22,500 pages to a
startling 90,000 pages to justify
478 decision packages
(approximately 190 pages per project). 85
others reported
large amounts of time were spent on
budgeting alone. Gary
Dietrich, the Director of Management
and Operations for
the Office of Water and Hazardous
Materials in the

Richard Watson and Norman Thomas, The Politics
of the
Presidency (Washington, D.C.
Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1988), 308-9;
see also Setting National Priorities:
The 1978 Budget ed. Joseph Pechman (Washington,
D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 382-83.
84 0 MB Bulletin
Number 77-12, Bert Lance to Heads of
Executive Departments and Establishments, "Additional
Subfunctioning Coding of Decision Units," Box FI-8, WHCF
Finance 8/21/77-8/31/77, Jimmy Carter Library.
85 Axelrod, Budgetin
g for Modern Government
1988, 297.
:

,

.
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Environmental Protection
Agency told one interviewer It
tthe ZBB process] was
12-hour days, six or seven
days a
week,
it does take its toll...
taother , taf£
wag
as claiming
spent so much timfl on
^

^

„

lot of other things slipped. "86

^

As a result, programs financed
through ZBB became a
permanent part of the federal
bureaucracy, the opposite

effect ZBB was meant to have
on the executive branch.
Once a program was funded, its
objectives could not be
changed without gravely risking
the entire financial support of the agency. Thus,
managers learned to "play it
safe" and were careful not to
alter programs in their
agencies, sacrificing the goal of
"streamlining"
to cau-

tion.

EPA was widely praised as the agency
making the
greatest effort to follow ZBB procedures,

but it showed

very little change by the end of the
ZBB process.
EPA budget official put it, "If we did

As one

the best job in the

government, I'd hate to see what the rest
of the government did. "87

Carter's plan to reform budget procedures using
zero

based budgeting ultimately had the opposite effect.

As

Aaron Wildavsky and Jack Knott observe:

0b Joel Havemann,

"The Tale of How One Agency Used ZBB And Lived to Tell About It," National Journal 10 (February
18, 1978):
87 Havemann,

268.
"The Tale of How One Agency Used ZBB," 265.
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imagxne one of us deciding
whether to
buy a tie or kerchief,
a simple task
Sk
one might think.
Suppose/ ho
e
rganiZati0nal rules mandate
nr^L°
prehensiveness; we are required comto
alter our entire wardrobe
as a unit
If everything must
be rearranged when
P^Ltem is altered, the probability
xs low that we will do
anything.
Being caught between
revolution
(change in everything) and
resignation
(change
nothing) has little to
recommend it. Yet this is what
a
zero-base, start-f rom-scratch,
comprehensive approach requires.
if one
could actually start from
scratch each
year, the only zero part of
the budget
would be its predictability,
for zerobase budgeting is ahistorical
.. .Everything at every period is
subject to
searching scrutiny. As a result,
calculations become unmanageable.
Figuring out how everything relates
to
everything else or, worse still,
how
other things would look if most
things
were changed, defeats every best
effort.
Consequently, attempts to
apply intelligence to programs
about
which something can and needs to be
done are defeated by mounds of paper.
The trivial drowns out the important*
because if everything must be examined, nothing can receive special
attention. 88

^^

'

,

m

Rather than simplifying government, ZBB guaranteed
complexity;

rather than "streamline" government, ZBB

further entrenched the bureaucracy.

ZBB failed to meet

any of its goals as a budget policy.

pp

°Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky,

"Jimmy Carter's Theory

of Governing," The Wilson Quarterly (winter 1977):
141
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^lassie" Studies

Traditional political science
offers two "classicexplanations for presidential
behavior, as described in
Chapter One.
this section, the "rational
decider" and
"Personality" models will be
applied to Carter's choice
of
strategy for reorganization
and budget reform.
The
"rational decider" model will
be tested by applying the
theory of its proponent,
Richard Neustadt, to Carter's
choices.
Similarly, the "personality"
model will be
tested by applying the theory
of its proponent, James
David Barber, to Carter's choices.
Both explanations win
be found to inadequately
account for Carter's decisions.

m

1.

The "Rational Decider;"

Carter as Calculator

Neustadt's conception of the "rational
decider"
presidency finds explaining Carter's decisions

difficult.

Recall Neustadt's argument that presidents
must consider
the political costs and benefits of each
decision, de-

ciding when to risk the favorable perception of
reputation
and prestige.

Presidents act when the political benefits

of the decision outweigh these costs, thus
enhancing repu-

tation and prestige and increasing the power to persuade.
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Given this understanding
of presidential behavior
one might expect Neustadt
to argue Carter's
decision to
seek reorganization
through a "bottom-upapproach was
shaped by a rational
decision on Carter's part
to attempt
to build a successful
record of reform to maximize
his
influence as a new president.
Certainly administration
advocates of a "bottom-up.,
strategy thought this would
be
the effect.

dress Carter.

However, Neustadt does not
specifically ads

reorganization efforts. 89

Pe ri Arnold doe;
discuss reorganization using
the Neustadt model when
he
argues presidents pursue
reorganization attempts because
such efforts enhance the ability
to persuade. 90
The record shows the opposite
to be the case, how-

ever, when one considers the
Carter example:

Carter's

efforts were a costly expenditure
of political reputation

89 Richard

Neustadt, President- a1 ppwgr (New
york
WU
and Sons, 1980), 212-20 comes closest
to such a discussxon.
90 Arnold, Making
the Managerial Pregidgngg 1986 351-52
Indeed, the structure of Carter's
reorganization effort
closely resembled the recommendations for
success made by
Neustadt;
see Neustadt, Presidential Power 1980
219
Others who adopt the Neustadt model for explaining
presidential behavior openly begin by taking ideology
as a
given;
for example, Barbara Kellerman's discussion
of
leadership begins by presuming presidents have their
goals
in mind before they exercise leadership
techniques;
Barbara Kellerman, The Political Presidency (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), x. These assumptions
separate ideas from action, however, by failing to consider why political beliefs might lead a president to
select certain administrative strategies for action. For
this reason, they also suffer from the defects of the
"rational decider" model.
.

,

#

.
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for very little political
benefit

^ ^^^
a

time, a seemingly
"irrational., political
act. 91

^organi-

zation became a frustrating
exercise for Carter:
although
he did achieve some
legislative success with his
yearly
reorganization plans, the political
cost he paid make them
Pyrrhic victories at best.
Rather than enhance his
reputation, political squabbling,
made possible by the
fragmentation of authority inherent
in his "bottom-up"
strategy, eroded Carter's
reputation as an administrator
who could get reorganization
accomplished. The Neustadt
model cannot account for Carters behavior since it
does
not anticipate the possibility
that presidents may be
drawn to certain administrative
strategies for reasons
other than a "rational" calculation
of costs and benefits,
in other words, the Neustadt
model cannot explain why
Carter would pursue a strategy with
no apparent political
benefit and fraught with political
danger
(loss of the

power to persuade)

-

and that he would do so over a long

Carter's own Georgia experience suggested
these efforts
would fail since he failed to realize his
reorganization
goals at that time as well; Robert Shogun,
Promises to
Keep. (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977), 34,.
Gary Fink, Prelude to the Presid^y (westport:
Greenwood
Press, 1980), 116;
Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, Jimmy
Carter: A Character Portrait (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1979), 199-200. Consider also the resistance
of
Carter's own staff to continuing reorganization plans and
Carter's insistence that they go on; Dennis Riley, Controlling the Federal Bu reaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987), 42; Peter Szanton, Federal
Reorganization: What Have We Learned? (New York: Chatham
House Publishers, 1981), 5.
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period of time. 92

carter' so
carter

»~k,t
objective"
-

appears to be out-

side the bounds of
rationality.
Similarly, one might
expect Neustadt to argue
Carter's decision to streamline
the federal government
and
open the budget process
to political debate
through a zero
based budgeting plan was
a rational decision on
Carter's
part, seeking to build a
successful record of reform
and
maximize his influence as a
new president. 93 Arnold
does
note ZBB was an important
element of Carter's plan,
mentioned in the previous paragraph,
to reorganize government
to enhance his ability to
persuade. Thus, the link between reorganization and ZBB
suggests both were strategies
employed to similar ends. 94

A closer examination of the Carter
record shows this
was hardly the case, however.
Carter pursued a method of
budget reform which failed to achieve
any of
the goals he

set for it, while creating the
political liability of a

growing federal budget and fragmenting
presidential power,
an "irrational" political act by
Neustadt s
standards.

'

The "bottom-up" approach as applied to
budgeting, as with

92 Thus,
t_

I would argue, Carter can hardly
be seen simply
making a mistake in judgement. Although a fine
line
certainly exists between judgmental error and more
selfdestructive actions, it is difficult to excuse or explain
Carter's continued efforts at reorganization as a judgmental miscalculation.
93 Neustadt does
not directly address Carter's budget
plans;
as note 63 mentions, the discussion at 212-20
comes closest to this subject.
94 Arnold, Making t he
Managerial Presidency 1986, 315-16.
.
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reorganization, guaranteed
a variety of parochial
forces
would gain strength as the
ability of the president
to
create coherent, goal
oriented change disappeared. 95
Without a forum for debate
over policy priorities among
the various agencies and
political bodies, the Carter
administration found it lacked any
sense of direction. 96
By 1978, even Carter's own
Office of Management and
Budget
had failed to justify the ZBB
reforms using any objective
standard for success. Despite
this conclusion, Carter
never wavered in his support
for ZBB.
indeed, he even
advocated expanding ZBB through
multi-year plans, putting
even more of the budget out of
his direct control 97 The
Neustadt model thus cannot account
for Carter's budget decisions,
in the end. Carter risked his
power to persuade
on an objective which he appears
to have had no rational
reason to support. 98
.

95 Draper and
Pitsvada,

Wk
Priorities

"

ZBB,

"

78.

9

Vessel, "Zero-Base Budgeting:
Setting National
Through the Ranking Process," Public Administration Review 38 (November /December 1978):
524.
97 Schick, "The
Road From ZBB, " 180.
98 An excellent
example of the problematic conclusion
arising from such an approach can be found in James
Benze,
Jr " Presidential Pow er and Management Techniques
(New
York:
Greenwood Press, 1987), 55-75. Benze attempts to
interpret Carter's actions within a framework of enhancing
power, much as Neustadt argues (although Benze is less
than explicit about using Neustadt s approach). in the
end, Benze must admit to being confused as to why Carter
would pursue "bottom-up" reorganization and zero based
budgeting.
1
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James David Barber's
discussion of Carter places
him
in the "active-positive"
category;
these presidents are
characterized by Barber as
presidents who possess
...an orientation toward
productiveness as a value and an ability
to use
his styles flexibly,
adaptively,
suiting the dance to the music.
He
sees himself as developing
over time
toward relatively well defined
personal goals - growing toward
his image
of himself as he might yet
be.
There
is an emphasis on rational
mastery, on
using the brain to move the feet. 9

Like Neustadt, Barber neglects to
address Carter's reorganization efforts directly in his
discussion of the
Carter presidency. Barber might conclude,
however, that

Carter's persistence in achieving his
goals was the result
of an active-positive president
doggedly trying to achieve
an important goal through a results-producing
method.

The limitations of Barber's single unit of
analysis,
character, is evident when one considers Carter's
reor-

ganization efforts, however.

Those efforts were hardly a

productive activity for Carter.

In fact, Carter's desire

to pursue a failed policy, despite the evidence of
failure

"james David Barber, Presidential Character
(Englewood Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall, 1985),
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.

3rd. ed.

and the counsel of his
closest advisers, reserves
the
behavior of an "active-negative"
president 100 Nor does
Carters "bottom-up" strategy reflect a desire
to pursue
clear goals:
instead, simply allowing
problems
.

to

"emerge" as one attempts to
reform the bureaucracy explains how one will conduct
reorganization efforts but
tells nothing about what is to
be reorganized or why. 101
One might explain Barber's
trouble accounting for
Carter's behavior by arguing Barber
merely misclassif ied
Carter in the character scheme,
that Carter is indeed an
"active-negative," like Richard Nixon.
Barber describes
this personality type as possessing
..a compulsive quality,

as if the man
were trying to make up for something
or to escape from anxiety into hard
work.
He seems ambitious, striving
upward, power seeking.
His stance
toward the environment is aggressive
and he has a persistent problem in
managing his aggressive feelings...
Life is a hard struggle to achieve and
hold power, hampered by the condem-

Carter makes no claims to success in his own biography,
a rather startling fact when one considers the time
he
spent on reorganization; his account presents the Georgia
record instead and focuses on the goal of reorganization
alone.
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam
Books, 1982), 68-71.
10 lMemo, Keith Miles to
Peter Szanton, "The Carter
Reorganization Project." Arnold, Making the Managerial
Presidency. 1986, 330.
Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour,
Politic s, Position and Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), 114-15.
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nations of a perfectionist
conscience 102

Barber provides a rather lengthy
refutation of Carter s
characterization as an "active-negative"
elsewhere in his
book. 103 Additionally/ the
bottom _ upll
'

,.

strategy>

emphasis on transferring the
power to direct administrative reform to the service
level rather than toward
the president, would hardly
seem appropriate to a president who has a character need
to enhance his power.
But
neither classification adequately
explains Carter's behavior.
Rather than simply a matter of
misclassif ication,
the troubles with Barber's analysis
are problems in

methodology, not application.

While Barber's analysis

does move beyond the Neustadt model in
considering reasons
why presidents might choose administrative
strategies

which seem "irrational" (in terms of maximizing
political
power), his analysis of character must rely
on the same

"self-fulfilling" assumption built into the Neustadt
approach.

Barber assumes Carter's goals were those of any

president seeking change, to promote some policy end, and
then uses selected elements of Carter's past to explain

why he chose to attempt such reform.

But as the earlier

analysis suggests, Carter sought reorganization not as a

102 Seidman and Gilmour, Politics,
Position and Power
1986.
inn
luo
Seidraan and Gilmour, Politics, Position and Power
1986, 401-37.

.

,
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means to a policv
icy end hmtbut to a procedural
goal determined
by his political beliefs.
In this sense Barber
looking in the wrong place
fQr dafca ugefui
expiaini
Carterbehavior,
and thus neither of his
s
classifications
can account for Carter's
decision to seek reorganization
through a "bottom-up" strategy.

u

,

^

Although carter-

b

zeal in pursuing budget
reform

would also seem to confirm
Barber's classification of
Carter as an "active-positive"
president, the

effect of

ZBB clearly indicates Carter
was pursuing a failed budget
policy. 104 Indeed/ the „ clear
goaisH sQught
act _^_

^

positives were notably and fatally
missing in ZBB procedures:
there was no political control
over the outcome of
the budget process, no clear
method for achieving budget
reform, and no guide for national
policy. 105 The „ bott omup approach thwarted any attempt on
Carter's part to provide coherence to the budget, and the
vague language in
the 0MB directives establishing ZBB
simply could not pro-

vide clear goals to individual managers. 106

Zero based

budgeting suffered from the same flaws attending
Carter's
other "bottom-up" strategy and, like the reorganization
plan, was precisely the wrong plan for an
"active-positive"

(or "active-negative")

to accept with an unlimited

and unqualified grant of support.

l° 4 Haider,

"Zero Base," 402.
"Zero-Base Budgeting," 524.
l° 6 Draper and Pitsvada, "ZBB,"
78.
105 Vessel,
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Explaining the Carl-Pr Decision.,.

..^ 11rf

The "rational decider" and
"personality" models cannot adequately account for
Carter's decision to pursue
administrative reform by the
strategies described earlier
in this chapter.
This section will attempt
to account for
those decisions using the
"belief systems" model explained
in Chapter One.
By assessing the influence
of political
beliefs on Carter's selection
of reorganization and
budgeting through a "bottom-up"
strategy, this chapter
will argue that a better
explanation for these administrative choices can be discovered.

Most observers have mistakenly
concluded Carter is a
president without any philosophy, a
"pragmatist" who holds
no central beliefs. Carter seemed
to encourage such conclusions by claiming to be neither liberal
nor conservative during his August 23, 1976 campaign
speech at the

Town Hall Forum in Los Angeles:
In the last analysis, good government
is not a matter of being liberal or
conservative. Good government is the
art of doing what is right, and that
is far more difficult.
To be liberal
or conservative requires only ide-
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ology;
to do what is right
require,,
sensitivity and wisdom. 107

A closer examination of
this argument reveals
the «biLas
trap" described in
chapter One: each observer
appli-es a
category (..liberal., or
..conservative..,, uses a
predetermined set of policy
positions to define

that category,

and concludes since Carter
fits in neither category
c:omfortably he must be without
beliefs, mistakenly label.ing
him ..pragmatic.. .108 If one
draws on Carter himself as
the
source for his own ..belief
system," a recognizable pattern
of ..primitive beliefs" emerges
in Carter's speeches and
private papers. Carter does
believe in the simple power
of reason, to be sure, but
this logical thinking
is a

means to a political end, not a
belief (or the absence of
belief) itself,
it is procedure, and not the
particulars
of policy, which captures Carter's
attention. 109

instead,

carter believes that the relationship
between the government and its citizens is the most fundamental
and crucial

factor for the functioning of democracy.

Nearly every

action taken by the government is judged by
Carter on a
l° 7 Jimmy Carter,
A Governm ent as onnd as its P»np 1o (Ne „
York:
Simon and Schuster, 1977), 140.
1 0 8 See, for
example, the discussion in Kandy

Stoud, How
Jimmy Won (New York: William Morrow and Company,
1977),
11-13 and Jules Witcover, Marathon (New York: viking
Press, 1977), 207, 225.
Many mistook Carter's hatred for
ideological "boxes" as an admission of "pragmatism"
without realizing pragmatism is itself an ideology.
Presidential Ca mpaign. 1976 vol. I, 1978, 99-100.
109 Knott and Wildavsky,
"Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 49
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° f b6nefit to i^ividuals, and Carter
consist-

ently argues
themselves

.

governs
HO

must accurately reflect
the people

Many of Carter's speeches
focus on the "people"
and
their importance for
government.
Like Woodrow Wilson, the
needs and desires of the
public, what
is best for the

nation and how government
can best serve to provide
both,
is a constant theme for
Carter and the

most important pro-

blem for government to resolve. HI

included in this service is the importance of
being democratically
accountable
and allowing the people to
make their own decisions 112
As he stated in his inaugural
speech as Georgia governor,
Carter considers the people to
be the most important
source of action for the government:
their active role
gives the government energy and
direction. The sole measure of desirable or effective
political action, Carter
argues, is the effect that action
has on the people
government is meant to serve. H3
.

The link between the government and
the people thus
takes on the greatest priority in Carter's
belief system.
110 Carter, Why Not
the Best?

.

1975,

9.

11:L While

Carter never specifically discussed the intellectual antecedents of his political beliefs,
save an
admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr and Bob Dylan, he
did feel
a sense of kinship to Wilson's beliefs after
reading the
former president's first inaugural address. See
Carter
Keeping Faith 1982, 19.
Mazlish and Diamond, Jimmy Carter; A Character Portrait, 1979, 257.
Presidential Campaign. 1976 Vol I
.

.

822-23.
^Carter, A Gover nment as Good as Its People

1978,
I

-I

-3

153

.

1977,

106.

indeed, Carter describee
that link as "fundamental.,
to
government, one of his ..deeply
held beliefs" that had
characterized his decision making
throughout his life. 114
He argued during the
campaign that this connection
had
been lost, claiming

When government becomes cut
off from
its people, when its leaders
are
talking only to themselves
instead of
addressing reality, then it is
time
for a process of national
selfrenewal, time to look outside
the
existing governing class for
new
leaders with new ideas. H5

Thus, the Carter promise was to
reestablish communication
between the government and its people,
not merely to adopt
a particular set of policies.

According to Carter, the most important
task for
governance is the maintenance of this link,
describing it
as "crucial" to bringing a "closeness
and an intimacy

between leaders who have been elected and the
people who
put them into office. -H6 one of Carter's
often

repeated

phrases, almost a litany,

explains the only way to guar-

antee the government will be "honest, decent, open,
fair
and compassionate" will be to have it reflect the
people.
As president, Carter clearly believed he had a special
1

*t

A

Carter, A Government as Good as Its People 1977, 7-8.
115 Carter, A Government as
Good as Its Peopl e. 1977, 141
116 "Questions and
Answers in Clinton, Massachusetts Town
Meeting, " Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter,
1977 Vol. I, 1978, 396.
.

•

,
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duty to discover and reflect
the people's will.
and Wildavsky explain:

As Knott

e
t0 refl6Ct the
lL°lt
the bestl way to organize P^OPle-s will,
government is
to make it democratic
at the bottom
and centralized at the top.
The President, then, as chief
hierarch and
ultimate definer of the
public interest, leaps over group
interests
through direct contact with
the populace.
President Carter would rather
interpret the inchoate desires
of the
mass of people than bargain
over who
gets what the government offers. 117

As Carter himself explained,

competent.

I

be competent.

"The American people are

see no reason why our government
shouldn't

The American people are fair.

i

reason why our government shouldn't
be fair.

people tell the truth.

I

see no

The American

see no reason why our government

should conceal the truth or lie. "118

Government loses

those qualities, however, when it becomes
distanced from
the people, isolated from their problems
and unresponsive
to their needs. 119

As a candidate, Carter spent a great deal of
time

conversing with the public and, as he claimed, learning

•'Knott and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 63
118 Presidential C ampaign. 1976
Vol. I, 1978, 822.
Carter, A Government as Good as Its People 1977,
Preside ntial Campaign. 1976 Vol. 1, 1977, 407-9.
.

.

.
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from thera.120

Even cynical

^_

Qf

didacy like Jules Witcover
were impressed by Carter's
sincere desire to understand
the needs and wants of
the
Public (Witcover contrasts
Carter- s sincerity to
Lyndon
Johnson and Richard Nixon's
claim to "listen to
the

public- as a cynical means
to getting elected). 121
As
president, Carter's enthusiasm
for this principle occasionally created problems for
his staff:
during a visit
to Clinton, Massachusetts,
Carter buoyantly asked a television and radio audience to
write him personally about
the problems they were experiencing
with government.
one week alone, the White House
was swamped with 87,000
letters, four times the normal
amount of mail handled by
the staff. At one point, some
315,000 letters

m

sat

unopened;

some 20,000-3 0,000 calls were
unanswered,

including calls from members of Congress
and various
federal and state officials. 122 carter
also participated
in an ambitious, if not somewhat amusing,
telephone callin program with Walter Cronkite on March

5,

197 7

(the

questions ranged from queries about foreign policy
to complaints about particular government services).

Carter's

12 0 "August 10,

1977 Interview with Harry Reasoner and Sam
Donaldson for ABC News," Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United S tates, Jimmy Carter. 1977 vol. II, 1978
.

1467
121ju les Witcover, Marathon (New York:
Viking Press,
1977), 210.
This view of Nixon is certainly consistent
with the conclusion in Chapter Two.
x<6<6
Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power (New York:
Viking Press, 1980), 153.
.
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Policy of listening to and
consulting with the peopl.e
was
hardly campaign rhetoric:
the Carter Administration
too*
an active and vigorous
interest in consulting the
public.
in addition, the notions
of •competence" and
"efficiency., are also closely
linked to the people in
Carter's
ideology:
far from mere ..pragmatism."
co^etence is meant
to include a moral element
of responsiveness.
Even the
term "streamlining" is concerned
with opening up the
governmental process to public
scrutiny and not simple
efficiency. As one examination
of Carter's beliefs put
it, "If openness is not a
form of godliness for President
Carter, it must come close. "123
Carter himsel£ olaimed
that efficiency is only meaningful
if tied to democratic
control over administration, claiming
"I don't believe
that the government can be sensitive
to people's needs nor
meet those needs effectively unless
it is administered

well."

m

a campaign speech in South Bend,
Carter

argued government competence requires citizen
participation to tell administrators where problems
exist.

He

suggested direct telephone conversations between
citizens
and the government were the best way to ensure
"competence" in administration (unlike other descriptions
of

1 o "3
x
* J Knott

and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 53
124 "Remarks at a Breakfast
Meeting of the Executive
Finance Committee of the Democratic National Committee,"
Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmv Carter, 1977 Vol
.

I,

1977,

190.
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that term, implying
administrative expertise or
technology) 125
.

Memos concerning reorganization
and ZBB continually
and consistently emphasized
this version of competence.
For example, a memo to
Carter from prp Director p
et tigrew
noted citizen input reaffirmed
"..the Administration
agenda to make government
more competent to deal with
problems identified, emphasizing
the need to improve governments treatment of people. "126
Carter even suggested
during the 1976 campaign that
his political guidance and
agenda came directly from the
people themselves 127 Jac k
Knott and Aaron Wildavsky took
note of this desire for
openness when they examined Carter's
theory of governing
in 1977:
.

Carter's espousal of openness is connected in his own mind with direct
access to the people. Just as he
favors giving the people open access
to governmental decision-making, he
plans, as President, to speak directly
to them.
He values openness "to let
the public know what we are doing and
to restore the concept in Congress
that their constituents are also my
constituents.
I have just as much
right and responsibility to reach the
people for support as a member of Congress does." He also said that he
plans to restore Franklin D. Roose125 Presidential C ampaign.

1976 Vol. 1, 1978, 999-1000;
224-25.
l 26 Memo, Richard
Pettigrew to the President, September 29,
1977.
127p r esidential Campaign. 1976 Vol.
1, 1978, 734-35.
.

.
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velt'a "fireside chat,"
accept "spety
PaSS
"
act as°i^People's

^ts-^rtf

xXS;

-

^W

SPGCial Crests,
Carter says he will go
to the people
eS Cart6r identif iea
himself as
;
the people.
reviewing his expedience with consumer
legislation in
Geor-g ia he said: "The
special interest groups prevailed on
about half
of it.
i prevailed - rather
the Georgia People prevailed - on
the other
half "12 8

Carter^^T^.^

^

m

,

.

Thus,

the greatest priority for
Carter is the establishment of a direct link between
the people and the government.
Absolutely clear channels of
communication must be
provided for democracy to work. 129

The crucial key to this link,
Carter concludes, is
government reorganization, and with
it zero based
budgeting as a tool for communication. 130
whenever Carter
substantively discussed reorganization,
his views were
expressed in terms of government openness
and responsiveness, not efficiency.
in fact, Carter's position on

reorganization during the 1976 campaign repeatedly
struck

°Knott and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 53
129 Carter frequently
referred to reorganization and budget
reform as his "high priority matter [s].» See Memo, Jimmy
Carter to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
June 29, 1977, "Comprehensive Review of Administrative
Services Delivery," [CF, 0/A 28] [1], Box 270, Domestic
Policy Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
130 Presidential C ampaign. 1976
Vol. I, 1978, 736.
.
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this theme. 131

Although matters of efficiency
and
management were often mentioned
during that

campaign,

Carter justified reorganization
on the grounds that it
would bridge the "chasm between
the people and government. "132 That chasm was w dened
by fche confus ng
of government, enhancing the
power of special interests
and further distancing the people.
As Carter explained in
.

.

1977,

I want it [government] to
work, and I
want it to be so that it can be understood by the American people.
I want
to root out the influence of special
interests. .And in a complex, confusing bureaucracy, those who are most
influential, most knowledgeable, are
the ones who can derive unwarranted
privilege or benefit. That's not
.

right. 13 3

Without reorganization, Carter's belief system implied,

government cannot adequately serve its primary communicative function, and would instead communicate only those

messages which advantage special interests.

Carter main-

tained the people would "..always have a voice in our

deliberations as a government itself.

13 4

indeed, the

people were to be more than one voice among other in13 lElizabeth Drew, American Journal
House, 1977), 19.

(New York:

Random

132 Carter, A Government as Good as its People
1977.
13 3 "Remarks at a Breakfast Meeting," 190.
134 Presidential campaign, 1976 Vol. I, 1978, 293.
See
also Johnson, In the Absence of Power 1980, 193.
.

.

,

160

8

terests.

Carter desired .....
partnership between the
People and their governs
and not a bridge that has
to
be crossed nor a wall
that has to
"135
be scaled.

Carter also argued zero
based budgeting had played
a
critical role of facilitating
communication between
government and citizen during his
"Goals for Georgiacampaign in 1971, allowing the
people to outline the types
of programs they desired and
thus creating a standard for
ranking various state decision
packages; Carter frequently related a story during the
campaign

(sounding a
bit like Reagan) concerning
citizen input from the parents
of handicapped children and
the influence their concerns

had over ZBB decisions 136
.

This commitment was reflected

in the central place in the budget
process given to ZBB by

Carter from the start of his administration.

Indeed,

Carter considered public input so important
he planned to
settle disputes over ZBB goals between his
administration
and Congress by consulting public opinion. 137

For Carter/

ZBB was an act of faith, not traditional
budget reform. 13

Taking into consideration the nature of Carter's
belief system, as well as the justification Carter
gives
for reorganization and budget policy, Neustadt would
be

135 "Remarks at a Breakfast
Meeting" 191.
l 36 Johnson,
In the Absence of Power 1980, 21-22, 410-11.
137 Johnson, In the Absence of Power 1980, 419.
Schick,
"The Road From ZBB," 177-78.
.

.

138Michael Babunakis, Budget Reform for Government (Westport:
Quorum Books, 1982), 11.
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better able to account
for Carterk v
carter's„ behavior
and the
failure of the administration
to xive
live up to the
«,
expecta,

t ions

of the public. 139

such an unaerstanding
aisQ

Plains why carter WQUla
adhere
a means of political
the

governs.

^

bagea buaaetin3

^

co^nication between the public
ana

A greater appreciation
for the role of

Political beliefs in this
decision better explains
Carter's choice of strategies.
Similarly, James David
Barber s analysis might
benefit from an understanding
of Carter's belief
-driven
goal of establishing clear
avenues of communication
between the government and
its citizens:
for Carter to
impose a set of reorganization
goals on his efforts (as an

Stephen Skowronek also recognizes
Carter's reorgani
zation attempt as a politically
costly policy; Stephen
Skowronek "Presidential Leadership
in Political Time «
The President and the Poli
t ical gv^en ed. Michael

gt
D C
»===5S==1 Quarterly Press,
19 sT 121-127.
1988),
2ll27 °:v
Skowronek explains Carter's decision
to
e
gan iZati0n aS 3 m° ment in
"Political
t!£*
in
wh
*Zll\l
1C h leadership
,
consists of establishing credibility
in
an enervated regime. To gain a
"credible leadership
posture," carter campaigned on and
organized an outsider's
crusade against the "moral degeneration"
of politics
However, Skowronek' s explanation
goes on to define this
degeneration only in terms of efficiency,
while Carter
clearly considered efficiency a byproduct
of greater
democratic control over government, not an
end in itself
Carter's reform is thus described by Skowronek
in purely
mechanical terms and fails to connect morality
to technical issues. This understanding neglects
the possibility
that the method of reform (the "bottom-up"
strategy) may
contain the moral aspect of government and may
therefore
be a goal in and of itself. Why did Carter choose
this
method and pursue it with such intensity? Skowronek
's
account does not offer an answer to either question.
'

-

:

7
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"active-positive.. might be
expected

fco

^

^^^

Purpose of a "bottom-up"
strategy is to receive
messages
from the public would
make little or no sense.
Past
-conization plans called for chan
ff es which would
come
from government planners,
such as the As h Council,
and not
the public, carter hoped
to use reorganisation
to make
government reflect the public
and not the planners,

m-

deed, any other form of
reorganization would defeat
the
very purpose of reform,
according to Carter's belief
system.
The same argument can be
applied to the budget
Process: a "top-down" decision
making process for budget
Planning would close off the
very conduit for learning
the

priorities and needs of the American
people by replacing
them with those of government
planners. Both reorganization and zero based budgeting
were
critical to the

achievement of career
Carter 'ns nnai
a
goals,
but inappropriate for an
"active-positive" president.
•

Political beliefs explain the decisions
of Jimmy
Carter more completely than the traditional
approaches of
presidential studies and public administration.
As one
understands Carter's central beliefs, one
can also

understand why the strategies of "bottom-up"
reorganization and zero based budgeting were selected.
more,

Further-

the reasons Carter would cling to those strategies

even as the evidence of failure was plainly clear
to both

outside observers and his own staff becomes more understandable when the powerful effect of beliefs on decision
163

-King

is considered.

without this understanaingi

actions of Carter see.
to

mafce

no sense;

^^^

understanding, the exercise
of administrative
better explained.
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CHAPTER IV

BELIEF AND "SUCCESS-"

in the previous chapter,

tht? REAGAN
de.^»„ ~
THE
PRESIDENCY

I

demonstrated the dele-

terious role political beliefs
can often play in decision
making:
led by a strong belief
in the importance of
citizen input, Jimmy Carter
selected a set of administrative strategies which
frustrated his attempts to
reorganize the federal government
and to create a new
budget policy. As Minar noted
in Chapter One, while it is
difficult to prove a belief causes
decisions
to be made,

chiefly because presidents often
provide explanations for
behavior which strike a "pragmatic"
tone, one
can

associate beliefs with decisions by
demonstrating the
influence ideas have over the decision
maker and reexamining the decision in that light.

Certainly this

process is easiest to demonstrate when the
policy decision
has "failed," since the determination of
the decider to
stick to a strategy which creates failure is
difficult to

explain by any other means.

165

A .ore difficult
methodological issue is
raised, however, when the decision
made by a president
leads to
"successful., policy, where
success is defined as
policy

which seems to achieve
the goals the president
sets for
action.
The language of such a
definition is

dependent,
however, on the ..rational
decider., model:
One assumes
••success" has been achieved
when goals are reached,
if
one cannot always determine
what the goals were with
accuracy, however, the
..rational decider" model
can only
assume they existed based on
the end result of the
decision,
it is this difficulty which
confounds discussions
of political beliefs.

This chapter examines one
"successful" president,
Ronald Reagan, and his choices of
administrative strategy
on reorganization and budgeting.
The chapter will argue
that while these decisions seem
"successful," the results
of each decision in fact frustrated
Reagan's apparent
goals.
in other words, Reagan did in fact
get what he
wanted, but he did so by pursuing a
strategy which undermined the explanation and assumed goals
found in the
"rational decider" and "personality" models.

Sections one

and two describe those choices and the consequences
they
produced.

Section three again analyzes those decision

using these "classic" models, arguing that the goals
each
model must assume existed in Reagan's mind cannot account
for the decisions made by Reagan.

The final section will

reexamine Reagan's decisions in light of his political
166

beliefs ana

-

win

^

demonstrate tne

explains Reagan

,

s

celief system" model

behavior<

^

restricted to the
public press and a
. limited
i
number of
memoirs, a opnerai
„
general sense
of nne
the role
mi « ~*
of political beliefs
in decision making
can be traced
K „ ,
aCSd a1
albeit
**** clearly than
„ fc
in the previous
chapters
Pters. as
a« more
m«
material becomes available, a clearer
connection may be
established.
i

•

'

'

.

A.

Reorc gnizinq Admini B hr a .
i Qn

Tne Rpagan

,

Rp^^

Ronald Reagan. commitment
to controlling the
s
federal
bureaucracy. l ike Nixon s
and Carter g>
clear during Ms campaign
for the presidency in
1980.
The
Pride of the Reagan campaign
was the candidates
professed
belief in "conservative
activism:"! a willingness
,

.

^^

^

to present new ideas for governing
while remaining true to
conservative principles.
Reagan ran his campaign on
2
the
promise that he would simpiity
simnlifv the
i-v, 0
government and reduce

lone should note that the
term "conservative" is used
here
y
se whom Reagan believed
^°
Political id
ideology.
The term "conservative" should
!
1
*°*
*
use of the ter^ "ideology;"
instead,
there
is
no shorthm**iway !to refer to Reagan-s
hand
belief system, a full
definition of what is meant by
"conservative" in this
context is offered in section four.
Candidates 1980 (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional
^
Quarterly Press, 1980), 58.

X p£±SSS
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It. size.3

Reagan

,

s

iQaugurai addregs force£uiiy
statea
that ....government is
not the solution to
our problem.
Government
tha problem „ anfl Reagan

U

_

^

bring the legitimate
activities of the federal
government
under tighter presidential
control.

To regain that control,
however. Reagan eschewed
the
traditional tools of earlier
administrations in his
attempt to reorganize the
federal government.

Por examPie, while carter's
reorganization took the form
of
changes in department authority
<guided by the ..bottom-up.,
strategy)
Reagan argued reorganization
itself was a time
,

consuming process which tended
to destabilize government
rather than improve its
performance, clearly, Reagan's

intention was not to completely
dismantle the federal
government as a set of governing
institutions;

instead,

the administration used limited
reorganization plans at
the agency level and rejected
government-wide programs of
restructuring. 5 Even these limited
reorganization efforts
concentrated action solely in the area
of management,
leaving the basic structure of the
federal agencies intact

3james Ceaser, "The Theory of Governance
of the Reagan
Administration," The Reaoan Administration and
the
Governing of America eds. Lester Salamon
and Michael Lund
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1984),
7 9-80
4 Reaqari's
First Year (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1982), 109.
5 Chester
Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal - The Reagan
Presidency: Limited Government and Political Administration," Public A dministration Review 43 (January/February 1983
13
,

)

:
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and a voi di„ g the redrawlng
Qf government
charts "

„

orffanization

.

in place of traditional
reorganization, the Reagan
administration substituted a
plan for the centralization
of the federal government
through the upper levels
of the
executive branch, creating a
"clearing house" for administrative action. Rather than
divesting agencies of
authority, Reagan altered agency
practices to give the
upper levels of each agency and
his own White House staff
a firm hand to control
agency activity. 7 The plan
called
for the careful selection of
loyal cabinet members whose
beliefs were compatible with
those of the president, as
well as the screening of new
appointees for loyalty to the
Reagan agenda, while the Reagan
plan seemed to be a
radical departure from more traditional
reorganization

reforms, Reagan was following a trend
toward the politicization of the bureaucracy which had
been developing

since the late 1960

-s

(although Reagan was adopting a form

of this trend which greatly expanded
his control).

8

In

essence, the federal government would be
recaptured by
6 James

L. Garnett, "Operationalizing the
Constitution via
Administrative Reorganization: Oilcans, Trends and Proverbs '" Public Administrat ion Review 47 January/
Februarv
(

1987):

38.

7 Elizabeth

Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic
State," The Pres idency and the Political Svahftm ed.
Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1988), 383-86.
8 Margaret
Wyszomirski, "The De-Institutionalization of
Presidential Staff Agencies," Public Administration Review
42 (September/October, 1982):
448-458.
169
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9

ending the ..government
of strangers" with
the right
exercise of executive power,
as the critics of Hugh
Hecio
predicted in chapter One.
As Reagan's Director
of the
Presidentiai Personnei Office
put it, ...if you are
going
to run the government,
you've got to control the
people
that come into it."
The task was enormous, as
Reagan discovered upon
taking office. His own
Executive Office had grown
to 1700
employees even after Carter's
radical restructuring, with
an operating budget in excess
of 120 million dollars. 10
One of Reagan ra first acts
as president wag a
freeze on government employment
and the dismissal of many
non-partisan, long-term clerical,
secretarial and other
support personnel from the White
House if their loyalty to
the Administration's program was
at all in question.
As
Martin Anderson claimed, "They [staff]
were treated as

Presidential appointments even when they
were not.

it was

also made clear that, with very few
exceptions, all incumbent employees should be fired." 11

9 James

Pfiffner, "Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy- Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third
Century," Public A dministration Review 47 (January/February 1987
59
10 John Burke, "The
Institutionalized Presidency," The
Presidency and the Political System ed. Michael Nelson
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988)
355-377
1:L
Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 5. Martin Anderson,
Revolution (San Diego: Har court, Brace and Jovanovich,
1988), 199.
170
)
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in addition to these
firings, there were long
delays
in cabinet level
appointments while the
administration

carefully screened the nominees
for their .-ideological"
loyalties. 12 As Laurence Lynn,
Jr ., explains:

The primary qualification
for
ment - overshadowing managerialappointcompetence and experience or
familiarity with issues - appeared
to be the
extent to which an appointee
shared
the president's values and
would be
reliable and persistent both
in transfusing these values into agency
practices and in executing central
directives bound to be unpopular in
his or
her agency. 13

The Cabinet also took on a new role
in the administration, playing an important, but not
leading, role in

policy formulation.

in this sense, the Reagan administra-

tion had an active Cabinet without operating
as a "cabinet-style" government: the Cabinet was to
act as a broker

between elements of the government and was to
coordinate
the implementation of the Reagan agenda, but
would not

serve as a decision making body on its own or apart
from
the President.

4

On the critical economic issues, Reagan

12 Richard Nathan,

"The Reagan Presidency in Domestic
Affairs," in The Reaaan Pr esidency; An Early Assessment
ed. Fred Greenstein (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1983), 72.
13 Laurence Lynn, Jr., "The
Reagan Administration and the
Renitent Bureaucracy, " The Reaaan Presidency and the
Governing of America, eds Lester Salamon and Michael Lund
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), 340.
14 Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 5-10.
,

.
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reserve* decision making
to himself
stration considered the

appoints

c-cia! to the

m

s^ful

^

.

^

of Cabinet officials

implementation Qf

^

this way, Martin Anderson
has argued the
"ideologue-

capture the White House
decision making dynamic.15
By
staffing the Cabinet with
loyal supporters, Heagan
could
have some confidence the
members would not become
-captured" by their individual
departments.
The Reagan plan for
recapturing the bureaucracy
was
also exercised at the agency
level.
Using the authority
Carter had secured in the Civil
Service Reform Act of
1978, Reagan took great care to
appoint a conservative to
head the Office of Personnel
Management.16 This office,
along with the Presidential
Personnel Office, placed its
greatest priority on the selection
of loyal "lower level"
employees.
Pendleton James elevated the
"ideological"
selection of appointees to new heights,
according to many
observers. Although James did consult
with the relevant
Cabinet members when selecting subcabinet
staff members,
15 Anderson,

Revolution, 1988, 164, 157-58. Lou Cannon
argues a better description would speak
of regional
(Californians versus non-Calif ornians or personal
(Nancy's allies versus Nancy's foes) divisions.
See Lou
Cannon President Reagan: T he Role of a Lifetime
New
York:
Putnam and Sons, 1991), 160.
16 Edie Goldenberg,
"The Permanent Government in an Era of
Retrenchment and Redirection," The Reaoan Presidency anri
the Governing of America e ds Lester Salamon and
Michael
Lund (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984)
)
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the final aeolsion
Qn these appointments
restea
-it. House. 17 Onoe appointed;
these reuabiy
members were "blanketed
in „ fcy passing a
series Qf new
civil servioe refQrm
laws fco cQnfer

^

cumbents. 1 ^

^

in-

The new appointees
were exn^t-^
expected to do more than
simPly occupy offices. Re
agan was counting Qn
Pressure on the Cabinet
members to »toe the line.a plan
for control which had
proven successful for
Covernor Reagan in Ca ii£orni a .19 As
Agent ProvooateurS/
appointees were given . greate
r degree of freedom
to act
as they believed fit,
increesing their personel
influence
while altering the agency
for which they labored. 20
if an
agency was staffed by long
tenured employees not loyal
to
conservative principles, the
administration took steps to
"gag., the bureaucrats
by limiting their contacts
with Congress and the press. 21 In
adaition threatened reductlons
in force (RTFs) and transfers
were used to intimidate more
recalcitrant employees. 22
«-

^^^

,.

..

^

,

On balance, the efforts of the
Reagan administration
to bring the federal government
under control were vigor1

7

Anderson, Revolution 1988, 198-99.
SrS/
PreSidency and the Bureaucratic State,"
39?-92
.

^Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic
Affairs,"
Lynn, "The Reagan Presidency and the
Renitent Bureaucracy, " 355-61.
21 Reaaan 's First Y P ar
1982, 25.
22 Sanders,
"The Presidency and the Bureaucratic State,"
.
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3

ous,

far caching, and
remarkably successful
There
little or no dissention
within the early
atodlll!ttitloa
(although this changed later),
according to Martin Anderson, compared to similar
periods in other presidencies. 2
While the new appointees
may not have always
agreed with
policy strategies and
priorities of the administration,
Joel Aherhach and Bert
RocKman compared the
appointees to
those of Richard Hixon and
concluded Reagan's appointees
maintained a higher degree of
agreement with the president
on basic questions of political
belief. 24 Lacking faifch
in traditional reorganisation
approaches, Reagan succeeded
in centralizing executive
power in the white House by
carefully appointing ideological
allies in the bureaucracy
_

and intimidating those who did
not share the administration's set of beliefs. In this sense,
Reagan's reorganization was very different from that
of Carter:
Reagan
required no reorganization plans and
therefore
no "Prp»,

Reagan also required no legislative
authority or acquiescence;
finally, Reagan achieved his

"reorganization"

through political, not structural, change.

For all these

reasons, Reagan created the most politicized
administra-

23 Anderson, Revolution
O

A

.

1988,

200.

Stephen Weatherf ord and Lorraine M. McDonnel, "Ideology and Economic Policy, " Looking Back on the Reaaan
Presidency, ed. Larry Berman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990), 122-155.
174
M.
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tion since Franklin Roosevelt
by changing the personnel,
not the structure, of
administration. 2

During the 1980 presidential
campaign, candidate
Reagan outlined his plans for economic
change along with
his reorganization plans:
simplification and reduction of
the federal government as part of
a pledge
to rein in

spending while providing citizens with
a tax "break" to
stimulate economic growth. 26 while the
details of supply
side economics are unimportant for this
discussion, it is
important to note the central role budgeting was
to play
in the Reagan plan for domestic policy.

Previous presi-

dents had used budget policies to guide resource allocation, but Reagan redefined the budget process in poli-

tical terms.

Indeed, this section will argue the budget

literally became the vehicle for the new "activism. "27

A large electoral college victory helped Reagan claim
a mandate for his "revolution;"

however, the gains made

by Republicans in the Senate were even more important to

^Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 3.
26 Reaqan's First Year 1982, 109.
27 For the best single summary of "supply side" principles,
see Paul Roberts, The Supply Side Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984).
,
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^ ^.

Reagan, s legislative
plans.28

Reagan anfl
sers
realized that action on
the budget would have
to take
Place almost immediately
if D
oniii=,rY 11
u lar =support for
P°P
reform was
to be harnessed. 29 To
=
guarantee his success,
Reagan cenntralized decision making in
the upper levels of
the executive branch (as described
in the previous section,,
f ormulated his economic policy
agenda in a circle of clo
se
advisers, and gave a rree
frpp han^
hand 4-~
to a trustworthy believer
in Reagans econoraic principles, Office of Management
and
Budget Director David Stockman.30
stockman guickiy

yea

^

ized that the only hope for
budget reform lay in avoiding
other elements of the
administration and Congress, including members of the Cabinet.
By establishing a budget
working group, Stockman managed
to completely eliminate
opportunities for obstruction by upper
levels
of the exe-

cutive branch. 31

m

essence, OMB operated without
poli-

28 Hugh Heclo and
Rudolph Penner, "Fiscal and Political
Strategy in the Reagan Administration,"
The Reagan
Presidency: An Early Ass^smpnt ed.
Fred Greenstein
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), 24-25
See also
Nxgel Bowles, The White House and
gagita] Hil] (OxfordClarendon Press, 1985), 219.
29 Laurence Barrett,
Gambling w ith Hishnry (Garden City
Doubleday and Company, 1983), 83-84.
30 Lester Salamon
and Alan Abramson, "Governance - The
Politics of Retrenchment," The Reagan B^orri
e ds. John
Palmer and Isabel Sawhill (Cambridge: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1984), 40-48. Howard Shuman,
Politics
and the Budget (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1988),
249-50.
More generally (and with some exaggeration), see
David Stockman, The Triumph of Polit-.jpg (New York: Harper
and Row, 1986
31 William Greider,
"The Education of David Stockman,"
Atlantic 24 8 (December, 1981): 33; Howard Shuman,
,

.

)

.
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tical challenge within
the Cabinet (with
the notable
exception of the Secretary
of Defense, who was
consent
of Reagan, s
to building up America's
military
Posture,, ana the ..top-down.,
centralists of the administration also precluded
reviews
ews ot
of 0MB
omr recommendations
by
the agencies themselves 32
Administrators were kept as
far away as possible from
the budget process, the
reverse
of the Carter "bottom-up"
approach to budget formulation,
in order to prevent any
further bureaucratic resistance 33
The second key element to
this plan, of course, was
the
reorganization plan described in
section

cogent

.

.

one.

Stockman worked so quickly, in
fact, that Reagan was
able to submit his budget revisions
for FY
1982 a brief

seven weeks after taking office. 34

The new administra-

tion's proposal called for a large
tax cut and sizable,
across the board spending cuts in
every domestic spending
area;

the message also briefly outlined
budget changes

Politics and the Budget (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall
1988), 249;
Glenn Pascall, The Trillion Dollar Bn^
(Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1985), 8.
32 A llen Schick,
"The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential Policy," The Reaaa n Presidency and the Governing
of America eds. Lester Salamon and Michael Lund
(Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984): 91.
Joel Krieger, Reaaan. Thatcher and the Politics of Decline
(New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 184-85.
33campbell, Managing the Presidency 1986, 183-84.
Schick, "The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy," 96-97.
34 R 0 bert Hartman, "Congress
and Budge t -Making, " Political
Science Quarterly 97(Fall 1982), 389.
177
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Reagan would seek over the
next three years.35
Gaining
legislative approval of these
proposals would be difficult, however, as Stockman
and others guickly
realized 36
The "Reagan Revolution"
itself had hardly won a
ringing
endorsement in the fall elections,
and the new administration was guite aware of
the potency of the
political
forces they planned to challenge.
a sense, the only
way Reagan could win the
budget ..game" was to change
the
rules, and he did so by
changing the nature of

m

the budget

reconciliation process created by
the Congressional Budget
and impoundment Control Act
of 1974.
To bypass Congress,
Reagan called for the use of
reconciliation procedures at
the beginning, not the end, of
the budget process, a
legislative "preemptive strike."
technicality:

The move was not a mere

In essence, the administration
had captured

the legislative agenda and excluded
congressional bar-

gaining in the budget process in a single
step. 37

By choosing to short circuit the
congressional budget
process, Reagan hoped to gain the same results
he achieved
by short circuiting his own Cabinet: passage
of
deep

budget cuts with little or no political resistance
and
35 Schick,

"The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy," 102-103.
Reagan's First Year 1982, 27.
36 Greider, "The
Education of David Stockman," 36-39.
37 Allen Schick, Reconciliation
and the Congressional
Budget Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981). See also
Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline
1986, 182-83;
Shuman, Politics and the Budget 1988, 252;
Reagan's First Year 1982, 32.
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^

with Uttt. examination
by hostile agents of
individual
interests.38 ln the

^

^

^

^

Senate passed the fi rst
Concurrent Resolution in
AprU.
and the House passed the
"Gra^-Latta I» bill on May , 39
A compromise version of
Gramm-Latta was passed later
that
month, after only two days
of floot debate .40
The

M11

passed so quickly,
=
Y. in farh
tact, f-*
that
no member knew exactly
what had been cut under
the new compromise. 41
4-

To guarantee the cuts would
remain in place, the
Reagan team shortly realized,
a second round of budget
cuts would be needed and the
earlier cuts reaffirmed.
Within two months, a second
Gramm-Latta bill was proposed
and debated. But Reagan's
advisers were more reluctant to
engage in this particular battle.42
The administration,
flush with its victory in the first
round of budget cuts,
had launched a second legislative
initiative to reform the
Social Security system. Reagan had
readily endorsed the

proposal, having spent years criticizing
the government's
program, but resistance came quickly and
the Congress was
in no mood to compromise after the
early defeat. Reagan
38 Jean Peters,

"Reconciliation 1982: What Happened'" PS
""
XIV (Fall 1981): 732-36. Bowles, The White
House and
Capital Hill
1985, 231.
39 Reaoan 's First Ysar
1982, 33.
40 Hartman, "Congress
and Budget-Making," 389-90.
41 Dale Tate,
"Reconciliation Conferees Face Slim Choices,"
Congressional Q uarterly Weekly Report 39 (July 4, 1981)-'
.

.

1167.
42 Lou Cannon,

Reagan (New York:

334-35.
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Putnam and Sons, 1982)

continued to insist on re for
m for Social Security
even
after his aides persuaded
him that the bad feeling
created
in the first Gramm-Latta
battle had robbed him of
his

earlier coalition, and that
his efforts were better
spent
in securing those first
43
budget
cuts.

"Son of Gramm-Latta," as
the bill was tagged, was
in
trouble as well. Reagan found
that after two short months
his coalition had begun to
collapse, with Democrats or-

ganizing themselves to resist
the administration and supporters resenting the administration's
"short circuit."

As Salamon and Abramson explain,
In short, faced with a
significant
opportunity to forge a moderateconservative coalition in both the
House and Senate behind a program
of

domestic spending constraint and
military growth, Ronald Reagan had
tended to stake out an extreme position, and hold out for the "whole
loaf" when it has seemed clear to most
that two-thirds of the loaf is all the
political system will accommodate.
Although a case can be made that this
represents an effective bargaining
strategy, the costs are considerable
in terms of the staying power of the
administration's policies and the
consolidation of a workable coalition
in Congress.
By 1983, in fact, moderate Democrats in the House felt the
president had cut the ground out from
under them, and even Republican support for the administration had de44
teriorated considerably

43 Barrett, Gambling With History
44 Salamon and Abramson,

.

1983,

154-59.

"Governance," 60.
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:

There is little do ub t
that the political ain
s made
g
in 1982 came at a hi
g h political p rice
Reagan s early
success came h y holding
together . remarkably
cohesive
coalition, hut resentment
over his politicization
of the
budget process forced the
early collapse of that
coalition. 45 By 1982> Reagan
s advisers fcnew
oomprom se
Congress would he necessary,
even if Reagan himself
refused to engage in such
compromise.
The members of the
Reagan team found themselves
in an awkward position:
trying to convince their own
president that the approach
which led to such swift and
far reaching victory
.

.

,

.

in 1981

had now yielded stalemate and
deadlock. Most of the members of congress were angry
that the White House had
usurped a tool Congress had created
to control presi-

dential power to press the passage
of the Reagan budget.
House Ways and Means Chair Dan
Rostenkowski seemed to
summarize the mood of Congress best
when he told his
colleagues

As one who served in Congress through
a succession of administrations,
I
find it genuinely alarming to see a
pattern developing on major pieces of
legislation in which the work product
of the committee system can be cynically discarded in favor of substitute
5 Allen

Schick, "How the Budget Was Won and Lost," Presi
dents and Congres s: Assessing Reaoan's First Y^r
e d.
Norman Ornstein (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), 15-19.
.
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niaeaway.
[the result] leaves
the institution [Congress]
weaker, for it
n
Republlca "s and Democrats
ti
ilt\t°
alike
the opportunity to
write and
take responsibility for
our work product. 46
.

.

The effect of the earlier
decisions was even more
keenly felt in the effort
to achieve the second,
and
perhaps more important, element
for Reagan's budget strategy:
tax reduction, while tax
policy is often
con-

sidered a separate subject from
budgeting, the Reagan
approach linked the two fiscal
elements in a new way.
Aaron Wildavsky explains,

As

President Reagan thought of budgets
as
political instruments. As he saw
it,
Democrats were using spending to
create constituents .. .To prevent
this,
Reagan brought in his children's
allowance theory, namely, the way to
stop spending was not to issue endless
admonitions but to cut down on the
allowance. If you took the tax money
away, Congress wouldn't have it
to
spend.
Believing the budget was about
political economy, not just economic
economy, the president radically reversed the conventional wisdom, which
held that spending had to be cut before taxes could be lowered. 47

^ Reagan's

First Year

47 Aaron Wildavsky,

1982, 35.
"if You Can't Budget,
.

How Can You
Govern?" Thinking About America; The United States in the
1990 s e ds. Annelise Anderson and Dennis Bark (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 269.
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One might expect passage
of a tax reduction
to be a
rather simple matter, as
giving money i s always
more

Popular than taxing money.

True to the description

^

by Salamon and Abramson,
however, the administration
chose
to »go for broke," in the
words of one Treasury
Department
official. 48 Fr esh on the
heels of Gramm-Latta II,
the
administration secured the tax
reduction package on July
But the victory was short
29.
lived, as the economy
failed to respond in the manner
predicted by the Reagan
team.
The "whole loaf," which
Congress had again granted,
began to appear to be a mistake.
Republicans in the
Senate, led by Pete Domenici
as chair
of the Budget

Committee, proposed tax increases
only two months after
the tax package had passed,
suggesting the coalition had
further collapsed and the support
from Senate Republicans
was drifting away from the
administration. 49

By the start of 1982, a cadre of
Reagan's strongest
supporters, including Domenici, Bob Dole
and Paul Laxalt,
were warning Reagan that he could no longer
count on the

support of Senate Republicans and demanding
Reagan accept
a set of tax increases.

Reagan angrily rejected their

proposals, later arguing some in the Senate had
"chickened
a little" but admitting his own advisers were among
those

clucking the grim news. 50

48Barrett, Gambling With History

.

1983,

170.

49 Barrett, Gambling With
History
50 Barrett, Gambling With History

.

1983,

.

1983,

184-85.
338-346.
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Assessing the Reaffan
deoision
shortcut budget prooeaures

is di£ficui

tOrU0

°

f

1981

fiscal policy

e

wiU

««

^

^
^

1—

^

since

effects of this

re-nain a subject
for debate a m ong

POlitic.1 scientists ana
econom ists for see
ti me
ever, few can aeny the
aeficits generatea
budget contributed greatly
to

^

^

^
.

How-

the fiscal crisis the

country races todey.Sl

The

q£

^

^

to debete the „isdom
of Re a g an .s budget,
insteed. the
focus should remein on
the budget stretegy
Rea an

^

g

selected.

The resistance to a second
round of reconciliation,
as well as the political
fallout from a $200 billion
deficit, forced Reagan to
finally agree to meet with
Con-

gressional leaders, the so-called
"Gang of 17," and to
barter for budget cuts with some
tax increases and a
reduction in the amount of defense
spending.
To preserve
the principles of his economic
plan, Reagan had finally
begun to realize he would have
to compromise
on the

details of its implementation. 52

The mere fact that Rea-

gan was willing to trade these
important concessions for
relatively meager budget cuts demonstrates
just how

51 Joseph Minarik
and Rudolph Penner, "Fiscal Choices "
Challenge to Leadership , ed. Isabel Sawhill
(Washington,
D.C.:
Urban Institute Press, 1988), 281.
52 Minarik and
Penner, "Fiscal Choices," 38-9;
Schick,
"The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy, "' 104
105;
Barrett, Gambling with Hist-.ory 1983, 362-63.
.
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damaging the "short circuit"
circuit had been
k„
to congressionalexecutive regions. 53
It would be erroneoug

^

economic program as he did
not reject all attempts
to
compromise on the particulars.
Ironically, those who
argue Reagan was merely a
"pragmatist" ignore the length
of time and the even
larger amount of pressure
from within
his own administration
Reagan had endured to
arrive at
this moment. Arguing Reagan
had "retreated" from his
agenda would be similar to
arguing the South had
abandoned
Vicksburg:
the final result is
captured, but the true
nature of the siege is forgotten.

The new round of budget haggling,
coupled with an
economic recession, tarnished the
image of the unbeatable
Ronald Reagan and contributed to
mid-term
losses in the

1982 Congressional elections for the
GOP. 54

Indee d, by

1983 Congressional resistance to Reagan's
control over the

This conclusion cannot ignore other
factors contributing
deClsion however. Certainly the recession
of
*
^q«o
1982 helped
to speed the demise of the Reagan
coalition in
Congress, as joblessness (as one indicator)
reached a peak
of 9* in May of that year.
Such contributing factors do
not mitigate the argument that Reagan had,
in effect
"burned his bridges" with Congress, preventing
the formulation of more short term and limited compromises
on
budget and tax policy. See the discussion in Jack
Germond
and Jules Witcover, Wake Us When Its Ov^r (New
York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), 33-35 for a brief
summary of these pressures.
54 Jeff Fishel,
Presiden ts and Promises (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985), 151. Heclo and
Penner, "Fiscal and Political Strategy in the Reagan
Administration," 31-33.
'
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budget process resulted
6(1 in
ln the Pronouncement
that the FY
1*84 hudget was „ aead
on arrivai „
conoress _
budget process refined
out of the contrQl
o£
House for the reminder
of Reagan s

^^
^
^^^

^

^

.

Keaga^s decision to
centralize and control the
hudget

Process virtually destroyed
that procedure, costing
hi m
the very success he
sought
in the future. 56

£j

Explaini.no

l-hc

Reagan Pfniaiwu.

"

Classic" gtujj es

As noted in the introduction
of this chapter, one
could interpret Reagans actions in reorganization
and
budget reform as "successes:"
the administration was
"politicized" in the manner Reagan
desired and the budget
process was manipulated to
administration ends. This
section will argue, however,
that these actions were in
fact destructive to what seemed
to be Reagan's goals.
To
do this, an examination of the
"rational decider" and
"personality" models is necessary.

55 John Crawford,

"Budget Standoffs Characterize the Reagan
Years '" Congressional Quart erly Weekly wpp nrM45 (October

24, 1987):
2572.
56 Schick, "The
Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy," 113-14; Fishel, Presidents and Promise
1985,
.
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^^1^

was publlshea before
the Reagan
Presidency began, but
Richard

^

^

earlier editions that
presidential staffs play
an important role in the success
of a president, as
noted in
Chapter Two. The most
recent edition of
Neustadt's work
does little to expand
upon or explain his
advice on this
matter. Earlier, Neustadt
had argued executive
officials
at the cabinet and
sub-Cabinet levels, must be
persuaded
into cooperation, since
the "literary theory

of the Constitution., does not reflect
the realities of presidential
power. 57 As notea ia chapter
Two> hQwe

^

some confusion about Neustadt

•

s

^

^

recommendation for presi-

dential decisions on administrative
policy:
does a
president select loyal staff members,
thus guaranteeing
the efficient exercise of
executive power, or will one run
a dangerous risk, like Nixon,
of having loyal staff members take the president's wishes
"too far?" As Chapter
Two notes, Neustadt believes Nixon
chose badly, but must
reduce his argument to a condemnation
of Nixon's personality to save his theory.

Neustadt

's

treatment of Reagan in the most recent

edition of Presidenti al Power further illustrates
the

problem of the "managerial presidency," to again
recall
57 Richard Neustadt,
Presidential Power (New York:
and Sons, 1980), 29-33.

187

Wiley

s

Arnold's terminology.
SY.

By
Bv fiin««
filling presidential
appoint»ents with of£lcials whQ
are
Reaffan

^

^

s

^^

Neustadt might arffue Reagan
haa fQuna a
auaran _
tee a successful presidency
without the risk Qf
"insecure- personality,
mdeed. the reputation and
prestige enjoyed by a preS
ident among his hand-picked
advisers
would virtually guarantee
the success Neustadt
argues
every president needs.
i
Barbara ir„i
Kellerman
praises Reagan's
actions in 1981 for exactly
these reasons when she
uses
Neustadt 'S framework to examine
the "political presidency."

Kellerman argues Reagan followed
Neustadt'
recommendations to achieve early
success, and was able to
skillfully persuade others to
accept the 1981 budget
through good marketing and
"consummate" political leadership.

58

Neustadt

interpretation of Reagan's decisions
on
the budget describes a president
who simultaneously
's

dis-

played detachment and conviction,
Reagan was "not dumb,

•'

while Neustadt notes

he blames David Stockman for Rea-

gan 's strong commitment to the budget
and tax policies. 5 9
His explanation for the depth of Reagan's
convictions
echoes the Barber analysis once again, however
unwittingly.

Just as Neustadt

's

accounting of Richard Nixon's

behavior ultimately relies on an assessment of person58 Barbara Kellerman,
The Political Presidency (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 220-253.
59 Richard Neustadt,

Presidential Power and the Modern
Presidents (New York: Free Press, 1990), 276-279.
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lity. his explanation
of Reagan
President's reaction to
logical need for their

Us

,

s

<audieaoe

approval

^

^^

oonfidence ig

^

^

a

applause 60
_

^

end, Heustadt's
analysis returns to
. defense of a

successful method which,
unfortunately. has o£ten
used by the wrong
presidents.
*he errors in Neustadt's
analysis sprin ff from
Ms use
of sources as well an
*.u
as h ls0 theory,
particularly when describing Reagan's budget
and tax policies
B
Bv
ei
" AUies
relying
y r
on
David Stockman-s account,
Neustadt .ay unwittingly
adopt
an erroneous view of
Reagan's decisions, while
a more
lengthy description of
Reagan's political beliefs
follows
it is worth noting here
that Neustadt seems to
accept an
image of the Reagan presidency
which is coming under increasing reconsideration,
without access to the
documents
of the administration,
analysis of the Reagan White
House
must necessarily rely on the
later accounts of chief
aides. But uncritical acceptance
of the account of a

m

•

'

young Budget Director with a very
large axe to grind seems
unwise, particularly when that
account is peppered with
sweeping conclusions based on rather
shaky
evidence.

For example, Stockman claims Reagan
had little
interest in economic theory or the
realities of budget
cutting, basing this conclusion on the
absence of detailed

instruction from Reagan and the president's
failure on an
60 Neustadt,

1990,

Presidential Power
273-74.
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a nd

the Modern Presidency ,

••economics test" administered
by stockman .

earlier and i„ the next
section ,
gave such detailed

^^

As notefl both

instruction, confident that
his handpicked loyalists could be
relied upon to find the
most
palatable method for implementing
the principles Reagan
articulated. His strategy for
•reorganization from within" made such instruction
unnecessary, and Reagan never
pretended to possess the technical
knowledge necessary to
get the legislative job done,
while this may reflect a
shortcoming on the part of Reagan,
it can hardly be concluded that Reagan was uninterested
in the economic policy
of his administration.

The second charge raised by
Stockman is more serious,
since it does suggest ignorance.
Again, while
a full

account of Reagan's beliefs must wait,
it is worth noting
that Stockman's test was hardly a worthy
gauge of Reagan's
knowledge. The correct answers on Stockman's
test were
written to conform to the outcomes Stockman
considered
necessary, while discretion could reasonably
be expected
to lead Reagan to different choices.

In other words, the

answers Reagan gave were "wrong" only so far as they
de-

viated from the legislative plan Stockman had constructed.
Thus, Reagan's failing grade may reflect a disagreement
on

the particulars of the legislative strategy, precisely the

aspect of policy making Reagan chose to avoid by selecting

190

Stockman, as well an
•,.
a *
as n,
the
failing
Stockman attributed to
Reagan in the fi rst part
of hig charge>61

_

Neustadt goes even further
in hig
arguing Reagan committed
a second error.
His analysis
stems from a rather lengthy
treatment of the Xran-Contra
affair, and his conclusions
are tainted by the
lessons of
that event. Ne ustadt
argues Reagan's lack of
-relevant
experience- in foreign affairs
and his inability to
access
those with such experience
left him vulnerable

^

to the

activities of North and
Poindexter 62
.

ThuS/ a greafcer

background in foreign policy
would have saved Reagan
from
ignorance about the arms for
hostage deal and the
diversion of funds to the Contras.
interestingly, the only independent
account of the
Reagan administration has emerged
from the investigations
and trials surrounding the
Iran-Contra affair. Although
it is beyond the scope of
this project to assess the
evidence presented in the public
record, it is worth
noting that more complete investigations
are also revising
the image of a "helpless" Reagan.
Theodore Draper's

compilation of the record has clearly
demonstrated the
quite active role played by Reagan in
directing

the over-

tures to the Iranian government.

Confirming the earlier

conclusion about Reagan's involvement in his
administration, Draper does not conclude Reagan actually
con61 Cannon,
62 Cannon,

President Reacran
President Reaaan

.

1991,

153.

.

1991,

308-312.
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cerned himself with the
6 aa
dav
t-«
y-to-day
operations of the
National Security staff.
However, he does argue
Heagan
agreed with the forei n
g policy principles
involved gpoke
with authority and inteili
ge nce at p la nnin
g meetings, ana
Provided a g ood deal more
instruction than the Tower
Commission report had indicated. 63
Axreaay,
Alreadv this
fh
early
Pee, into the operations of
the White House su
g3 ests many
have been underestimating
Reagan's involvement in his
own
administration. It la a safe
leap
ment extended even more
deeply into economic policy,
a
subject of equal or more
importance during the early
administration.
,

-

^

^

Reagan's surprisingly successful
first year in office
would seem to confirm Neustadt
s initial expectations
for
a president who can persuade
his own administration. His
ability to shape the government to
conform to his principles and to alter the government's
thinking on budget
matters seem to support this conclusion,
with a "blitzkrieg" of legislation, government
resources were shifted
away from social spending and quickly moved
to a large

defense buildup, all with little or no internal
opposition. 64

Reagan seems to have managed both changes with

skill, just as Neustadt would predict.

On balance, the

Reagan decisions to "recapture" the executive branch
63 Theodore Draper,

A Very Thin Lin* (New York: Hill -Wang,
1991), esp. 596-98.
64 Schick, Reconci
liation and the Congressional Budget
Process
1981, 389-91.
.
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™

through the politici^-at~* the
poiiticization of
bureaucracy and the
swift alteration
on or
of the
th<» budget
hu*„ A process
seemed to pay off
in presidential success.
-5

,

4.

A closer examination ut
of thf>
cne r«»«=«
Reagan record suggests
the opposite result was
achieved

by the Reagan decisions,

however.

By concentrating solely
on the substance of a
budget which could be enacted
with the swift and monolithic action of loyal aides,
Reagan guickly discovered
that by ignoring the political
structure of budget
politics he experienced disastrous
congressional relations
in his second year in office.
The erosion of
the coa-

lition led to further troubles
in the area of tax reduction, with Reagan stubbornly
refusing to budge on tax
relief until it was absolutely clear
the entire economic
passage was in jeopardy. Reagan's use
of persuasion
rested on his personal appeal, making
coalition building a
secondary concern rather than an important
consideration;
in other words, one element of Neustadt's
notion of prestige had begun to undermine another, just
as Nixon's

administrative strategies had damaged his ability
to persuade. 65

The reconciliation strategy allowed Reagan to

make full and effective use of his powers of persuasion,
but in the end that decision undermined his policy, and

65 Newland,

Abramson

,

"

"A Mid-Term Appraisal," 53;
Governance " 59-60.
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Salamon and

Political victory actually
translate into a losa of
power. 66
The virtual collapse
of the budget process
in 1981
also opened new avenues
of access to a series
of interest
group lobbyists, and
government agencies began
to utilize
the media to compete for
shrinking domestic resources;
Reagan became increasingly
unable to govern as the
momentum for change shifted
away from his administ:ration.67 In the end/ Reagan
fQund h mself iQcked into
a
tense relationship with
Congress, with virtually no
procedure for breaking budget
deadlocks. 68 a new, efficient
budget process had not been
created;
instead, Reagan
merely traded the political power
of a landslide victory
for an early series of successful
votes.
By cutting Congress out of the process, Reagan
alienated that body and
incurred its desire to reassert some
measure of political
control. 69 Politicizing the executive
branch only widened
that gulf.
.

If Reagan did seek to create a more
easily persuaded

executive branch, he was successful to the
extent his
66 John Hoadley, "Easy Riders:
Gramm-Rudman- Hoi lings and
the Legislative Fast Track," PS 19 (Winter,
1986):
30-36.
67 H arold Wolman
and Fred Teitelbaum, "Interest Groups and
the Reagan Presidency," The Reaaan Presidency and thg
Governing of America eds. Lester Salamon and Michael
Lund
(Washington, D.C.:
The Urban Institute Press, 1984), 306308;
Salamon and Abramson, "Governance," 60. Schick,
"The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential Policy," 96,

7

.

ca

DO Salamon and Abramson,

69Newland,

"Governance," 63-4.

"A Mid-Term Appraisal," 53.
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administration presented a unified
front to the politica!
system on issues like budget
reform;
however, choosing to
pursue reform by staffing the
executive branch with
administrators who were loyal to
Reagan's principles
eroded support in Congress and
increased Congressional
desires to reassert its will.
Reagan's seemingly ..irrational" technique for gaining
power to persuade only led
to further erosion of his power
to govern.
Neustadt's
explanation cannot adequately account
for Reagan's decision to govern through a loyal
administration
and to cen-

tralize the budget process.

2

-

"Personality;"

The "Passive-Positive"

w^rp r^

Interestingly, James David Barber describes Reagan
as
a "passive-positive" president

seeking approval, the

passive-positive is characterized as having a low self-

esteem and a superficial optimism.

in addition, the pas-

sive-positive is agreeable and cooperative, although her
or his hopes are particularly fragile. 71

While Barber's

characterization does seem to capture some of Reagan's
personality, it seems ironic that the administration most

/u James

David Barber, Presidential Character 3rd. ed.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 463.
71 Barber, Presidential Character
1985, 9-10.
195
,

.

often described in terms of
confidence, if not arrogance,
would also be described as
approval
-seeking.

Ind eed, the

Reagan administration can hardly
be described as "passive." While Reagan was not,
l ike Lyndon Johnson,
a
cyclone of activity, he clearly
asserted presidential
authority to reduce resistance
to his agenda. 72

Rather than surrender power or
play a passive role in
governance, Reagan placed his
greatest efforts at control
in the beginning of the
administrative process (selection
of staff) rather than at the more
traditional later stages
(such as policy formation or
implementation, areas more

easily reached through reorganization)

.

Although some

accounts of the transition period at the
start of the administration have suggested Reagan passively
allowed his
"troika" to choose the Cabinet, more recent
accounts belie

the story. 7 3

These "Reaganites" created the illusion of a passive

president (or, in more common parlance, a president
"asleep at the wheel") by carrying out the Reagan agenda

with less guidance than was previously necessary. 74

while

Reagan certainly did not involve himself in the daily
decisions of the administration, it would be a mistake to
suggest he failed to direct the administration.
72 Goldenberg,

Although

"The Permanent Government in an Era of Retrenchment and Redirection," 402-403. The Johnson characterization is Barber's at 8.
73 Cannon, President Reagan
1991, 73.
74Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 19-20.
.
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:

the public

^

o£ the

„

passive Reaganu stiu

reality was much more
complicated, as Garry will,
ex .
plains

^

••it is hard to find
a parallel for
Reagan's function, in
government,
business, or any other
organizatlon
he is the indispensable
center, as well as the
symbol,
highly personalized government of his
.Reagan. .not only sells
the product, he
is the product. 75
.

.

Reagan played a unique central
role in his administration,
and misinterpretations of that
role have led some to decry
and others to forgive Reagan's
mistakes.
But as many of
the more recent materials cited
in this chapter suggest
(including Draper, Cannon and Barrett),
Reagan was much
more active and central to his
administration
than earlier

"kiss and tell" books had indicated.

This does not sug-

gest Reagan governed well or in the
same manner as Johnson
or even Carter;
it does suggest Reagan can hardly
be

classified as a "passive" president. 76

A better characterization of Reagan's
approach would
describe a president who is long on principle
but

short on

75 Garry Wills, Reagan's
America (Garden City:
and Company, 1987), 321.
7 6 Barrett

Doubleday

even reports Reagan was quite angry with
Barber's characterization of himself as a "passive"
president. A revealing exchange is found in Barrett,
Gambling With History 1983, 22-24.
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knowledge about the process
an*
a( a n
and fl
details
of governance .77
As Reagan himself noted
in his
.

autobiography,

don't believe a chief
executive
should supervise every
detail of what
goes on in his organization.
The
chief executive should
set broad
Policy and general ground
rules, tell
people what he or she wants
them to
do then let them do it;
he should
make himself (or herself)
available,
so that the members of
his team can
come to him if there is a
problem,
if
there is, you can work on
it together
and, if necessary, fine-tune
the
policies. But I don't think a
chief
executive should peer constantly
over
the shoulders of the people
who are in
charge of a project and tell
them
every few minutes what to do. 7 8
I

Measuring passivity in traditional ways,
by counting
telephone calls to members of Congress

or giving detailed

instructions on legislative strategy, fails
to capture
this side of presidential activity.
By relying

on this

conception of the presidency, many were puzzled
by Reagan:
he seemed to be both the center of a revolution

and asleep

at the wheel.

Thus, Reagan was occasionally compared to

both Franklin Roosevelt and Warren

G.

Harding in the

press, since both characterizations capture aspects
of

Reagan's administration.

77 cannon,

Where one looks for presidential

President Reagan 1991, 47, 55.
°Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York:
Schuster, 1990), 161.
,
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Simon and

activity often shapes
the perception of
"active., and
"passive" characters.
Other interpretations
suggest even this activity
was
manufactured, however. Rea
gan is described as
an actor
who never leaves the
set of his presidency,
a politician
who merely reads the
lines clever handlers
provide. As
noted earlier, this is
reflected in Neustadt's
account of
Reagan as well, while
Reagan frequently relied

on the
skills of his speechwriters,
Lou Cannon recently
argued
this reliance can be
misinterpreted:

Though most of his speeches
were
written by others, many of
them still
reflected the uncluttered
values he
had expressed on the banquet
circuit
for a quarter century.
He thought of
himself as a man of principle,
and he
was difficult to push on
the issues
that mattered most to him.
As president, he was at once the most
malleable and least movable of men. 7 9

The budget record of 1981 also
seems to refute this
characterization. Reagan's greatest and
earliest effort
was to control the budget process,
not passively surrender
it to Congress.
The effort to control came
so quickly,

David Stockman recalled, "We didn't have
time to add up
all the numbers. "80 Reagan's willingness
to allow

Stock-

man a free hand in devising the budget cuts
could be
79 Cannon, President
Reaaan 1991, 35.
80 Greider, "The Education
of David Stockman," 54.
.
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"Pretea

38

*»"

«

to gambie on budget
outs ana

Politics of
year. 81

Ms

Politics,

Ms Bkiu

^

^

hanfliing

^

dealings with Congress
durinj
In either

^

Reagan budget decisions.

Neither

on the

first

^

..classic..

model of presidential
behavior can
fully explain the
administrative choices Reagan
made
during his presidency.
Both models fail to
demonstrate
why Reagan would pursue
reorganization and hndget
strategies which would ultimately
undermine the goals he
seemed to seek as president.
To understand those decisions, one must gain a
greater appreciation of Reagan's
belief system.

~

Ex Plainina the

R^^ n

D ec j

fi

innc

Relief Syst ems"

This section offers a more
complete understanding of
Reagan's selection of his administrative
strategies by
examining the role his political
beliefs played in decision making. Reagan has often been
described as one of

America's most "ideological'' presidents,
the opposite of
the assessment usually given of Carter
and, to
a lesser

Barrett, Gambling With History

200

.

1983,

368.

"

degree, N ixon.82

Arffuments

^

^ o con-

servative principles abound,
however, and a rentable
consistency emerges as one
compares bis beliefs to
those
of Nixon and Carter.
L ike his predecessors,
Reagan was
frequently charged with
inconsistency and political
expediency as critics evaluated
his departures from true
conservatism, others finally
conclude he was ..pragmatic,usually noting Reagan's
complaint that conservatives
outside the administration
seem to want to go "off
the
cliff with all flags flying.. .83
Such debates
the "bias trap,
however, by mistakenly concluding
that
such inconsistencies mean
political beliefs

^

do not exist

(and by erroneously using the
term "pragmatism" to characterize an absence of political
belief). Understanding

Reagan's political beliefs requires
the observer abandon
the category of "conservatism" and
examine the central
principles of Reagan's belief system.

Reagan's early speeches and political
activities
reflect a remarkably consistent set of
central political
beliefs, albeit less clearly articulated
than
those of

Nixon and Carter in their early years.

82 Because

Two themes are

of this description, one has a difficult time

writing about Reagan's political beliefs without slipping
into the language of "ideology." Thus, terms like
"ideological" are rendered in the text with quotation
marks, to remind the reader that the term is often being
used by others to describe what Chapter One defines as
"belief
83 Cannon, President Reagan
1991, 114, 185-86.
.

.
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given expression:

a fundamental hostility
for government

activity, and the importance
of government for
promoting
and encouraging proper
social and moral values.
Reagan's
dislike of government finds
its earliest expression
in hi s
opposition to fascism and communism
as "coiiectivist
Philosophies. Reagan argued that
such philosophies were
inherently undemocratic and
undermined principles of
freedom. 84 Suoh oollectivism>
he

^

failure of such systems in the
future.

Early Reagan

speeches, particularly as
spokesperson for General Electric, also argued individuals
should act without government help, since such help always
led to inefficiency and
bad policy. 85

Reagan's objection to coiiectivist
states did not
rest on abstract discussions of political
philosophy,

however.

The key to understanding Reagan's ant
i- communism

was his belief that such systems undermined
basic social
and moral values. Those values are reflected
in the

common sense of purpose found in families and
communities,
according to Reagan:
You get to know people as individuals,
not as blocs or members of special
interest groups. You discover that,
despite their differences, most people
have a lot in common: Every individual is unique, but we all want free84 Paul Erickson,

Reagan Speaks (New York:
University Press, 1985), 18-21.
85 Reagan, An American Life
1990, 127-28.
.
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New York
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peaoe love
«*
me ' and 3 chanoe
•»
°
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°Ur OWn wayj we
^1
want tL ,t a ° 0< t0
96t ahead
our children
chil„^
\lives better ana »*•
than our

curitv

-

Reagan.

confidence in these
principles as the central
ideas holding together
African society also accounts
for
the sense of African
exceptional which characteri.es
his rhetoric. 86 Suoh
oonfidenoe alsQ aocounts
roots of the Reagan social
and moral agenda. As
Reagan
remarked to the National
Association of Evangelicals
in
s

^^

1983

:

want you to know that this
administration is motivated by a
political
Philosophy that sees the greatness
of
America in yOU/ her people, and
in
your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities - the
institutions
that foster and nourish values
like
concern for others and respect for
the
rule of law under God. 87
I

indeed, it is this character and not
mere military might,

according to Reagan, which accounts for
the success of
American foreign policy as it attempts
to resist

communist

expansion. 88

86 For a fuller
discussion,

1985,

see Erickson,

2-4.

Reagan Spea ks.

87 Quoted in
Erickson, Reagan Soeaka 1985, 157.
88 Reagan, An American
Life 1990, 348, 484-85.
.

.

203

These two central belief* n„v ^
oenefs, linked together,
also
account for Reagan'ss earlv
early fn^.j
flirtation with the New
Deal
and his admiration for
Franklin Koosevelt.
Roosevelt
»
Reagan
admired
the active of the
New Deal ia certain
reaimg
particularly those whion
encouragefl oomnunities
fellies to prosper.89 Reagan
great
autobiography in comparing
his belief in the
proper rQle
of government with
that of Roosevelt,
illustrating his
Point with a wot. £rom the
architeot Qf fche
claimed "Continued dependence
upon relief induces a
spiritual and moral disintegration
fundamentally destructive to the national fiber."*)
Ia Reagan s

^

^ ^

^
^

^

^

,

the New Deal and the Reagan
Revolution share the same
basic aims: government
promotion of social and moral

values and, at the same time,
the limitation of government
activity.
Thus,

like Nixon and Carter, Reagan
argues the sim-

plification of government should be
the central idea of an
administration.
Simplification takes on a different
meaning for Reagan, however, than it
had for these earlier
presidents.

Nixon's belief in simplification meant
the

return of federal programs to individuals,
as well as
s tate and local governments,
where political power would
res t with those who knew their own problems
best.

Carter,

on the other hand, wished to provide democratic
control

"wills, Reagan's America

1987,

.

qa

^"Reagan, An American Life

.

1990,

204

72.

134.

over the federal

governs,

making process the vehicX,
Le

for the exercise of
political power. Un iike
these presidents, and indeed any
other modern president.
Reagan
sought to eliminate government
activity, while in sympathy with Hixon.s confidence
in the individual,
Reagan
disdained the idea of revenue
sharing or block grants;
he
simply did not believe any
government should be involved
in the lives of its people
at certain times. 91
In some

ways, Reagan and Carter
*xxer aorpp
agree that „
government has somehow
failed the American people,
and that some change is
crucial to returning the nation's
well being.
However,

Carter clearly believes improved
communication is critical
to achieving broader democratic
goals, while Reagan
believes government must be simplified
to enable it to
carry out other elements of the Reagan
agenda.

To miss

the second element of Reagan's
agenda, the transformation
of social life through carefully
selected intervention, is
to miss the evangelical side of Reagan.
As Reagan himself

explained to one interviewer during his first
year in
office,

Listen, after you left
I got to
wondering about some things.. What I
should have said to you yesterday was
91 Weatherford and
McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic
Policy," 130. Barrett notes some efforts at a Reagan-

style New Federalism program (although Reagan was loathe
to call it that) in 1981, but it received very little
support from the president. See Barrett, Gambling with
History 1983, 342-44.
,
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that while
I j-eej.
fe*»l as
»e> t
<=
I a
do about th*»
relati0nShiP f
°
statr
state government,
o
i fee i that
those
thxngs that are the
federal govern!
menfs responsibility, we
damn "ell
611
do them [sic] .92

This interpretation of
Reagan-

words also accounts for

s

the centralis of this
belief (Reagan spoke of
this theme
the closing mom ents of
his tenure, standing
in an empty
Oval Office on the day of
the Bush Inauguration)
even as
he presided over the
continued expansion of the
federal
bureaucracy. 93 For Reagan

-

^

^

,

sprang from its misguided
choices of activism, not
efficiency or democratic theory.
In Reagan- s own words,
"..as you look back on that
myriad of new federal programs, ifs hard to find any
that did much good
for the

poor or the nation as a whole. "94
Thus, Reagan's ant i -government
theme encompassed more
than a simple count of government
employees:
government
was the problem because of the role
it was playing in the
lives of Americans, and Reagan wanted
to change that role.
In other words, Nixon changed
government by vastly con-

stricting its scope, creating greater
individual freedom
at the local level of government and
for the
individual;

Carter changed government by opening communication
from
92 Barrett,

Gambling With History 1983, 23.
"Ideology and Economic
.

93 W eatherford and
McDonnell,

Policy," 20-21.
94 Reagan, An American
Life

.

1990,

206

198.

s

.

the "bottom-up- to make
government activity more
democratically responsive,
Reaga n changed government
by
changing its agenda, and
by altering it to become
a more
effective tool for reaching
these new ends. 95
indeed, as noted above,
Reagan is hardly an advocate
of laissez-faire conservatism:
like Theodore Lowi
•

characterization in The End of
Tnberminm, Reagan does not
debate the existence of an
activist state, he merely
wishes to direct that activity
in the arenas of ..good" and
"evil," or over issues of morality
rather than social
service. 96 This re;pjires aotion>

^

inaction<

^

government is the tool which must
be honed and used to
these ends. Garry Wills captured
the evangelical nature
of Reagan's belief system when
he drew this interesting
comparison in 1987:
Jesse Jackson, in fact, more than any
other politician now on the scene,
resembles Reagan. .Both men are believers in the cause they embody, so
that self-promotion and ideological
commitment are fused. Both think,
always, of a way to turn each situation, each event, into a vehicle for
increasing the acceptance of their
message.
Both make claims that are
one-sided, partial, over-simple, but
deeply felt and almost hypnotically
convincing to any listeners not actively determined to resist them.
..They both need to believe they are
.

95 Ceaser,

"The Theory of Governance of the Reagan
Administration," 79-80.
96 Salamon and Lund, "Governance," 6-7.

207

9

selling something far
larger than
themselves, but that the
only way to
do that is through
themselves.
They
carry the message ..
.Neither is the
manager. They look to
others for administrative direction. 97

Thus, any element of
executive power must be
used to
achieve that agenda, and
the power of reorganization
to
make government act in
unison and the power of
the budget
to define and set national
priorities make these strategies primary instruments
for the expression of
political

beliefs.

Government truly is the problem
for Reagan, but
that statement does not
reflect a desire to eliminate
government.
instead, government must be
properly shaped
to make the Reagan social and
moral agenda the policy for
the nation. 98

Reagan's determination to achieve
these goals is the
undertold story of the Reagan White
House,
while others
have noted his determined adherence
to his political
beliefs, that adherence has been
misinterpreted as
"unquenchable optimism."

Confidence in a belief and

optimism are easily confused, as the former
often includes
the latter, and separating the two can
be difficult.

9

Wills, Reagan's America 1987, 323.
"A Mid-Term Appraisal," 45.
"This, I would argue, is the mistake Lou Cannon makes in
his account of Reagan. Cannon himself argues Reagan
was
smarter than many give him credit, and that he had a firm
grasp on the principles of his administration. To dismiss
Reagan's confidence in his political beliefs as mere
optimism seems to sell Reagan short. If Reagan was simply
.

98 Newland,
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Hea gai,s con f i d e nce in
his Political beliefs
below th. surface of his
ot herwise agreeable
emerging at unexpected

^^

times.

This point is critical
for understanding much
of
Reagan-s decision making,
since misinterpreting
the role
of belief in Reagan's
decisions has led to
contradictory
conclusions in many accounts
of his presidency.
For
example, Reagan
s stubborn refusal to raise
taxes even as
his closest economic
advisers argued doing so
was
necessary to close the deficit
can be given two interpretations, one argues Reagan
was foolishly blind to
the
consequences of his decision,
optimistically ignoring the
advice being given by his aides.
This explanation does
not account for Reagan's
willingness to seek out and
accept advice from the same advisers
in other situations.
Either Reagan haphazardly accepted
and rejected advice
from the same group of trusted
people, or he had his own
reasons for maintaining his opinion
on this matter,
if
one argues Reagan lacked political
beliefs and simply did
the politically "rational.. (Neustadt)
or the "agreeable"
(Barber), one cannot explain his decision
to reject this
advice. 100

optimistic, he could be blind to principle, a point
Cannon
goes to great lengths to disprove.
In the end, I would
argue believing one is right in one's beliefs may seem
like optimism to those who do not share those beliefs.
See Cannon, President Reagan 1991, 25, 179.
100 Cannon, President Reagan
1991, 134, 220.
The fact
that Cannon describes this determination as "optimism,
.

.
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Others misinterpret
Reagan- s apparent lack
of
interest in the conservative
social agenda, or his
willingness to trade
support
pport tor
for his
hi a economic agenda by
compromising on certaxn
r^T-t-a-Sr, ~ n
elements of his social
agenda, as
an absence of political
belief
ButBut Reagan made the
economic program his first
tirst prxonty,
nri^- consciously
excluding
social issues, in the
belief that those changes
would
follow f^prn and not come
his budget

p^i^

^

do otherwise, in Reagan's
mind, would be to
-put the cart
before the horse." In fact,
it was the lesson of
the

Carter presidency which led
Reagan to this conclusion:
too much, too soon and with
little attention paid to
prioritizing meant failure and
frustration. 101

Given this system of political
beliefs, it is clear
why Reagan would maintain
that centralizing the decision
making process in the White
House and short circuiting the
normal budget process were
crucial and why Neustadt's
explanation for Reagan 's choices is
inadequate.

Reagan-

chief concern was control over
the administration and
"stubbornness" and "confidence- all in
the same biography
suggests he has failed to distinguish
between the implications of each term.
l 01
Stockman is again the source of this
interpretation of
Reagan s social agenda. Because Reagan
did not broadly
shake up" government in his first two
years, Stockman
concludes Reagan is merely a "consensus
politician" who
lacks a strong ideology. But Stockman's
criticism is
aimed at Reagan's decision not to disassemble
the Social
Security program, a battle he would have certainly
lost
and one which would have eroded congressional
support for
the economic program he wished to advance.
Cannon,
Presiden t Reaaan 1991, 109, 111.
.
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,

Passage of the budget.

Both were political instruments

for change in and of
themselves, not disagreements
over
priorities. 102 Por Reagan
,
budget change
and he found it uirricuit
difficult- to
t-o abandon
a v,„^
his course even when
it resulted in deadlock. 103
with only success on the
agenda important to his political
beliefs in mind, Reagan
could be happy with early
victories in Congress even as he
guaranteed future defeats. 104 B
y pursuing the goal of
budget centralization, Reagan
undermined his control over
the very tool he was trying to
strengthen.
His political
beliefs left him little choice. By
considering the
influence of political beliefs on the
goals of his decisions, Neustadt would be better able
to account for Reagan's seemingly self -destructive behavior.

^

,

Similarly, Barber's account of Reagan's
behavior

would be enhanced by a consideration of the
effect of
these political beliefs. Reagan can hardly be

seen as a

"passive" president, and his unwillingness to compromise,

like that of Jimmy Carter, certainly casts some
doubt on
the wisdom of classifying Reagan as an "active-positive."

In a sense, Barber's analysis leaves us no closer to

understanding Reagan than before.

lu ^Schick,

"How the Budget Was Won and Lost," 42-3.
Ronald Reagan: The Politics of
Symbolism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 71;
Barrett, Gambling With History 1983, 338-9.
l° 4 "Reading Reagan," Economist
286
26March-lApril
1983):
21.
l° 3 Robert Dallek,

.

.
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For Reagan, as for Nixon
and Carter politioal
beliefs shaped his decision
making in ways underappre_

ciated by traditional political
science accounts.
i„
final analysis, all three
..pragmatists" appear to make
decisions guided more by their
belief systems than is
suspected by either '.classicstudy of the presidency.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS, WITH REFLECTIONS
ON THE BUSH PRESIDENCY

By examining the role of
political beliefs in the
decision making process, the
preceding

chapters have
illustrated the often unappreciated
role ideas play in
shaping action. As Chapter One
noted, this study sought a
more complete understanding of
decision making as an
important presidential activity.
it is perhaps wise to
begin by concluding that a more
complete explanation has
been found by examining belief systems,
but by no means is
the "belief" model an explanation
for all presidential
behavior. The model seeks to supplement,
not replace,

current understandings of presidential
behavior by ad-

dressing decisions which cannot be adequately
explained by
dominant theories in contemporary American
political
science

This is clear when one reconsiders the "classic"

models in light of the preceding analysis.

The "rational

decider" model, argued Chapter One, fails to account for
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apparently irrational behavior
by presidents. The
source
of this shortcoming lay
in the methodology of
the approach:
the model presupposed
the existence of certain
goals by assuming that the
goals which the president
achieved or aimed for but
failed to achieve at the
conclusion of policy action were
the original goals of
the
decider.
By making this assumption,
the "rational de-

cider" model created a series
of self -fulfilling prophecies, assuming the goals
existed and then demonstrating their existence by
working backwards from the
conclusion to the inception of
action.
Doing so locked
Neustadt's analysis into a conceptual
difficulty when he
attempted to articulate the proper
activity for a president who seeks to persuade his own
executive branch to a
given policy. As the analysis in
Chapters Two, Three and
Four demonstrated, the only solution
Neustadt could

utilize to save himself from this difficulty
was to blame
the personalities of the presidents involved
for their

failure to correctly utilize his advice.

A greater appreciation of political beliefs
acts as a
valuable guide out of that conceptual difficulty, however.
As the presidential chapters indicated, decisions
made by

the presidents in the areas of reorganization and bud-

geting often pursued goals which sprang from political
beliefs which were unaccounted for by the "rational decider" model precisely because they appeared to be "ir-

rational" by the definition of that model.
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By reexamining

beliefs, one discovers
a way to escape the
"bias trap"
imposed by the assumptions
built into the N eustadt
thesis.
Similarly, the "personality"
model was found to be
deficient in its explanations
of presidential behavior.
Recall the objection raised
in Chapter One centered
on the
"personality" model's susceptibility
to the same "bias
trap", selecting only
certain aspects of personality
to
consider and missing the
interaction of beliefs with the
environment of the decider. For
that reason, the presidential chapters demonstrated,
Barber's analysis consistently failed adequately to
account for presidential

decision making, even as one attempted
to correct his
analysis on its own terms.
The "belief" model could better
account for these
decisions, however, by reexamining this
relationship and

providing a clear understanding of the
role of beliefs in
decision making. By reconsidering the
importance of beliefs, a realm of decision making left
underdeveloped by

Barber's work is demonstrated to direct decision
making in
ways his analysis cannot appreciate.
One important caveat to the conclusions drawn from
the preceding analysis is the important reminder that

while understanding political beliefs is important, it is
not the sole factor in presidential decision making.

No

claim has been made that analyses of political beliefs
explain all presidential action.

Instead, as the pre-

ceding summary indicates, the best one can venture is the

215

statement that belief system
influence decisions, often
in important ways, and
that such influence
can be used to
explain some decisions
which would otherwise be
unexplainable, or at least
imperfectly explained. To
claim more
from the analysis of this
study would be hubris;
to claim
less, however, would be
to ignore the often
dramatic
effect beliefs can have on
decisions.

A second, equally important
caveat, would point out
the limits of the case
studies presented in this
study.
Each sought to better explain
a set of decisions inadequately explained by other models.
None of the chapters
sought to engage in a revisionist
reexamination of the
three presidents they considered.
For example, nothing in
Chapter Two suggests Richard Nixon
did not have an
unusual, even paranoid, personality.
Instead, the chapter
argued that this understanding alone
could not explain

certain decisions made by Nixon on
reorganization and
budgeting.
Similarly, Chapter Three did not seek
to prove
Carter was a completely competent president,
despite

analyses to the contrary.

Chapter Three sought instead to

prove Carter's beliefs account for many of the "irrational" decisions he seemed to make.

Finally, the

intention in Chapter Four was not to prove that Reagan was
a president firmly in charge of all aspects of his
admini-

stration.

Rather, the reexamination attempted to show

that Reagan's beliefs had a greater amount of influence

over decision making than many scholars allow.
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With those caveats in
mi nd, one
usefulness of the ..belief

t , le£t

^

fcQ

TOael for explalning preai .

dential behavior.

-del

It is perhaps vaiuabie
to apply the

to a final e X an,ple in
hopes of sheading see
li ght
on what appears to be
an unexplainable decision
„,a k in
g

system.

While it is still too early
to form firm conclusions
about the Bush administration,
particularly when considering the areas of
reorganization and budget policy,
some preliminary conclusions
may be ventured which
illustrate not only the continuing
need to appreciate the
importance of political beliefs
but also the need to
reconsider political science's
standards for judging
presidential behavior. Information
on Bush is still
largely limited to that which is
reported in the popular
press, with the exclusion of Bob
Woodward's book on the
war with Iraq.l Judgements on the
basis

of this data must

be tentatively stated, but a picture
of Bush decision

making has begun to emerge in a piecemeal
fashion.

This

section does not seek to continue the more
formal analysis
of the previous chapters, but offers some
observations

which suggest beliefs are important for explaining
Bush's
behavior as well.
1 But

this book deals only tangentially with Bush as a
decision maker, in some respects. In fact, one of the
shortcomings of Woodward's analysis is the comparatively
small amount of information on the president. Bob Woodwa rd, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1991)

.
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The Bush administration
began under rather unusual
circumstances. Bush is the
first president since
1928 to
succeed a member of his own
party, and the first
sitting
Vice President since 1836
to be elected to office. 2
More
than mere matters of historical
curiosity, these facts
have done much to shape the
organization of the new Bush
administration. The differences
between the presidencies
of Ronald Reagan and George
Bush are dramatic, and yet
the
public perception of Bush, shaped
largely by his portrayal
in the media, are based on
a standard drawn from Ronald
Reagan's administration (and,
ultimately, Franklin Roosevelt's).
But the peculiar circumstances
of the Bush
transition make such comparisons suspect
and, as Chapter
Four suggests, even misleading if one
utilizes an understanding of presidential behavior which
neglects the role
of political beliefs in decision making.

The most peculiar circumstance of Bush's
administra-

tion may be the continuation of the Reagan
administrative
and budgetary agendas, aspects frequently
ignored by the
media. 3

The general perception of the public primarily

focuses on the apparent "drift" of the administration.

Bush is frequently criticized for lacking a domestic
agenda, for presiding over an administration with few new

2 James

Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency,"
Public Administration Review 50 (January/ February 1990):
64.
J Haynes

Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1991), 439.
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.

ideas, and (by the right,
for surrounding himself
with
less conservative, less
committed advisers. 4 Bush
thus
appears to drift from one
domestic crisis to another,
reacting rather than acting,
and concentrating on foreign
policy to the exclusion of
domestic concerns.
But these images may have
been a consequence of the
more active Reagan first
years. As Fred Barnes

pointed

out early in the administration,

-The problem with being a

caretaker president is that the
press wants more from the
president than that, an expectation
that makes Bush look
weaker than he is. "6 As Bush
functions
ag

^

quo" president, his reputation
and administration remain
hostage to the status quo created by
Reagan. 7 Bush himself professes to be comfortable
with the Reagan agenda,

particularly where budgetary matters are
concerned. 8
asked how President Bush would differ from

when

President

Reagan, Bush rather lamely replied in his
campaign auto-

biography by pointing out the fundamental agreement
he had
with Reagan. Only after making this point did
Bush ven-

ture a few extensions of Reagan policies but no
breaks

4 Kenneth

Walsh,

"Bush's First Quarter," U.S. News and

World Report 106 (May 1, 1989): 24-27.
5 Pfiffner, "Establishing
the Bush Presidency," 66.
6 Fred Barnes,
"Four Bore Years," New Republic 200 (March
1989):
14.
Schneider, "The In-Box President," Atlantic 265
(January 1990)
37
8 George Bush
and Victor Gold, Looking Forward (New York:
Bantam Books, 1988), 8-9, 80-81, 90, 202.
27,

7 William

:
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with his predecessor.

9

The
rne few actual, ^
breaks with the
Reagan administration have
i ar ^i,
been largely
^
oeen
symbolic:
Bush's
family is more visible
(with a

^

from the public,, his work
schedule more
administration more open and,
despite John Sununu, apparently more ethical. 10
As one 8en Qr off
.

^

^

Bush administration succinctly
put it, "We inherited a
situation that was basically
A-OK.
People were happy with
the status quo. No domestic
revolution was about to take
Place, with a few changes here
and
there, the G.O.P.

could rule forever." 1 !
The Bush transition seemed to
reflect these circumstances.
The transition team was
exceptionally small,

particularly when compared to the
organization assembled
by Pendleton James for the Reagan
administration.

in activity,

Limited

the team ignored the type of planning
James

had conducted.

"Ideological" tests were abandoned, as

were the various uses of Civil Service law
to "blanket in"
new appointees and punish malcontents.
Instead, appointees were selected with personal loyalty to
Bush as
the primary qualification, coupled with an
equal concern
for "competency."

As a result, Bush was more likely to

hire career public servants by selecting his immediate
9 Bush

and Gold, Looking Forward 1988, xii-xviii
•••upf if fner,
"Establishing the Bush Presidency," 14;
Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History
— 1991, 442-43.
1L 1L
Michael Duffy, "A Case of Doing Nothing," Time 137
(January 7, 1991): 28.
.

.
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^

cabinet only and allo„in
g each me-fcer to or ani
g
2e her or
his department. Although
Bush
fin
Pr °Tal ° f 311
•«"*»*—:. for hiffiB6l f. the change
signi .
fxcantly departed from the
Reagan approach. 12

^.^

^

^

One mi g ht assume Bush
departed from the Rea an
g
method
of "reoraanization from
within" because that
reorganization had already taken
place, and Bush could
be complacent to simply carry over
the Reagan appointees
into
the new administration.
Surveys
,e'" or
of th«
t
the .™
appointees
find
this was not the case,
however. Only approximately
onethird of the Bush appointees,
at the end of his first
year
in office, had seen service
in the Reagan administra•

tion.^

As far as administrative
personnel were concerned, the new administration
was indeed mostly new.
Thus, the Bush administration
would seem to be

characterized by the basic agenda and
functions of the
Reagan administration, but without
the "ideological-

underpinnings of the Reagan selection
system.

The Bush

team is perceived as less "ideological,"
less conservative, more cooperative and malleable.

The driven Reagan

years seem to have been replaced by the rudderless
Bush
years

.

4

Pfiffner,

"Establishing the Bush Presidency," 67-69.
"Reagan Regime Lives On Through
Appointee's Alumni Groups," Washington Post (August 25,
1989):
A19.
14 Pfiffner, "Establishing
the Bush Presidency," 70-71.
13 Judith Haremann,
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"

This

understand

of Bush, however,

is also in some

measure a product of the
popular perception of
the new
administration through the
prism of the Reagan
year,
:s
Like Bush, Reagan presided
over a Cabinet which
wa<
is a
mixture of "conservative.,
and "pragmatic"

appointees. As
the previous chapter
suggests, these distinctions
are
rather meaningless for
explaining the dynamic of
the Reagan White House, and the
y seem even less appropriate
for
understanding Bush, ah of
the currenfc president
g
closest assistants held
positions of authority in
the
Reagan administration; in
that sense, Bush can hardly
be
said to be playing the game
with a "new team. "15 Indeed
the Bush "conservatives.. Sununu, Thornburgh, Boyden
Gray, James Pinkerton, to
name a few - are unusual in
their ready access to Bush,
reflecting their close ties to
the president and their shared
interest in domestic
policy. 16 Bush is hardly a
"pragmatist " surrounded by
"pragmatists," as he is frequently
described, as distin,

,

Oguished from the Reagan presidency.

Instead, Bush seems

15 "Ready to
Go," National Rpvi.w X LI (January
27,
Haremann, "Reagan Regime Lives on Through
15.

1989)-

Appointees

Alumni Groups
16 For details
and examples, see Donald Baer, "A white
House of Many Mansions," U.S. News and World Rpp nrh
i06
(January 23, 1989):
16-17.
Kenneth Walsh, "George Bush's
Idea-Free Zone," U.S. News and World Rppor^
0 (January
14, 1991):
34-35.
Jason DeParle, "Point Man in Battle
for GOP's Soul Doesn't Worry About Drawing Fire,"
New York
Times (December 18, 1990): B12. Anne Riley Dowd, "How
Bush Manages the Presidency," Fortune 122 (August 27,
.

n

1990):

70-71.
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^^

to have a slmilar mix
Qf
the Oval Office.

^

^^

*he Bush administration
appears to Qperate w±th
beliefs to guide decision
„a klaff . But Bush s
beliefs can he use, to
his decision ma*^.
and
a better understanding
of Bush reveals a
degree of consistency in his decisions
which may escape the
casual
observer. Perhaps nowhere
was this perception and
^perception more evident than
in the apparent -flip-flopBush
did on the issue of raising
taxes during the budget
negotiations of 1990. Bush
seemed to change his mind
several
times during the negotiations
and did not seem to have
a
sense of what goals his
budget proposals hoped to
achieve.
Without those clear goals,
painted in the strong terms
the
"Reagan Revolution" used to
press the first budget cuts,
the Bush administration seems
to drift." Bush seems to
violate Neustadt s advice that a
president persuade others
to a clearly defined set of
goals.
Instead, Bush seems to
have no domestic agenda goals.
.

innate

•

But Bush does seem in agreement
with Reagan's agenda,
as noted earlier,

while this has led some to engage in
a

rather fruitless debate over the depth of
Bush's con-

servatism,^ it is important; to note Bush himself
17 For the
strongest case for this view,
"The In-Box President," 37.
18 Ronald Elving,

is

see Schnieder,

"House Service Set Course for New
President," Congress ional Quarterly Weekly Report. 47
(January 14, 1989):
55-57.
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comfortable with supporting
ana ooatinuing what
Reaaan hafl
started. 19 To understand
the aif£erences
Reagan and Bush presidencies,
and to understand the reasons Bush altered the
practices of the Reagan administration in the areas of
reorganization and

^

budgeting, it
is necessary to look beyond
the record of the administration to the decision maker
himself.

A closer examination of Bush's
political beliefs
begins to shed some light on the
Bush decisions and helps
to explain why Bush altered
the Reagan
selection process.

Recall that Reagan believed the
best and only way to make
government work was to staff his
administration with
appointees who were loyal to his principles
and to press
an economic program in Congress no
matter what the cost.
Bush, on the other hand, seems to
believe the best and

only way to preserve the Reagan agenda
is to create a
politics of inclusion, where potential challengers

are

drawn into the agenda already in place.

Bush seems to

prize the process of connecting individuals and
ideas,
rather than the achievement of policy ends, as the
primary
goal of leadership and the chief motivation for his deci-

sions as president.

Defining this idea in precise terms is difficult,
since Bush himself has failed to articulate it in a single

place and few have reflected on this aspect of the Bush
19..j.

ve Been Underestimated," Time 132 (August 22, 1988):
20-21.
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PreSidenCy
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-

eValUatl ° nS
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-"tion concur, most

° f BUSh

of policy-orienta«tion, as do the
interpretive models o£
Neustaat Ma
Barher: presidents
are pol oy joai
oriented>
^
successful or „ ffooa „
presiaent

^

.

is

model, in that hls
speeohes ana

articuiates

.^^^ ^ ^_

meated with references to
"listening., and ..including .
For example, a good
leader, according to
Bush, is . person
who bargains well, listens
to
opponents, includes those

who are normally excluded. 20

This extends to creation
of

a process which provides
this leadership, where
policy

goals are less important
than an open process which
is
inclusive. 21

While this interpretation seems
to be at odds with
political beliefs, it is in fact
a belief in itself,
although its goals go undefined
and are left to this

process to determine.

m

this sense, interestingly,

George Bush seems to resemble Jimmy
Carter more than he
does Ronald Reagan: both Carter
and Bush were criticized
for being "goalless" presidents,
for being "pragmatists"
without political beliefs. Unlike Carter,
however, Bush
20 Examples of
these positions are scattered throughout
Bush and Gold, Looking Forward 1988, 91-92,
94, 165, 22829, 251-52 with reference to both Reagan and
himself ' (in
.

various positions).
21 Kerry Mull ins
and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Procedural
Presidency of George Bush," Society 28 (January/
February
1991):

51-52.
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s

displays little or no
concern for democratizing
this
Process.
instead, Bush creates an
interesting
amal-

gamation of carter-

confidence in process with
Nixonconcern for community and
state decision making.
For
Bush, being a conservative
means the creation of connections within families,
between families in a community,
between conununities within
nations and, arguably, between
communities of nations. This
theme has been a consistent
belief in Bushes major speeches,
from his first days in
Congress to his current administration. 22
s

This process is assured by
appointing individuals who
can be trusted to remain loyal
to the process.
this,
the reasons for the alteration
of the Reagan selection
process can be better understood,
while the dominant
question asked about Reagan appointees
was "Is she/he with
us?", the important query for Bush
nominees was

m

"Is she/he

a team player? "23

The difference

ifl

gubtle

^

important:

the first question asks for loyalty
to a principle or

policy, while the second asks for loyalty
to a process or

person.

it is this confidence in the people
around him

which makes Bush happiest, as none seek to pull
the

22 Elving,

"House Service Set Course for New President,"
Peggy Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution (New York:
55.
Ivy Books, 1990), 322-23.
23Dowd, "How George Bush Manages the Presidency," 70-71.
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.

Process in . single direction,
apart from the presiflent
24
wishes

,

s

A president whose focus
is on process rather
than
Policy is something new to
modern presidential admini-

stration, and may suggest
these presidents seek to
avoid
the problems of the managerial
presidency noted by Arnold.
Such a president would avoid
directing policy but strive
to guarantee a process.
By doing so, the problem
of
"managerialism" is changed. Rather
than marshal a vast
force to achieve policy ends,
or seek drastic measures to
end the "government of strangers,"
presidents accept the
more limited goal of guaranteeing
avenues of interest

articulation and methods for creating
compromise.

As a

result, even such presidents will
be uncertain as to where
that process will end, even though they
remain an active
and influential element in those
negotiations. But the

perception of the public, as Wildavsky and
Mullins point
out,

is apparent policy "drift," as

..the political system and the processes it requires to make the individual parts mesh with the social
whole thus become crucial reference
points .. .This concentration on form as
substance is Bush's hallmark, and it
explains the purpose in his seeming
lack of purpose. 25
24 Woodward's account of
Bush is revealing in the loyalty
and attention Bush feels for those around him. See Woodward, The Commanders
1991, 47, 57, 245.
25 Mullins and Wildavsky, "The
Procedural Presidency of
George Bush, " 50
.
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Again, it is interesting
to note that the same
paragraph
could have been written
about Jimmy Carter, despite
the
very different definition
of ..mesh" the ..bottom-up"
strategy implied. The ..drift"
of the prp also seems to
be a
function of Carter's acceptance
and belief in a "form as
substance." if Bush does prize
this process, in any
event, it is clear why he
might choose to "flip-flop"
on
budget issues while striving
to preserve a process which
would protect an agenda already
in place. 26 Such a belief
would also explain why the "rational
decider" and "personality" models would have a
difficult time explaining
Bush's decisions, since both models
base their evaluations
on policy goal achievement. A
reconsideration of Bush's

belief system can provide a more complete
understanding of
Bush decision making.
Parenthetically, such an explanation also helps
to

account for the nature of the criticisms of
Bush raised by
conservatives.

Many believe Bush has abandoned the Reagan

path, but hold this belief because Bush has been
less

confrontational, less willing to press the conservative
agenda. 27

In a sharply critical essay, the National

Review editorial board revealingly concluded by writing
"At the midpoint of the presidential cycle, conservatives

26charles Krauthammer, "The Great Cooper at or, " Washington
Post (October 19, 1990): A23.
27 Gwen If ill, "Restless
Conservatives Debate Future,"
Washington Post (December 24, 1990): A3.
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assassin, George Bush.s

Nestle

record find thems elves
about where they should
have expected: hopeful
here and
there and deeply vexed
that they cannot be
more hopeful. "28 By the 8ame
pubUo standara< Bush
faii
conservative cause as well,
but only if one adopts
view that the Reagan
administration is the model for
Bush
to follow.

^

^

The Bush example would seem
to point to a final
conclusion, while the "bias trap"
should make any observer hesitant to offer
presidential "types," the preceding analysis does seem to
suggest two broad approaches
stemming from the influence of
political beliefs on decision making. One approach,
characterized by Nixon and
Reagan, demonstrates that decisions
can be shaped by
"policy" beliefs, with little or no
attention paid to

procedure.

On the other hand, Carter and Bush
seem to

suggest "process" beliefs may be considered
more important
to decision making than policy concerns.
In this manner,

their decisions on reorganization and budgeting
will be

markedly different from those of "policy" presidents.
While these are tentative categories at best, they
do
have certain implications for the study of presidential
behavior.

The "policy" presidents are likely to be mis-

interpreted by the "classic" models since those models are
forced to assume certain gcals exist and can only consider
28 "Bush, At Home and Abroad,"
National Review XLIII
(February 25, 1991):
15.
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"rational" policy ends.

Si mi i arly ,

the

„

process „ pregi _

dents are even more likely
to be widely misunderstood,
since their goals lie
completely outside the realm
of
these -classic" models.
In either case, the
discipline
will be unable to explain
those decisions.

Reconsideration of the three
models presented in
Chapter One reaffirms this
point.

The "rational decider"

model, given its assumption
of the beliefs of the
decider,
can only provide explanations
of behavior based upon the

outcome of the decision.

By this standard, Nixon's
deci-

sion to reorganize the executive
branch to gain political
control for the purposes of
decentralization
is "ir-

rational," as are his persistent
efforts to enact and
expand revenue sharing. Carter's
preference for a
"bottom-up" strategy is "irrational,"
since it undermines
Carter's ability to make reorganization work.
Similarly,

Carter's use of zero base budgeting is an
"irrational"

fragmentation of his presidential power to make
budget

reform work.

Reagan's determination to enact his budget

goals through the use of an executive branch which
has

been "reorganized from within," even as those actions

undermine his ability to maintain those reforms or his
governing coalition, is "irrational" by Neustadt

'

s

standards as well.
The "personality" model suffers from similar shortcomings, based upon its presumptions.

To classify each

president, Barber must assume the character of the presi-
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aent by reading into
the policy outco.es
of each decision
By this standard, Nixons personality should
have led him
to covet power for its
own sake, ..naturally,
leading to
the Watergate affair.
However, Barber-s analysis
misses
Nixon-s goals for his
centralization of power and
revenue
sharing, and reasoning
backward from that centralists
Lon
leads Barber to conclusions
which ignore those goals.
Similarly, Carters decisions to pursue reorganizati<
Lon
through a "bottom-up., strategy
and to create zero base
budgeting assumes each action
was a policy end
in itself,

part of an "active-positive",
character,

when those

decisions began to undermine the
policies themselves,
Barber's analysis cannot adequately
account for Carter's
determination to stand by both decisions.
Reagan's
character cannot explain his decisions
to politicize the
executive branch and pursue budget success
through

politically destructive means, as Chapter
Four concluded.
An examination of the "belief "model,

however, helped

to better explain these decisions.

Nixon's decision to

centralize government and pursue revenue sharing
makes

better sense when one considers Nixon's belief that
individual power is (or, in terms of federalism, local and
state government are) fundamental to the health of American political society.

Carter's determination to continue

"bottom-up" reorganization and zero base budgeting is

better explained when one takes into account Carter's
belief in government as an agent of communication in a
231

democratic society.

Reaga „. s deciaion to

^

^
^

within- and to pur8ue
budget re£orm
when one considers Reagan's
gan s bell
h*-M.«
ef in government as
an
agency for social change,
a
but on±y
uut
onlv at***
after government itself
is retooled for that
change.
•

/

While the "classic" models
offer plausible explanations for presidential
behavior, they cannot offer
complete accounts of all
behavior. The examples in
this
study demonstrate the importance
of understanding political beliefs for decision
making in different contexts
and
in different presidencies.
Certainly political

actors
take actions, in some measure,
on the basis of sincerely
held political beliefs about the
role of government in
shaping the public good. Theoretical
schemes which
attempt to understand those beliefs
through pre-determined
categories of ideology, or through
deterministic understandings of belief like Marxism, may
dismiss the importance of these beliefs for political action.
But this

study demonstrates the importance of those
beliefs for

guiding action, and ignoring those beliefs will
prevent
any scholar of presidential behavior from truly
understanding presidential decision making.
The effect of political beliefs on decision making

may be difficult to demonstrate with direct evidence, but
their effect can be seen in a variety of situations.

While beliefs may not be consistent enough (or widely
held) to constitute a true ideology, and while all beliefs
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must be shaped by the
larger oontext Qf
thought, it would be a
mistake to dismiss belief
as an
important element in decision
making.
Beliefs do not
always play the sole role
in determining decisions,
and
may sometimes play an
unimportant role. However,
at
times, an appreciation of
political Beliefs
k.n.«. is crucial for
wucicai
understanding why and how
presidents decide.
•
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